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This dissertation’s main research questions concern common European principles of 
democracy in regard to religious freedom. It deals with the modern understanding of 
European democracy and is a combination of interdisciplinary research on law, culture, 
politics and philosophy.
The main objective of this research is to identify common European legal 
principles and standards applying to religious freedom and compare them with 
standards and approaches in particular states. The bases for the analysis are the 
principles of equality and achievement of religious pluralism. It approaches issues 
such as the problems of defining religion and the pursuit of religious equality vis-à-vis 
principles of establishment or quasi-establishment of traditional European religions. 
In analytical part it critically approaches the commitment of European countries to 
principles of equality and religious pluralism on examples of selected problematic 
areas. These areas include women’s reproductive rights, problems of blasphemy and 
hate speech and relationships between religion and education. It evaluates the impact 
of various legal regulations in Europe and their influence on religious or non-religious 
adherents. Finally, in the theoretical part the research deals with the sustainable model 
of democracy in the multicultural era. It evaluates the possibilities for extending the 
legal system’s flexibility towards other legal systems, such as Sharia law. Finally, it joins 
more general discussion on European values, commitment of European states to these 
values and further perspectives for European integration on axiological level. 
The analysis shows that currently European consensus and commitment to 
values of equality and religious pluralism lacks consistency. Even “religion” itself is not 
uniformly understood. The question whether the state should remain neutral towards 
doctrines and to what degree has neither been approached with sufficient coherence. 
While traditional Christian religions still enjoy a wide margin of religious freedom, 
even in public sphere, new religious movements or culturally new religions are often 
restrained. Without common commitment to European values, the principle of 
pluralism and equality is bound to be applied selectively. It is important that the model 
of European democracy adjusts to the conditions of religious pluralism. Without 
coherence in application of democratic principles and rights, Europe is bound to be 





“No one who achieves success does so without acknowledging the help of 
others. The wise and confident acknowledge this help with gratitude.” 
– Alfred North Whitehead
Nothing exists in a vacuum and all our achievements are a sum of our 
efforts and help provided by those around us. This book is no exception to 
this rule and finishing it would not have been possible without invaluable 
help of people who were in various ways involved in the process of its 
creation. I would like to thank everyone who in any way contributed to 
this research.
First of all, I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Ari 
Hirvonen for accepting the task of research supervision. He supported 
me both with valuable comments on the subsequent drafts of the book 
and assistance in the difficult process of applying for research financing. 
Furthermore, I would like to thank my reviewers; Professor Lisbet 
Christoffersen from the University of Roskilde and the University of 
Copenhagen and Professor Kimmo Nuotio from the University of 
Helsinki. Professor Christoffersen with her expert knowledge on the 
topic of law and religion provided me with her inestimably important 
comments. Professor Kimmo Nuotio with his crucial and meaningful 
remarks helped me improve the research style and lacks in the first draft 
of this dissertation. Moreover, throughout my doctoral studies he was 
always a strong and indispensible supporter of my research interests and 
helped me sustain faith in the future of this project. 
I would also like to thank my opponent, Professor Zenon Bakowski 
10
from the University of Edinburgh for taking the duty of examining the 
dissertation during the public defence.
I express my gratitude to the Dean of the Faculty of Law of the 
University of Helsinki, Professor Jukka Kekkonen, who agreed to be the 
custos at the defence examination. I also appreciate his support for my 
research activities during my doctoral studies.
I would like to dedicate my special thanks to Doctor Pamela Slotte, 
who in addition to being a wonderful and supportive colleague and 
friend, provided her voluntary help and expertise on the topics of law and 
religion. Her careful reading of the first drafts helped me improve and 
rethink the final shape of this book.
I would also like to express my special gratitude to Doctor Joan 
Löfgren, who undertook the task of language edition. Her careful and 
critical comments helped me express my thoughts in a smoother and 
clearer way. 
Furthermore, this research would not have been possible without 
important input of translators. I want to thank my friend and German 
language translator, Claudia Rehwagen. Her translation of legal 
documents and cases from German was equally important for this 
research as her unconditional friendship and encouragement. I am also 
most grateful for translation from Norwegian offered by Svanhil Aldal 
and analysis of Spanish law provided by my colleague Manuel Jimenez 
Fonesca.
My colleague Jukka Siro with his cheerful and supportive company 
helped me keep my spirits high on those long working days spent in our 
shared study room at the University. I am also grateful for his patient help 
with drafting various documents in Finnish, which I needed to provide 
during the process of writing this book. I also want to thank Samuli 
Hurri for his literature suggestions and interest in my research and Jutta 
Kajander for her assistance with administrative matters.
Furthermore, I would like to acknowledge efforts of Professor Heikki 
Pihlajamäki who supported my search for funding at the last stages of 
writing this dissertation.
And although my parents, Wanda and Bogdan, come only here in 
the list of the acknowledgements, I would foremost like to thank them 
for the effort they put into my educational process and for having always 
1 1
been there for me, whenever life situations disrupted my research process. 
Dedicating a book and a few sentences to you is not enough to thank 
you for all your care, support and simply being the best parents one could 
imagine to have!
I would also like to thank my dear friends for their moral and other 
support at various stages of this research. Ville Sutinen, in addition to 
his professional graphic layout assistance, helped me on numerous other 
occasions with his supportive and constructive attitude. I want to thank 
you for your long lasting friendship, which was an undeniable support 
during various difficult points that I had to face during conducting this 
study. Few people have the privilege of having friends like you. 
Anna Kozar-Poikonen, with her artistic skills, illuminated this book 
by designing this beautiful cover graphic. She has also on numerous 
occasions illuminated dark points in my life with her creativity and 
encouragement.
Special thanks go to my friends Hanna Lyytikäinen, Magdalena 
Jasinska-Nurmela and Sari Vehmaskangas for all those times, when I 
would have given up in the face of adversity, if you were not there for me. 
And last but not least, my most special thanks are dedicated to Marko! 
Without your love, unconditional support and critical and constructive 
comments on this work, I would have never got to the final stage of this 
research. I still do not know how to thank you for all your help, including 
editorial. Thank you for always being there for me, for your patience, for 
bringing me my evening cup of tea to energise me and give me some 
additional strength for writing, and all those times when you helped me 
keep my faith in this project! Again, words do not suffice to express my 
gratitude for your love and support!
Finally, I would like to thank Aili and Brynolf Honkalsalo Fund 
as well as the Research Foundation and Legal Research Fund of the 
University of Helsinki for financial support provided for this research. 
And I dedicate my thanks to everyone else who was in any way 









Part I: Initial Considerations
1. How and by what means? A few remarks on the method .....................................2
1.1. Europe, modern law, hermeneutics and Rawlsian reasonable consensus  
in the context of religion. .....................................................................................................30
1.2. This research among other research on religious problems in Europe ........................... 35
1.3. The kinds of sources used ..............................................................................................36
1.4. Languages ......................................................................................................................38
1.5. Comparison as a background for further theoretical discussion .....................................38
1.6. The method of selecting examples ................................................................................ 40
1.1. The critical approach ...................................................................................................... 41
1.2. The important theoretical constructions ........................................................................43
2. Definitional struggles with problematic concepts .............................................4
2.1. How to understand “Europe” .........................................................................................4
2.2. Democracy as liberal and deliberative democracy .........................................................4
2.3. “Religion” and “belief ” – well-understood concepts beyond definition? ........................ 5
2.3.1. “Religion” as understood in various branches of science ....................................... 5
2.3.2. The terms “religion” and “religious” as used in law ...............................................63
2.3.3. Direct interpretation of the term “religion” in the United Nations materials .......65
2.3.4. Examples from afar: American and Australian approaches  
towards defining religion ..............................................................................................6
2.3.5. European Court of Human Rights and avoidance of the definition .................... 1
2.3.6. The European Union and the lack of definition ..................................................6
14
2.4. Some European definitions ...........................................................................................
2.4.1. The Charity Commissioners on “religion” in light  
of the Charities Act  
in England and Wales...................................................................................................
2.4.2. German courts on the notion of “religion” and “religious”  
– the battle for the recognition of the Church of Scientology  .....................................8
2.4.3. The Spanish Constitutional court and their strategy of avoiding a definition .....
2.4.4. The Dutch Equal Treatment Commission on “religion” and “belief ” ................. 80
2.4.5. Polish and Austrian traditional approach towards “communities of faith”  .......... 81
2.5. Could a definition or a guideline help in European conditions? ....................................83
2.6. Universal or purpose-based definition? ......................................................................... 85
2.. Problems with definitions: flexibility of the legal language and the need  
for preventing arbitrariness ..................................................................................................86
2.8. Guidelines of what kind? Some final observations regarding the nature  
of definitional considerations  ..............................................................................................8
3. The mosaic of Europe: legal problems stemming  
from the current church and state relationships in European countries ........ 1
3.1. The mosaic of Europe – national identities and various churches..................................1
3.2. Europe on religion and equality - the ideal of religiously plural Europe .......................5
3.3. The established state Church in otherwise secular states .............................................100
3.3.1. Legal foundations and historical roots ...............................................................100
3.3.2. The social dimension of establishment countries  
— secularity and multiculturalism  ............................................................................. 102
3.3.3. Establishment and the principle of equality and religious pluralism .................. 105
3.4. The state Church and homogeneous religious population .......................................... 10
3.5. Non-endowment and historical factual endorsement of religious values ...................... 113
3.6. Concordats – the variety of approaches  ....................................................................... 115
3.6.1. From factual endorsement to neutralism ............................................................. 115
3.6.2. Regulating matters of religion by an international agreement ............................118
3.. The separation or French laïcité  ................................................................................. 120
3..1. Legal grounds and historical roots ..................................................................... 120
3..2. Discussion of the French headscarf ban ..............................................................123
3..3. Laïcité and democratic religious pluralism? ........................................................125
3.8. Pluralism and neutralism ..............................................................................................128
3.8.1. Changes on the legal level in the Church of Sweden ..........................................128
3.8.2. The ambiguous nature of the Finnish Church ................................................... 130
3.8.3. Neutrality regulation and the principle of religious pluralism ............................. 131
3.. Democracy and the current setting  
– the religious puzzle as the source of problems  ................................................................133
15
Part II: Critical Analysis of Contemporary  
problems of law and religion in Europe
Introduction ...................................................................................................................138
4. Relationship between religions and women’s rights ...........................................13
4.1. Women’s rights as the foundation of the European polity  
and the complicated nature of reproductive rights ..............................................................13
4.2. Europe’s new commitment to a female’s rights ............................................................141
4.3. Discourse versus practice in the European countries ....................................................143
4.3.1. The situation in Ireland ...................................................................................... 144
4.3.2. The cases before the Supreme court of Ireland that influenced  
the contemporary understanding of the reproductive rights of Irish women ...............14
4.3.3. Open Door and Grogan – Europe’s word on Irish abortion law......................... 151
4.3.4. Malta’s absolute ban on abortion and the state of reproductive health  
and rights .....................................................................................................................154
4.3.5. Reproductive rights in Poland – return to conservative Catholic family  
values as the core of Polish politics between the years 2005-200 ................................156
4.3.6. Catholic values as a political programme ............................................................158
4.3.. Visions of changes in law in regard to reproductive rights and the activity  
of the Parliamentary Committee on Family Matters and Women’s Rights .................161
4.3.8. International community on the Polish situation ...............................................163
4.4. Why are some life-endangering practices less tolerated than others?  
– life-hazardous abortion laws versus condemnation of female genital mutilation (fgm) .. 166
4.5. Religions, religious pluralism and the reproductive rights of women .......................... 168
5. Freedom of expression versus freedom of religion and discussion of the 
essence of democracy ..................................................................................................... 11
5.1. Introduction: the struggle between faith and reason and between faiths ...................... 11
5.2. Older blasphemy and morality cases - the judicial principles of the ecthr ....................13
5.3. Legal critique concerning the ecthr’s judicial principles in blasphemy cases ................ 16
5.4. Silence before the storm - new cases arising after the year 2000 .................................. 181
5.5. The groundbreaking case – the Mohammad caricatures and endangered  
identity of ‘Europe’ .............................................................................................................183
5.6. The new approach and its principles ............................................................................185
5.. Current blasphemy regulations in some European countries  ...................................... 186
5.8. The importance of blasphemy abolition for religious pluralism  .................................. 12
5.. Hate speech bans and religion ..................................................................................... 14
5.10. Hate speech – necessity or another form of limiting speech? ..................................... 1
5.11. Conclusions ................................................................................................................ 201
16
6. Religion and education – between equality and indoctrination ....................203
6.1. The school as an institution of unavoidable tensions between doctrines .....................203
6.2. The complexity of rights involved ...............................................................................204
6.3. The right to education in European and international law .........................................204
6.4. European strategies for education and religion and equity in education .....................206
6.5. Types of religious instruction.......................................................................................208
6.5.1. Confessional instruction and principles of pluralism .........................................20
6.5.2. Multicultural compulsory education and the principle  
of equality and pluralism ............................................................................................ 214
6.5.3. Should religious education be compulsory? ....................................................... 216
6.5.4. Secularism and lack of religious instruction and its influence  
on the principle of equality and religious pluralism .....................................................218
6.6. Other areas where education and religion collide ....................................................... 21
6.6.1. Sexual education ................................................................................................ 21
6.6.2. Headscarves in educational establishments ....................................................... 222
6.6.3. Education for peace/education for citizenship ..................................................226
6.. Securing religious pluralism and equality in education  
– convergent standard under European law? .....................................................................230
Part III: Theoretical Considerations  
of a Democratic Model for Religiously Plural Europe
. Religion and democracy – a constructivist approach ..........................................235
.1. From problems of law and religion in Europe to problems of European democracy ....235
.2. Democracy - secular versus post-secular approaches ................................................... 236
.3. Democracy as a moral conception and a set of values .................................................. 238
.4. Legal principles as fundamentals of liberal democracy ................................................240
.4.1. The principle of equality as the fundamental democratic principle  
and the source of other principles ...............................................................................242
.4.2. The principle of freedom ...................................................................................244
.4.3. The principle of the rule of law as the guarantee of stable democracy ............... 245
.4.4. Other principles as the necessary corollary of equality, freedom  
and the rule of law ...................................................................................................... 24
.5. The role of rights in democracy ...................................................................................250
.6. The role of international obligations in a democracy ...................................................253
.6.1. Rawlsian reasonable consensus as a model for religious peace ........................... 254
.6.2. The concept of citizens as free and equal ........................................................... 256
.6.3. The citizens and doctrines as reasonable and rational .........................................25
.6.4. The overlapping consensus as the essence of the constructivist  
model of democracy ....................................................................................................260
1 
.6.5. Why the political must be separated from the doctrinal .................................... 263
.. The critique of the Rawlsian conception .....................................................................264
.8. The necessary margin of secularity in a democratic state ............................................266
.. Religion and collective rights – the role of cultures and the addendum  
to the Rawlsian conception ................................................................................................268
..1. The role of culture ..............................................................................................268
..2. Private versus public presence as an inadequate measure in discussion  
on religious communities ............................................................................................20
..3. Legal pluralism or one neutral system applying to all? To what extent can  
a liberal democracy allow for different cultural approaches to fundamental values? ... 23
8. Europe’s commitment to democracy and basic values  
in the context of religion ............................................................................................281
8.1. European democracy or European democracies? ..........................................................281
8.2. European Union’s commitment to basic values ........................................................... 283
8.3. European identity? ...................................................................................................... 284
8.4. Can Rawlsian conception be the leading model for Europe  
in search of European identity and religious pluralism? .................................................... 28
8.5. Religious pluralism as a new challenging common principle ....................................... 21
8.6. What kind of Europe do we want? .............................................................................22
Conclusions .................................................................................................................... 25
Bibliography ................................................................................................................... 2
Legal sources ..................................................................................................................... 2
Cases ................................................................................................................................300
Documents issued by nationaland international institutions ........................... 302
Literature ......................................................................................................................306
Press materials and Internet Sources ....................................................................... 315
18
List of Figures
Figure 1: Tuori’s forms of the criticism of the law ................................................................42
Figure 2: Patterns of legal and social secularisation .............................................................8
Figure 3: Correlation of democratic fundamentals............................................................. 23
Figure 4: Correlation of democratic principles .................................................................. 241
Figure 5: The idea of overlapping consensus ......................................................................262
Figure 6: Margin of legal pluralistic adjustment governed  
by the principle of non-derogable rights ............................................................................ 2
1
Glossary
CEDAW Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
 Discrimination against Women 
COE Council of Europe 
CRC Convention on the Rights of the Child
ECJ European Court of Justice
ECtHR European Court of Human Rights
EComHR European Commission of Human Rights 
ECHR Convention for the Protection of Human Rights  
and Fundamental Freedoms
EU European Union
FGM Female genital mutilation
HSE Health Service Executive
LPR Liga Polskich Rodzin (League of Polish Families)
MP Member of Parliament
NGO Non Governmental Organization
NRM  New Religious Movement






The issue of religious resurgence has recently been the subject of interest 
all around the world. Today, traditional religions influence law, culture 
and society with an entirely new impact - and the discussion of the 
clash of civilizations has centred on religious problems.1 As Habermas 
observed, the phenomenon can also be seen in secular Europe, even 
though the extents vary in different countries.2 Europe, however, with 
its complex historical background and various religious traditions, is a 
difficult research ground for the study of the phenomenon. The variety 
of approaches towards religion in Europe is so wide, that Machado dares 
to call it a “potpourri” of different notions of religious freedom, religious 
confessions, equality, laicism, secularism and state neutrality.3 
Against such a complicated background, the legal questions on the 
European level pose no less difficulty. Europe enjoys freedom of religion 
as provided by the ECHR and EU citizens and residents enjoy freedom 
from religious discrimination in employment. Yet, the problems start with 
the very attempt at even defining a “religion”. Europe is not free from 
religious conflict or religiously based problems. In 2006 the Deutsche 
Oper (the German National Opera) in Berlin cancelled performances 
of Mozart’s opera Idomeneo due to fear of offending religious feelings. 
The controversial scene, in which King Idomeneo presents the severed 
heads not only of the Greek god Poseidon, but also of Mohammad, Jesus 
1.  See: Huntington S.P, 1996.
2.  Habermas J., 2005.
3.  Machado J.E.M., 2004-2005.
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and Buddha, was the main reason for the cancellation.4 Other events 
in Europe, such as the crisis connected with printing caricatures of the 
prophet Mohammad in Danish newspapers, headscarf cases in France or 
Germany, or the restrictive and openly pro-Catholic policy of the Polish 
authorities between 2005-2007, all gave rise to questions about where the 
core of democracy and rule of law lie. For me as a Pole, examples from 
my home country’s most recent history constantly provoked questions 
concerning the core and borderlines of European democracy. 
On the other side of the spectrum of the discussion around the 
European approach towards religion appear issues of multiculturalism, 
religious pluralism and safeguarding the broadest possible choice in 
matters of conscience.
This research attempts to outline the relationship among religion, 
politics, culture and law - exploring whether the impact of religion on 
law and liberty can expand without limits. I attempt to balance religious 
and secular interests and offer a democratic model, which would in the 
best way secure both the pursuit of European democratic goals and 
individual religious goals. This dissertation offers a useful combination of 
interdisciplinary research on law, culture, politics and philosophy with the 
primary approach being legal-theoretical. Law is a phenomenon which 
cannot be separated from its social application and the application of law 
is always culturally influenced5. For this reason, the research has been set 
in a wider social context. 
The dissertation is divided into three parts. Part one offers an 
introduction to the legal panorama of approaches towards religion in 
Europe. Part two is analytical, having as its subject particular cases and 
approaches to problems connected with religion. Part three is theoretical, 
drawing upon the previous analysis in order to offer a deeper theoretical 
understanding. 
In part one I first look at the term “religion” and its understanding in 
law. I have used legal documents and case law from different legal cultures 
as well as theoretical works on the subject. I have addressed the question 
if the legal concept of religion is definable and the extent to which its 
4.  Fury as Berlin Opera Cancels Performance, Der Spiegel International, 26.09.2006.
5.  See e.g.: Glenn, H. P, 2004.
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modern understanding in Europe includes atheism, agnosticism, cults, 
non-mainstream religions and modern forms of occult movements. I 
propose a definition of religion that could be universally applicable in 
European conditions and discuss whether such a definition is necessary 
and helpful. 
Secondly, I analyse various legal positions on religion in European 
countries. Initially I address European-wide principles concerning 
religion and religious pluralism and characterise the core of a common 
European standard. Furthermore, I deal with church-state relationships 
and offer a critical analysis of various approaches and their influence on 
the principle of religious pluralism.
In part two, I move towards legal problems of a religious nature in 
contemporary European society and outline the legal implications of 
the chosen case examples. Traditional religious communities still often 
influence the state to penalise or regulate public matters in accordance 
with their beliefs. As a result, non-religious individuals are affected 
and subject to limitations not consistent with their own philosophical 
convictions. I define the use of the term “non-religious individuals” in 
the chapter concerning the methodology employed in this research. If 
regulations based on the religious (or non-religious) beliefs of a “moral 
majority” are passed into legislation, they often create inequality de facto 
although not necessarily de iure. Legislation of this nature is usually 
supported by arguments that refer to more general concepts such as 
“morality” or “social order”. However, in contemporary European 
society notions such as “morality” are still often interpreted exclusively 
as historically traditional Christian morality due to the long historical 
influence of Christianity on understandings of morals and social order. 
At the same time, Europe seems to reject morality as understood in Islam 
and defend its public sphere from its influence. On legal grounds, this 
tendency is evident in the judgments of the European Court of Human 
Rights in head scarf or blasphemy cases, for instance. 
In part two of the research, I concentrate on legal aspects of specific 
conflict areas of religious freedom and other freedoms. As the three topics 
of legal analysis, I have chosen the issues of women’s reproductive rights, 
blasphemy and hate-speech laws, and religious education. This choice was 
primarily dictated by the appearance of a common European approach 
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to these issues. The approach is reflected in the recent interpretive 
documents adopted by the Council of Europe and the European Union. 
The approach is compared with law and its application in countries where 
the national standards diverge from the recognised common standard. 
In part three, I deal with deeper theoretical and philosophical 
questions based on the analysis of law and legal policies conducted 
in previous chapters. I base my theoretical analysis to a large degree 
on Rawls’ theory concerning the co-existence of various fundamental 
doctrines in democratic society. I refer also to Habermasian and 
Dworkinian theories of multicultural liberal democracy and rights. I 
attempt to address the question of what the meaning of democracy is 
when we take into consideration different religious traditions present 
in society. In connection to this diverse picture I discuss the role of 
secularism in democratisation processes. I attempt to assess whether 
secularism and neutralism towards religions are necessary for the 
existence of a democratic state and if so, to what degree. I also evaluate 
whether secularism is incompatible with freedom of religion and how 
far the secularism or neutralism of the state in religious matters can be 
limited in order to secure the best facilitation of freedom of religion. I 
also analyse whether liberal democratic pluralism is the only possible 
democratic model or whether legal pluralism is possible to pursue and to 
what degree. 
I next discuss issues of democracy and its understanding in Europe. 
I evaluate what a common democratic standard means in European 
conditions. I assess the role of rights as an essential part of democratic 
foundations and the instrument of democratisation of the European 
polity. Furthermore, I draw on other fundamental principles and their 
impact on European integration. I then evaluate the commitment of 
European countries to the agreed fundamental principles and values. 
I critically approach the cultural relativism of efforts promoting greater 
religious and cultural pluralism. Moreover, I ask questions about the 
future of European democracy and offer a critical perspective on its 
current development. Finally, I conclude by showing how the case of 
religion illustrates the larger picture of the essential problems associated 
with processes of European integration. 
To understand the problem of religion in modern society and its 
25
influence on law, this research addresses a wide area of problems and 
questions. However, the key questions reoccurring throughout this volume 
are: Is European democracy a secular democracy? Does secularism mean a 
strict separation of religion and the state? Does religious pluralism mean 
only pluralism for traditionally recognised religions? How freely can law 
be influenced by other rules such as moral or religious ones? Does Europe 
need changes in approaches towards religion in order to safeguard the 
peaceful coexistence of religions and avoid a clash of civilizations?





1. How and by what means?  
A few remarks on the method
Legal research is an exceptional branch of science as far as methodology 
is concerned. It is disputed whether legal scholarship actually has any 
method at all - and in case it does not, what makes it a science?6 Tuori 
reproaches legal science for its bad conscience:
“Legal science seems to be constantly plagued by a bad conscience. It 
doubts its scientific status and has an insatiable need to prove, both to 
itself, and to others that it shares the defining features of a scientific 
paradigm. But why? Legal science possesses a particular normativity, 
which separates it from social scientific, such as sociological research 
on law.”7
This dispute is caused by a multiplicity of legal science methods. Whereas 
some researchers like Tuori attempt to classify methods of, for instance, 
critical legal research8, others like Koskenniemi argue that even a style 
can count as a method.9 This research does not aim to take any position 
in the methodological dispute. Like the majority of legal researchers, I do 
not employ a fixed scheme of research methods, as understood in other 
social sciences. Nevertheless, since my approach to the issues discussed 
here has certain specific characteristics, and in discussions concerning my 
6.  For further discussion on methods and/or the lack thereof in legal science, see: 
Häyhä J. (ed.), 1997.
7.  Tuori K., 2002, p 285.
8.  Ibid., pp. 283-322.
9.  Koskenniemi M., 1997.
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work questions on the criteria for selecting the material have appeared, I 
feel obliged to clarify certain issues concerning how and by what means 
this research was conducted. 
The leading themes of democracy and religion as well as the 
spatial setting of this research, being Europe, influenced the choice of 
unorthodox legal methodology. This research cannot be easily classified 
as human rights, constitutional, international or comparative law 
research. It includes elements of all these types of legal analysis but it 
focuses primarily on examples of insufficient commitment to common 
democratic principles in Europe. These examples naturally deal with 
various legal problems from the realm of constitutional, international 
or human rights law. The focus on the insufficient commitment to 
common principles aims at initiating discussion and providing a useful 
theoretical democratic model of the relationship between law and religion 
in increasingly multicultural Europe. It illustrates not only problems 
of religion but also of Europe as a legal and political polity. Therefore I 
attempt to guide the reader gradually from presenting the panorama of 
constitutional problems of regulating religion, through an analysis of the 
double standardisation of approaches towards “traditional” and “other” 
religions, to a discussion of the best available democratic models that 
could reduce problems of “otherisation”, double standards or insufficient 
commitment to the common democratic principles of the European 
polity. As the underpinning for the theoretical model, I took a Rawlsian 
model of reasonable consensus, which could serve as the starting point for 
multicultural modification due to its focus on neutrality towards various 
doctrines as well as its striking similarity to the process of building 
common European identity.
1.1. Europe, modern law, hermeneutics and Rawlsian 
reasonable consensus in the context of religion.
Modern law has developed as a mirror of modern society and culture10 
and European law gave rise to what is nowadays considered modern 
10.  Tuori K., 2002, pp. 3-5.
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Western law. The leading feature of modern law is its positivity11. 
This positivity means primarily that law is a system of rules created by 
human action and in large degree separated from morals. Modern 
law is not perceived as a reflection of higher moral norms of divine or 
other supreme origin. It is instead a logical structure, which needs to 
have legitimacy and coherence12. Traditional positivism, attempting to 
find the legitimacy of rules and norms in its hierarchical structure has, 
however, been criticised due to its potential to fall into formalism and 
totalitarianism13. Hermeneutic jurisprudence, while criticizing positivism, 
still attempts to ensure the coherence of the legal system14. Unlike natural 
law theoreticians, who seek external validation of the legal order, modern 
liberal democratic thinkers do not look for its legitimacy in any extralegal 
sources. Instead, they approach law rather as a certain coherent unity and 
look for its legitimacy and coherence in its own integrity. Dworkin, for 
instance, in his hermeneutical approach, treats law as integrity and claims 
that the object of law not only consists of rules but also principles15. 
These principles do not, however, stem from a basic norm or rule, like in 
classical positivism. The object of law is identified by bringing to light its 
underlying principles, which are shaped in the process of its application 
and interpretation. In Warrington’s words, following the Dworkinian 
hermeneutic approach:
“The law is approached as a seamless semantic tissue that is woven 
together inextricably and expands harmoniously as its principles are 
applied to new contexts. At each particular point in time this textual 
fabric is complete and closed.”16
Law cannot be interpreted by selective application of rules but instead 
11.  Ibid., pp. 5-8.
12.  For different ways of explaining legitimacy and coherence in positivist theory, 
compare for instance Kelsen’s Grundnorm or Hart’s distinction between primary or 
secondary rules in: Kelsen, H., 1960 or Hart H.L.A., 1961.
13.  E.g. Tuori K., 2002, pp.15-21 .
14.  Douzinas C., Warrington R,, McVeigh S., 1991, pp. 22-28.
15.  See: Dworkin R., 1885, Dworkin R., 1986, or Dworkin R., 1978.
16.  Douzinas C., Warrington R,, McVeigh S., 1991, p 57.
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as integrity based on master principles, which in Dworkin’s case are 
primarily principles of equal concern and respect.17 Similarly Rawls, 
whose theory is taken as the underpinning for the theoretical approach of 
this research, offers a model of interpretation of the law, which recourses 
to certain principles that citizens agreed upon and which create a 
reasonable consensus under which a society has agreed to live. Therefore, 
individual legal rules must be interpreted in light of these principles.
Tuori distinguishes three levels of the law. Law on the surface consists 
of changeable norms:
”At the surface level, the legal order assumes the form of linguistically 
expressed norms. Although its contents are in a continuous flux, the 
surface-level legal order can be delineated through fairly unequivocal 
criteria of formal legal validity; (…). But all in all, the major part of 
the surface-level legal order, that which the judges and other officials 
apply in routine cases, is relatively easy and reliably identifiable”18.
Law on its middle level consists of legal culture, which has an important 
role in interpretation of the norms. Law in its deep structure consists of 
basic categories and fundamental principles.19 Law in its deep structure 
is similar in majority of legal systems. In regard to legitimacy of the 
surface level norms, Tuori distinguishes various forms of legitimacy. One 
of them is justifiability. From the point of view of justifiability, modern 
law is normatively legitimate, if and only if it can be justified through the 
principles of subsurface level20. 
In this research I approach law in a similar manner. I treat the legal 
order in Europe as an integral whole based on common legal principles. 
Although in Europe rules and principles are created at various levels – 
national, international and domestic, common principles can be identified. 
Many individual legal rules and their application contradict one another. 
Differences, contradictions and conflicts between domestic law rules 
17.  Ibid., p 57.
18.  Tuori K., 2002, p 193
19.  Ibid., pp. 193-194
20.  Ibid., p 245.
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themselves and domestic and European rules are, however, gradually 
reduced through processes of supranationalisation of the European Union 
and the Council of Europe. This supranationalisation leads to greater 
harmonisation of domestic laws in the member states in various legal 
areas, including those dealing with understandings of democracy, religion 
and multicultural coexistence. This harmonisation happens both through 
legally binding instruments, like international treaties or EU directives, 
and case-law or interpretative documents, which aim to promote a 
common democratic approach. As the basis for formulating common 
standards in the process of supranational harmonisation, European 
institutions, courts and member state organs invoke common European 
legal democratic principles. The 2000 Employment Equality Directive 
as well as broad case law of the European Court of Justice concerning 
gender equality in employment illustrates how a common principle of 
equality leads to the creation of harmonising rules applicable throughout 
Europe. In the fragmented and complicated landscape of legal rules in 
Europe, democratic principles encoded in common treaties or the case 
law of European courts constitute the common basis of the democratic 
legitimacy of the law. In this research, law in Europe is treated as a 
coherent legal unity and the legitimacy of the law is sought in common 
democratic principles encoded in various legal and interpretative sources 
drafted at the European level. The basic assumption of this research is 
that for ensuring the coherence of the complicated mosaic of rules in 
Europe, domestic law in various countries, while it need not be identical, 
ought to be interpreted and applied in accordance with those underlying 
principles.
Europe as a supranational entity does not call for a traditional 
nation-state-based positivist approach. For these reasons, the common 
democratic principles of the European polity were taken as the test 
tool for measuring tensions and problems relevant to this research. 
The analysis conducted in this research illustrates that even in today’s 
Europe, integrated through common democratic principles such as 
equality, traditional European religions and churches still influence 
legal regulations in accordance with their teaching, leaving religious 
“others” without the realistic possibility of exercising their religious 
and moral choices. While comparing the common basket of principles 
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and their application in the case of traditional and non-traditional 
religions, the research identifies major problems and their consequence 
for the coherence of European legal systems. Thus in the final part, I 
deal with questions concerning theoretical democratic models based on 
today’s European approach towards democracy, religious pluralism and 
multiculturalism. 
Taking into consideration common democratic principles stemming 
from European legal harmonisation, this research builds on the Rawlsian 
theoretical model. I took as the underpinning of my model the theory 
of reasonable consensus proposed by Rawls in his A Theory of Justice 
and Political Liberalism. The theory was chosen due to its emphasis on 
religious pluralism and equality, which are identified in this research as 
the underlying foundations of the developing approach towards religious 
issues in Europe. The Rawlsian model is a theoretical construction 
of a political community living together and consisting of groups with 
conflicting comprehensive doctrines. The idea of reasonable consensus 
assumes that the only way in which a political community consisting 
of persons adhering to conflicting doctrines is able coexist is to agree 
on the core of values that bind the community together. This core of 
common principles is reasonable consensus. Other values remain outside 
the scope of the consensus and members of the political community 
need to work out the way in which they merge in their lives both the 
principles contained in the reasonable consensus and those outside of it. 
The Rawslian conception of reasonable consensus resonates in the ideas 
expressed in the documents issued by the COE and analysed in this 
study in the context of religion. However, the communitarian critique by 
authors such as Taylor or Pharekh challenged liberal theory by accusing 
it of having monopolised thinking on democracy and ignoring in fact 
those communities whose values and principles are non-liberal. Those 
communities are treated as fundamentalists and thus left outside the 
scope of reasonable consensus. 
In this study I have attempted to accommodate communitarian 
concerns and rework the Rawlsian model to fit the new context. This 
study’s analysis of particular tensions between law and religion in Europe 
confirms communitarian concerns and illustrates how easily non-
traditional religious adherents are subject to “otherisation”. Therefore, in 
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this study the Rawlsian model is rebuilt to accommodate and recognise 
those communities whose basic values and principles are non-liberal and 
who cannot easily accept the leading positivist paradigm of Western law, 
in which law, morals and religious values exist as independent normative 
systems. The new rebuilt model attempts to prevent the “otherisation” of 
some religious and cultural communities while maintaining a democratic 
focus, the peaceful coexistence of individuals and groups with diverse 
religious or non-religious backgrounds, and a hermeneutic view of law 
as a coherent unity. Despite this communitarian critique, however, I 
am convinced that in liberal democratic conditions, liberal democratic 
theory must be taken as the starting point for any further development 
or adjustment. In legal and political reality, where liberal democratic 
values are embodied in law and the law’s interpretation, like in the case 
of Europe, taking any other starting point would be deemed to fail, as 
MacIntyre has argued21. 
1.2. This research among other research  
on religious problems in Europe
This research is unique among other research on law and religion in 
Europe. Much of this research employs solely political science and 
sociological perspectives and methods, like, for instance that adopted in 
the work edited by Byrnes and Katzenstein in Religion in an Expanding 
Europe or Grace Davie’s Europe: the Exceptional Case: Parameters of Faith 
in the Modern World. 
In a strictly legal analysis of religious issues in Europe, a purely 
comparative focus and human rights analysis dominate. The works edited 
by Eneyedi and Madeley, Church and State in Contemporary Europe, the 
Chimera of Neutrality or Goldschmidt, Religious Pluralism and Human 
Rights in Europe: Where to Draw the Line? can be used as primary 
examples here. 
Some other works, like Thorson-Plesner’s Freedom of religion and belief 
– a quest for state neutrality? attempt to analyse European problems of law 
21.  MacItyre A.,1988, p 392.
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and religion together with analysing the same issues in other countries of 
the world. Evans, on the other hand, for instance in Freedom of Religion 
Under the European Convention on Human Rights analyses the topics from 
the perspective of international law
This study is unique as it presents problems of law and religion in a 
multi-layered and multi-dimensional way. It adopts a legal perspective but 
is not limited to comparative law or purely human rights or international 
law analysis. It attempts to approach Europe as a unique polity, in which 
a multiplicity of various norms requires an interdisciplinary and holistic 
approach. It approaches religion as a part of cultural reality of Europe, 
which must be taken into consideration while constructing common 
principles of justice in a European legal community. It is a theoretical 
study on problems of religion, multiculturalism and democracy as well as 
the identity of Europe. Through research on problems of law and religion, 
this study offers insight into the current development of the European 
polity. Therefore sources and methods may vary in different parts of this 
research, but their goal remains the same – scrutinising and re-shaping 
the theoretical model of the relationship between law and religion 
in Europe in order to ensure religious pluralism and strengthen the 
democratic commitment and identity of Europe as a community.
1.3. The kinds of sources used
In order to address my research questions and illustrate problems 
regarding my research, I have drawn on a wide variety of sources: 
legal, extralegal and those collected from other academic and popular 
disciplines.
In terms of hard law, I have used legal sources on both the national 
and European levels and when needed referred also to wider international 
agreements. The European sources include first of all European treaties 
and conventions both under the European Union and the Council 
of Europe systems. However, the scope of the legal sources used is not 
limited only to treaties but also to other executive documents like 
directives. Further, on the national level constitutional sources as well as 
ordinary laws have been analysed. 
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In addition, I have used a wide variety of soft law and other non-
binding interpretative documents concerning the interpretation and 
application of European law. They include documents such as resolutions, 
recommendations, strategies or reports issued by the organs of the COE or 
the EU. Occasionally, in the second part of the research, I have also used 
similar kinds of sources issued by national institutions and state organs.
Moreover, I have analysed case law, both on the European and in 
some cases national levels. Case law on the European level includes both 
judgments of the European Court of Justice as well as judgments and 
decisions issued by the European Court of Human Rights, including 
previous decisions on admissibility by the European Commission of 
Human Rights. In addition, when available, cases from national courts 
were analysed. Where the merits of the judgments were not available, a 
briefing into the legal dispute, as well as key findings were presented on 
the basis of available press materials. In each case reference to either the 
case number or the press source is indicated. The complete list of articles 
is included in the index of sources. They were chosen mainly on the basis 
of the language (English) and European sources were preferred. 
In addition, in those parts of the dissertation that engage in 
theoretical discussion, the research refers to a wide range of literature 
comprising legal, philosophical, political science and sociological 
perspectives on law and religion. In order to employ an interdisciplinary 
approach, I did not limit the sources to strictly legal theoretical ones. 
References to broader social science literature are usually used in order 
to illustrate the social or political background of problems discussed in 
particular chapters. This interdisciplinary perspective, or ‘multidisciplinary 
perspective’ as Thorson Plesner calls it22, is challenging for maintaining 
the legal perspective. This challenge was solved by applying the construct 
of a “non-religious” and “religiously different” individual, described below, 
for the majority of the analysed problems. These categories enabled me 
to maintain a legal focus, while referring to broader social implications 
22.  Thorson Plesner I., 2008, p 22. The author discusses more broadly the challenges 
of comparative and interdisciplinary approaches and observes similar difficulties in 
maintaining the focus and coherence while researching law and religion phenomena, 
as those observed in this volume.
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of certain laws and policies. They were used as a legal test of evaluation 
whether like cases were treated alike and whether application of the 
principle of equality applied to traditional as well as differently religious 
or non-religious individuals.
1.4. Languages
Research concentrating on Europe is in large degree limited by the 
understanding of languages. Understanding norms depends very much 
on verbal nuances. It is therefore essential to mention what languages 
were used in conducting this research. The language of the included 
sources is primarily English, as that is the language of this research. 
The interpretation of legal sources relies in the majority of cases on the 
English translation. However, in specific cases other languages were 
relied on and include: Danish, Finnish, French, German, Norwegian, 
Polish, Spanish and Swedish. Those materials are indicated by reference 
to their titles in the original language. The interpretation of language 
texts other than English was based on my understanding of Polish, 
Finnish, Swedish, German, Norwegian and Danish as well as translations 
provided by native language speakers of Spanish, Danish, Norwegian 
and German and French. 
1.5. Comparison as a background  
for further theoretical discussion
Since this research concentrates on Europe, it is by nature comparative. 
A comparative perspective usually calls for more detailed explanation as 
to how the comparison was done and what the purpose of it was. Like 
other legal research, comparative law struggles with the search for a 
proper method. De Cruz observes that: “There is no generally accepted 
framework for comparison, although most writers appear to assume that 
the comparative methods which should be employed are obvious.”23 
23.  De Cruz P., 1999, p 5.
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Comparisons require attention to things such as the comparability 
of the subjects of comparison. Such comparability does not necessarily 
mean an orthodox search for the identical nature of the sources compared. 
Comparability means also comparing those legal sources or practices that 
are similar in function.24 And functionality was the leading criterion for the 
comparison made in this dissertation. The goal of this volume is a critical 
evaluation of the European commitment to democratic principles affecting 
religious coexistence – primarily equality and the achievement of religious 
pluralism. For that reason, certain specific areas were chosen as test cases of 
that commitment. The selection criteria of those areas are described below. 
The comparison conducted in this book has not been carried out 
solely for the sake of comparison itself, but rather for the purpose of 
giving a point of departure to discussion covering broader and more 
general issues. It is used as a method of illustrating particular observed 
problems. In order to achieve functionality, it works on a few distinctive 
but intertwined planes. First of all, it concentrates on European-wide 
legal standards and discourses and compares them with legal standards 
and discourses in particular states. The European-wide standards are 
identified through an analysis of European legal sources as well as 
interpretation documents issued by the EU and the COE. The national 
standards were identified through an analysis of corresponding national 
legal sources and interpretation documents.
Secondly, in some parts the research engages in a comparison of 
national standards. Again, the purpose of such a comparison is functional. 
It is done in order to show certain observed patterns or solutions to 
observed problems. 
Thirdly, as a natural consequence of employing a broad 
interdisciplinary perspective, it compares legal and non-legal standards. 
The challenge of this interdisciplinary approach was described above. 
I want to underline, however, that a comprehensive comparison as 
such is not the sole purpose of this research. Comparison is an inherent 
characteristic of research that focuses on wider aspects of law both 
territorially and in regard to its relations with other non-legal aspects 
of social life. Comparison is treated as a basis for further theoretical 
24.  Platsas A. E., 2008, pp. 8-10.
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discussion and the consideration of issues of Europeanisation and 
religious pluralism. A comparison of facts, approaches and disparities is 
employed in order to illustrate certain theoretical problems and support 
arguments used in the discussion on a wider theoretical plane.
1.6. The method of selecting examples
The method of selecting the analysis examples is unique and consists of 
two steps. The first step is identifying the European standard, whether 
strictly legal, based on hard law and case law or based on strengthened 
soft law and interpretation documents issued by European institutions. 
The second step is comparing this identified standard with national 
practices least compliant or totally non-compliant with it. When available, 
the standard is compared with practices most compliant with it.
The identification of the thematic examples – such as reproductive 
rights, freedom of speech or education, was dictated by the recent 
emergence of new standards and convergence criteria in regard to these 
topics on the European level. These new interpretative standards include 
Resolution 1607 (2008), Access to safe and legal abortion; Recommendation 
1675 (2004), European strategy for the promotion of sexual and reproductive 
health and rights; Recommendation 1804 (2007), State, religion, secularity 
and human rights; Recommendation 1805 (2007) Blasphemy, religious insults 
and hate speech against persons on grounds of their religion; Recommendation 
1720 (2005), Education and religion and Recommendation 12 (2002), on 
education for democratic citizenship. Also initiatives calling for greater 
commitment, like the Report on the situation of fundamental rights in 
the European Union 2004-2008, were used as interpretative documents 
regarding common European principles. At the same time, these thematic 
topics, due to certain widely disputed events, like the Mohammed cartoon 
crisis, have in many cases been the focus of broader social European 
discussion on the relationship between law and religion. The perspective 
on that discussion was employed in the analysis conducted.
The choice of national laws and examples may not be exhaustive for the 
particular theme, but as was explained previously, an exhaustive comparison 
is not an objective of the comparative parts of this research. Therefore the 
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basic criterion for the selection of state law examples was based on the 
tangible disproportion between the declared commitment to European 
principles of equality, religious pluralism and non-discrimination and the 
practical effect of the legal norms and their application on the surface 
level. All of the countries selected have a clearly stated commitment to 
the common democratic principles of the European polity through their 
ratification of relevant treaties and membership in the EU and the COE. 
However, particular policies, laws and cases associated with selected 
themes chosen for further scrutiny in this research do not comply with this 
declared commitment. On the other hand, some of the selected examples, 
especially in the part dealing with various systems regulating state and 
church relations, were selected to illustrate how commitment to these 
democratic principles can be strengthened. Since all of the countries are 
rooted deeply in the liberal democratic tradition, the selection was directed 
towards those examples which illustrate the following problems connected 
with the European liberal tradition — how:
- Western legal tradition is not always separated from religious 
morality;
- neutrality is understood as neutrality towards traditional religious 
movements;
- seemingly neutral policies can have an “otherising” effect on “non-
religious” or “differently religious” individuals
- democratic consensus is often understood as the protection of 
traditional religious and national traditions.
This particular focus allowed me to develop a theoretical model that could 
eliminate the deficiencies of the liberal democratic approach observed 
both in these examples as well as by other critics of liberal theory.
1.1. The critical approach
Even though no fixed set of methods in the same meaning as they exist 
in the social sciences were used, a few techniques can be identified in the 
legal research. The legal method in this research employs nearly all of 
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the known techniques of legal research. In addition to the comparative 
element, the leading methodological approach is critical and corresponds 
in large degree to critical research methods identified by Tuori. His 
model of legal criticism distinguishes unmasking and normative forms of 
criticism. He illustrates this distinction in the following figure:
Figure 1: Tuori’s forms of the criticism of the law25
The difference between unmasking and normative criticism of both 
legal practices and norms lies in the direction of the criticism. Whereas 
unmasking criticism is content with explicating the existing state of affairs, 
the normative form of criticism engages in a discussion of the desirable 
direction of change. However, as Tuori underlines, existence of pure 
unmasking criticism is doubtful26. The author also distinguishes further 
divisions of various forms of criticism, but they remain irrelevant for 
describing the method of this research.27 In this volume I engage in both 
forms of criticism. The first step consists of unmasking criticism of either 
legal practices or norms. The functionality is again the leading criterion 
for the selection of the object of criticism. Furthermore, I proceed to a 
normative criticism of those norms or practices and attempt to point out a 
possible desirable direction of development for the facilitation of religious 
pluralism and equality.
25.  Tuori K., 2002, p 309.
26.  Ibid., pp. 305-306
27.  For further details on legal criticism and critical legal positivism see: Tuori K., 
2002, pp. 304-322.
Criticism of the law
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1.2. The important theoretical constructions
In order to provide a legal and philosophical perspective on the issues 
of law and religion, and take part in the discussion on the borderlines 
between religion and democracy, this volume uses repeatedly a few 
theoretical constructions. The perspective I employ is the liberal 
democratic perspective and further I explain why this and not, for 
instance, a communitarian perspective is applied. Due to the selection 
of such a perspective and bearing in mind the function of the analysis, 
certain important theoretical constructions are used as analysis tools. 
The key term and the leading theme used is “religious pluralism”. 
In line with Skeie, I distinguish plurality from pluralism.28 Plurality 
indicates a state of multiplicity. Pluralism is a certain positive evaluation 
of plurality. In the context of religion, growing plurality is a fact in Europe 
while growing pluralism has not necessarily developed yet. Nevertheless, 
as this study shows, religious pluralism is one of the contemporary 
democratic goals in Europe. For that reason religious pluralism is chosen 
as the leading criterion for evaluating laws and policies. Steps facilitating 
or hindering pluralism measure the commitment to basic values such as 
equality and fundamental rights. For that reason, religious pluralism is the 
lens through which I view contemporary religious problems in Europe.
Secondly, I concentrate on equality as the founding value of the 
European polity. I adapt a Rawlsian view of all citizens as free and equal29. 
The selection of the Rawlsian perspective is justified below and in the last 
part of this research. Although equality does not always mean identical 
treatment, in the context of religion, I take the position that it cannot 
mean treatment leading to or increasing a discriminated social position in 
society of an adherent to a particular religion or belief. Although certain 
particular procedures may differ, they should not differ to such a degree 
as to prevent equal citizens from having equally valued choices. And in 
order to maintain equality, I believe these choices must be treated with 
equal respect and none should be favoured. Discrimination on the basis of 
28.  Skeie G., 2002, pp.48-55.
29.  Rawls J., 2005 or Rawls J., 1971. The idea of free and equal citizens serves as the 
underpinning for the entire Rawlsian theory.
44
belief is understood as denial of an equal position solely on the grounds 
of adhering to another religious or non-religious doctrine than the one(s) 
supported or recognised by the state.
Thirdly, the category “non-religious individual”, for the purpose 
of this volume, refers to an individual who does not belong to a major 
religious tradition and states that he or she is not religious at all. The 
category “religiously different individual” here refers to an individual who, 
for a variety of reasons, does not follow the religion that receives legally 
preferential treatment. The term “a religiously different individual” refers 
also to individuals who do not share the same worldview and belief as 
individuals belonging to the religious community(ies) best able to affect 
legislation. These categories have been constructed for the purpose of 
this volume and are not necessarily identical to other popular or scientific 
understandings of these terms. Their function is to include not only non-
religious individuals in the traditional meaning of the word, including 
atheists, agnostics or secular humanists, but also persons belonging to 
religious communities sharing different values than those belonging the 
dominant and well-recognised religions in a particular society or having 
a highly individualised belief. Both of these categories refer to individuals 
belonging to communities less capable of influencing political and legal 
decisions or having a highly individualised belief. Both of these categories 
stand in contrast to the traditionally religious individual and are used as a 
test tool for evaluating the application of the equality principle.
In the process of the legal analysis, I use the term “othering”, “other” 
and “otherisation”. This terminology refers to the terminology used in 
social sciences in studies such as, for instance, Simone De Beauvoir’s The 
Second Sex30 or Edward Said’s Orientalism31. De Beauvoir’s construction 
of women as “the other” emphasises women’s exclusion from what is 
considered masculine and thus normal. Said, on the other hand, while 
describing the Orient and Westerners’ representation of the Orient, 
observed how the West is treated as a standard and how elements 
representing the Orient create the “Other”, meaning that which is 
30.  Beauvoir S. de, 1988.
31.  Said E.W., 1978.
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inferior and alien to the standard. I refer to “othering” in the analysis 
of legal practices regarding religion. Since I treat religious pluralism 
as a principle and the leading theme of this work, I also observe how 
“religious pluralism” is treated primarily as acceptance of traditional, 
national religious (or non-religious) traditions32. Meanwhile, I observe 
the “otherisation” of traditions that are alien to a particular nation 
state’s tradition(s). Depending on the traditional place of a religion in a 
nation state’s legal system, religious (or non-religious) adherents of non-
traditional religion (or non-religion) are often legally marginalised. Law is 
either shaped in a way which leads to “otherisation” or is applied in a way 
which leads to it. Other researchers have observed the phenomenon of 
“otherisation” in different contexts. Ward observes that generally: “Europe 
still fears the ‘other’, those it deems to be somehow un-European, even 
if they are indefinably so.”33 Similarly to “a non-religious” individual, 
measuring “otherisation” is used as a tool of evaluation of the application 
of the equality and pluralism principles.
32.  See also e.g.: Evans C., 2006. The author observes similar problems and deals with 
the lack of Europe’s readiness to abandon own Christian or secular religious paradigms 
on the examples of the cases of Dahlab and Sahin.
33.  Ward I., 2004, p 7.

4
2. Definitional struggles  
with problematic concepts
2.1. How to understand “Europe”
“To define Europe you have to be a genius (…)” - Madeleine Albright
The topic of this dissertation is limited in its spatial scope to Europe 
and an understanding of democracy in Europe. However, when we 
speak of “Europe” we can encounter multiple definitions and multiple 
understandings and it proves to be impossible to reach any satisfying 
common understanding of the word. Thus it is always necessary to 
emphasise how we understand “Europe”. We can speak of geographical 
Europe, the borders of which stretch from the Arctic Ocean to the 
Mediterranean Sea and from the Atlantic Ocean to the Caucasus 
Mountains, the Black Sea and the water divide of the Ural Mountains. 
However, it is also possible to look at Europe from an historical 
perspective and define the continent on the basis of common history. Last 
but not least, we can look at Europe from the perspective of integration 
efforts in the post-World War II period and especially the post-Cold War 
era. 
But even the concept of an “integrated Europe”, which I am most 
comfortable with for the purposes of this dissertation, is far from 
uniform. We can speak of two circles, namely countries belonging to 
the European Union or a broader circle of countries belonging to the 
Council of Europe. Both of these organizations and their member states 
express their deepest affirmation of democratic principles. The Treaty 
Establishing the Council of Europe in its preamble accentuates that the 
Treaty was adopted as a reaffirmation of the member states’: “devotion to 
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the spiritual and moral values which are the common heritage of their 
peoples and the true source of individual freedom, political liberty and the 
rule of law, principles which form the basis of all genuine democracy.”34
The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms also reaffirms the commitment to democratic 
principles common to the member states in the following wording:
“Members of the Council of Europe, reaffirming their profound belief 
in those fundamental freedoms which are the foundation of justice 
and peace in the world and are best maintained on the one hand 
by an effective political democracy and on the other by a common 
understanding and observance of the human rights(…) Have agreed 
as follows(…)”35
The European Union, on the other hand, has once more reaffirmed their 
democratic commitment in the recently adopted text of the Lisbon Treaty, 
which is in the ratification process. The Treaty declares in Article 2: 
“The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, 
freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human 
rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities.”
These values are common to the member states in a society in which 
pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality 
between women and men prevail.”36
And since democracy and its understanding are the leading themes 
of this work and since they are supposed to be the values common to 
the member states of the above-mentioned organizations, Europe in 
this dissertation will include primarily the countries of the European 
Union as the closest integrated community within geographical Europe. 
34.  Statute of the Council of Europe, 1949, emphasis by this author.
35.  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as 
amended by Protocol no. 11, 1950.
36.  Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty 
establishing the European Community, 2007.
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In addition, it also includes references to the documents issued by the 
Council of Europe as the forum where decisive actions concerning 
the European understanding of human rights, playing the role of 
fundamentals of modern democracies, take place. 
2.2. Democracy as liberal and deliberative democracy
In this dissertation democracy is approached as liberal and deliberative 
democracy. Liberal democratic theories focus on liberty, pluralism 
and individualism. Leading theoreticians of liberalism, including both 
founding fathers of liberalism, such as Kant, Locke, Mill and those more 
contemporary to us like Arendt, Berlin or Rawls, all focused on similar 
assumptions. Liberal state should secure freedom of every member of 
society, secure equality of individuals and independence of each member 
of society37. Despite differences in liberal theories liberal thinkers are 
joined by the “priority of liberty”. Holmes, however, underlines that such 
generalisation does not necessarily express the whole idea of liberalism. 
According to Holmes:
“(…) we can say that the highest political values, from a liberal 
perspective, are psychological security and personal independence for 
all, legal impartiality within a single system of laws applied equally 
to all, the human diversity fostered by liberty and collective self-rule 
through elected government and uncensored discussion.”38
These central concerns in the liberal thought lead liberal democrats 
towards focusing on the idea of rights. Individual rights lie at the heart of 
democratic approach towards law and relationship between state and the 
individual.39 That is why liberal approach must be taken into consideration 
37.  For more detailed account of development and variety of liberal conceptions both 
modern and classical see e.g. Halldenius L., 2001, pp. 33-122, Holmes S., 1997 or 
Flathman R.E., 2005.
38.  Holmes S., 1997, p 16.
39.  Ibid., pp. 18-21.
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while discussing issues of rights and their reciprocal influence. 
Moreover, as Flathman observes, all liberalisms include and embrace 
pluralism. Even if pluralism’s relationship to liberalism has been 
challenged mainly by communitarians in their desire to embrace more 
diversity and the concept of solidarity, pluralism is still a centrepiece of 
liberalism. 40 Therefore, liberal democratic theory ought to be considered 
while discussing issues of religious pluralism.
Liberal democratic theory is also strongly connected with deliberative 
theory of democracy. However, liberal democratic approach did not 
always imply deliberative approach. Broadly defined, deliberative 
democratic theory concentrates on ideals of rational legislation, 
participatory politics and political autonomy based on practical reasoning 
of citizens41. Aggregative conception of democracy stands in the 
opposition to the deliberative conception. In an aggregative democracy 
the focus is put on the voting mechanism. Voting is the mechanism for 
aggregating individual preferences42. In other words, in an aggregative 
democracy, collective decisions are positively responsive to the interests 
of individuals expressed in the voting43. In deliberative democracy, on the 
other hand, decision is collective, when it emerges from the arrangements 
of binding collective choice. These arrangements establish conditions 
of free public reasoning between individuals who treat one another as 
equals. In a deliberative collective decision, free and equal citizens focus 
not on individual interest, but instead on justifications for the exercise of 
collective power, that can be acknowledged by all of them as reasons44. 
Dryzek observes that liberal and deliberative conceptions were not 
always naturally reconcilable. Originally democratic theory focused on 
the individual interest and thus was closer to aggregative approach45. 
It was only in the twentieth century that liberalism, democracy and 
deliberation developed a tighter connection46. According to Dryzek, 
40.  Flathman R.E., 2005, pp. 180-185.
41.  Bohman J., Rehg W., 1997, p IX.
42.  Ibid., p XI.
43.  Cohen J., 1998, p 186 .
44.  Ibid., p 186.
45.  Dryzek J.S., 2002, pp. 8-12.
46.  Ibid., p 10.
5 1
there are three reasons why liberal democratic theory accommodated 
deliberative approach. First of all, deliberative principles justify liberal 
rights. Secondly, liberal constitutions promote deliberation. And thirdly, 
constitution making is in itself is a deliberative process47. Dryzek 
underlines that deliberative democracy took place at the heart of liberal 
democratic thinking when leading liberal democratic philosopher 
John Rawls in his “Idea of Public Reason Revisited”, proclaimed that 
a well-ordered constitutional democracy should be understood also as 
deliberative democracy48. 
Deliberative democratic theory corresponds also with hermeneutic 
legal theory. Just as hermeneutic legal theorists, like Dworkin, see law 
as a certain unity based on principles, so do deliberative thinkers see 
democracy. Deliberative democracy is based on certain principles, thanks 
to which collective choices are found to be legitimate and justified by all 
as reasons. Cohen distinguishes such principles of political legitimacy as 
reasonable pluralism organised around the conception of the public good, 
egalitarianism and respect for citizens’ identity in ways, which contribute 
to the formation of the public good49. The unifying and central value of 
the deliberative conception is the ideal of the public good, which can 
be justified by all citizens. In the Rawlsian theory the idea of reasonable 
consensus concerns the public good. Equal citizens through reasonable 
consensus agree on common principles of justice, which constitute the 
public good50. Legitimate political action can be justified through this 
public good.
Approach towards the law in this research is strictly connected with 
democratic legitimacy. This legitimacy, on the other hand, is understood 
as rooted in the common democratic principles constituting the public 
good. Law and its application are at the heart of liberal democratic and 
deliberative theory. Law’s legitimacy is undividable from democratic 
legitimacy. Law does not only consist of rules that could be placed on its 
surface and change but it instead has also got its deep structure, which 
47.  Ibid., pp. 10-17.
48.  Ibid., p 14.
49.  Cohen J., 1997, pp. 68-70.
50.  Rawls J., 2005, pp. 201-206.
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determines of its validity and legitimacy. In Tuori ‘s model of structure of 
law fundamental principles are understood as foundations of the model 
of justice and are treated as crucial for legitimacy of the law and validity 
of legal rules51.
In this research I am also aware of the communitarian critique of 
liberal and deliberative theories. Liberal presuppositions have been 
contested especially in the context of pluralism, religious diversity and 
multiculturalism. It may be argued that liberal democratic theory is not 
sufficient for the solution of the problems related to multiculturalism 
and multi-religious society. Communitarian approach criticises liberal 
democratic approach and offers different vision of democracy based on 
cultural and community identity.
Taylor observes that liberal politics of equal dignity, equal rights 
and immunities create an identical “basket” of standards applicable to 
everyone, regardless of their unique cultural identity. Such approach, 
according to Taylor creates the effect opposite to the intended. Instead of 
recognising distinctiveness, it creates a dominant identity of the majority:
“The claim is that the supposedly neutral set of difference-blind 
principles of the politics of equal dignity is in fact reflection of 
one hegemonic culture. As it turns out, then, only the minority or 
suppressed cultures are being forced to take alien form. Consequently, 
the supposedly fair and difference-blind society is not only inhuman 
(because suppressing identities) buy also, in a subtle and unconscious 
way, itself highly discriminatory.”52
Also MacIntyre argues that liberalism does not allow other conceptions 
to participate in objective discussion:
“Liberalism (…) does of course appear in contemporary debates 
in a number of guises and in so doing is often successful in pre-
empting the debate by reformulating quarrels and conflicts within 
liberalism, putting in question this or that particular set of attitudes 
51.  Tuori K., 2002, pp. 244-246
52.  Taylor C., 1994, p 43.
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or policies, but not the fundamental tenets of liberalism with respect 
to individuals and the expression of their preferences. So so-called 
conservatism and so-called radicalism in these contemporary guises 
are in general mere stalking-horses for liberalism: the contemporary 
debates within modern political systems are almost exclusively 
between conservative liberals, liberal liberals and radical liberals. There 
is little in place in such political systems for the criticism of the system 
itself, for putting liberalism in question.”53
MacIntyre criticises liberalism for rejecting claims of any overriding 
theory of justice and good, and in fact for embodying such a theory. 
The assumptions of liberalism are, according to MacIntyre, not only an 
overriding conception of the good but also a tradition, just like other 
traditions. Just like other traditions it provides a model of a just order. 
And therefore, any “hope of discovering tradition-independent standards 
of judgement turns out to be illusory.”54
Parekh, similarly, criticises liberal theory for its monopolisation of the 
legal and political arena. Parekh argues that liberal theories, even those 
attempting to accommodate to multicultural conditions are inadequate. 
Thinning down liberal principles to their minimum content and making 
tolerance of non-liberal cultures conditional upon it is, according to 
Parekh not enough: 
“In other words, liberals need to rise to a higher level of abstraction 
than they have done so far, and distinguish between universal and a 
liberal moral minimum, insisting on the former in all circumstances 
and on the latter when it does not violate the universal minimum and 
can be shown to be central to a liberal society’s historically inherited 
cultural character.”55
Parekh disagrees that modern western society is liberal and therefore 
entitled to ask its members to live by liberal values. Parekh argues that 
53.  MacItyre A.,1988, p 392.
54.  Ibid., pp. 326-348.
55.  Parekh B., 2000, p 111.
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modern western society includes non-liberal groups and that certain 
institutions, even if they are touched by liberal spirit, cannot be fully 
liberal. Such institutions, according to Parekh include family, religion and 
schools. Moreover, argues further Parekh, liberals are not and cannot be 
liberal in all areas of life and they live according to the mixture of liberal 
and non-liberals ideas and instincts, like habits, personal or political 
loyalties, moral values or religious beliefs.56 
As Dryzek observes deliberative liberal democratic thinkers often 
fail to be critical towards their own ideas and appear to be reconciled 
with the status quo, without the need of challenging it57. He underlines 
that it is vital that critical voice in deliberative democracy be retrieved. 
For these reasons communitarian critique ought not to be dismissed 
as irreconcilable with fundamentals of liberal thought. The law and 
its application ought to be scrutinised and viewed through the lens of 
communitarian critique. The difference between liberals and deliberative 
critical liberals, claims Dryzek, is that classical liberals “fail to recognise 
that getting constitutions and laws right is only half the battle. They fail 
to recognise extra-constitutional agents of distortion that cannot easily 
be counteracted through such means.”58 This study’s critical approach 
and its scrutiny of application of laws and its effect on the principle of 
equality and religious pluralism attempts to reach beyond such a narrow 
understanding of law and democracy. It contributes to the critical line of 
deliberative liberal theory of democracy. Through recognising practical 
limits to liberal thinking and communitarian concerns, it draws on liberal 
theory as the basis, but attempts to accommodate communitarian views 
and expand liberal model to prevent exclusion and “otherisation”.
Liberal and deliberative theoretical setting of this research was 
dictated by the fact that in the analysis of laws and polices, I deal with 
the values that are considered to be a democratic credo in Europe. 
Liberal democratic values are at the legal foundation of the European 
polity. The European democratic core of common principles includes 
such liberal democratic principles like equality, non-discrimination, 
56.  Ibid., pp. 109-113.
57.  Dryzek J.S., 2002, p 20.
58.  Ibid., p 21.
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the rule-of law, pluralism, tolerance, broadmindedness and solidarity. 
These principles are either explicitly included in European obligations, 
including human rights and EU Treaties or then have been developed 
in the process of interpretation done either by courts on the European 
level or by other European institutions. The Treaty on European 
Union in its current shape provides that the Union is based on liberty, 
democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
and the rule of law.59 Lisbon Treaty extends these principles and in 
addition to currently included fundamental principles pronounces that 
the Union is based on principles of equality, and moreover it assumes 
that pluralism, non-discrimination, justice, solidarity and equality of 
men and women are common for European democracies.60 The Statute 
of the Council of Europe provides that the founding principles of the 
Council are the principles of the rule of law and of the enjoyment by 
all persons of human rights and fundamental freedoms.61 I analyse 
these principles in more depth in part III of this dissertation. European 
democracy due to the choice of its principles can be characterised as a 
liberal democracy. 
For these reasons, I chose to approach the topics of democracy from 
the liberal and deliberative perspective and refer mainly to the Rawlsian 
conceptions as parallel to the conceptions lying at the foundation of the 
European democratic model. I use Rawlsian conception of reasonable 
consensus as the underpinning for further theoretical development of the 
model of justice in relationship between law and religion. This choice is 
dictated by the fact that Rawslian conception of reasonable consensus 
resonates in the ideas concerning religious and multi-cultural coexistence 
expressed in the documents issued by the COE and also in the European 
Parliament’s report on the EU’s commitment to fundamental rights. 
The Recommendation 1804 (2007), State, religion, secularity and human 
rights can be used as an example illustrating this tendency. The key 
findings presented in the recommendation conform to the Rawlsian 
ideas of reasonable consensus and public good. The COE confirmed 
59.  Treaty on European Union, article 2.
60.  Treaty of Lisbon, article 2.
61.  Statutes of the Council of Europe, article 3.
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that religion is an individual matter and reaffirmed its commitment 
to plurality of ethical, moral and ideological conceptions of individual 
European citizens’. It also underlined the necessity of neutrality of the 
state in approach to these conceptions and advocated that governance 
and religion should not mix and that states should exclude from 
consultations any religious groups not supporting fundamental values of 
democracy. Fundamental values of democracy are treated as the public 
good while such exclusion of certain groups from deliberation resembles 
the Rawlsian notion of “unreasonable doctrine”. As explained further in 
part III, the model of European democracy in large degree corresponds to 
the Rawlsian model. Also creation of a common “European identity” is a 
similar project to the creation of an “overlapping consensus”. 
Being aware of the communitarian critique, however, I do not claim 
the value of neutrality for the liberal conception. On the contrary, I argue 
that liberal democratic model is a value-laden conception. It requires 
compliance with certain common principles in order to make it possible 
for the multicultural society to function. From the point of view of the 
legal principles currently present in Europe, an approach different than 
liberal democratic would require rethinking the concept of democracy. 
As I argue, in Part III, the concept of democracy is nowadays broader 
than that based purely on the equality of political participation and it 
corresponds better to deliberative rather than aggregative understanding 
of democracy. It includes democratic fundamentals that are intertwined 
and reciprocally influence each other. In my analysis of the democratic 
model, I recognise the concerns of the communitarian critics and argue 
that liberal democracy has a potential for pluralistic adjustment. However, 
I remain within liberal assumptions and agree with Habermas62 that 
communitarian rights in a democracy must stem from individual’s rights. 
But I do not support Habermasian argument that doctrines must adjust 
themselves to democratic model. On the contrary, I argue that liberal 
democracy has space for potential expansion of legal pluralism and 
greater inclusion of those who identify their rights with the rights of 
their religious or cultural community. These problems are explored more 
thoroughly in part III.
62.  Habermas J., 2008a, pp. 271-311.
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2.3. “Religion” and “belief” – well-understood  
concepts beyond definition?
2.3.1. “Religion” as understood in various branches of science
In order to speak of religion and religious problems, it seems rather 
natural to attempt to define the phenomenon we are dealing with and to 
set at least some guidelines regarding its understanding. But as difficult as 
it is to define Europe, it is as difficult, or even more so, to define “religion”. 
As far as the concept of “Europe” is concerned, it is possible to agree on 
adapting a certain concept and operating within it. The same will not be 
possible, however, with the term “religion” due to the very nature of the 
concept itself. Not only that the meaning of the word is obscure, but the 
approach of every branch of science towards it produces new questions 
and new inquires into its nature.
In 1994 seven European philosophers gathered on Capri in order to 
discuss the problems of the so-called “religious revival” in contemporary 
Europe. As the culmination of this event, the book titled simply “Religion” 
was published a few years later. Surprisingly, the main problem the 
participants had to confront was defining “religion”. As Derrida observed, 
the mere problem of the variety of languages in Europe may have affected 
different understandings of the term:
“We met, thus at Capri, we Europeans, assigned to languages (Italian, 
Spanish, German, French) in which the same word, religion, should 
mean, or so we thought, the same thing. (…) But everything remains 
problematic in this respect.”
The word “religion” in most of the European languages is derived from 
the Latin word “religio”. But even the etymology of the word “religio” 
remains unclear. Hoyt63 in her search for the etymology of the word 
arrived at the conclusion that careful analysis would lead to the preference 
for the interpretation of Cicero , who derived the word “religio” from 
63.  Hoyt S. F., The Etymology of Religion, Journal of the American Oriental Society, 
Vol. 32, no. 2. (1912), pp. 126-129.
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“relegere” (to go through again in speech, thought, reading) and not from 
another verb: “religare” (to bind). But the option of accepting “religare” 
as the etymological root cannot be excluded either. However, the mere 
etymology in itself cannot provide answers to the problem of defining 
what religion is. 
Among the major branches of the social sciences that deal with the 
phenomenon of religion, theories of what religion is differ depending on 
the approach. 
Anthropologists have been attempting to see religion as a space of 
human practice. One of the most influential anthropological definitions 
of religion was offered by Clifford Geertz in his Religion as a Cultural 
System. Geertz defines religion as 
“a system of symbols which acts to establish powerful, pervasive, and 
long lasting motivations in men by formulating conceptions of a 
general order of existence and clothing these conceptions with such 
an aura of factuality that the moods and motivations seem uniquely 
 realistic.”64
However, this definition did not remain without critique. Asad65 disagreed 
with Geertz’s symbolic definition on numerous grounds. According to 
Asad, Geertz’s definition claims universality and such universality cannot 
be reached due to constituent elements of religions and their historically 
specific relationships. Asad proposed that an anthropological definition 
of religion as a system of symbols must include historical relations with 
non-religious symbols and their articulation in social life. 
Another symbolic anthropological definition was drawn by Spiro, 
who defined religion as “an institution consisting of culturally patterned 
interaction with culturally postulated superhuman beings” 66. This 
definition includes the existence of Supreme or at least supernatural 
symbolic beings, like gods, idols, elements. The existence of these symbols, 
though, is for Spiro an effect of culture.
64.  Geertz C., 2002, p 63.
65.  Asad T., 2002, pp. 116-129.
66.  Spiro, M. E. 1966, p 122 .
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According to Bowie67, symbolic definitions in anthropology were most 
vociferously criticised by Robin Horton. The definition which Horton68 
has proposed referred to the fields of social relationships. Religion is, in 
his meaning, an extension of the relationships of purely human society to 
relations with non-human alters. 
Firth69, on the other hand, described religion by referring to its 
functions in society. The functions that Firth ascribed to religions include: 
the integrating function, the function of vesting interests in social and 
economic affairs, and the function of providing an outlet for individual 
sentiments and finally the cathartic function. However, since each religion 
differs and may not share these functions, Firth proposes the following 
unifying definition to describe the beliefs that can be considered religious: 
“a man’s attempt to make the supreme, final and unique but really 
unattainable adjustment – the search after the complete formula for the 
synthesis of human conduct”.70
Frazer71, on the other hand, saw religion as a stage of intellectual 
development of mankind, parallel to a stage in evolution. Mankind 
was, according to him, passing through three stages of intellectual 
development: from magic, through religion, to science.
Another famous anthropologist of religion, Evans-Pritchard72, in 
his research on primitive religions, criticised the scientific approach and 
attempted to define religion in psychological categories. Psychological 
definitions see religion as an emotion or even an illusion arising from 
various grounds, like the experience of ghosts, a soul or fear of death. 
Evans-Pritchard criticised other psychological approaches, of among 
others, Freud73 and Tylor74, which perceive religion as a sort of emotional 
illusion claiming that: 
67.  Bowie F., 2006, pp. 20-21.
68.  Horton R., 1994, p 23.
69.  Firth R., 1996, pp. 44-47.
70.  Ibid., p 47.
71.  Frazer J., 1890.
72.  Evans-Pritchard, E.E., 1965.
73.  Freud S., 1975.
74.  Tylor E. B., 1958.
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“Desires and impulses, conscious and unconscious, motivate man, 
direct his interest, and impel him to action; and they certainly play 
their part in religion. That is not to be denied. What has to be 
determined is their nature and the part they do play. What I protest 
against is mere assertion, and what I challenge is an explanation 
of religion in terms of emotion or even, in the sway of it, of 
hallucination.”75
Further approaches to defining religion can be found in sociological 
research. In one of the most highly quoted sociological work on religion, 
The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, Durkheim defines religion as a 
collective, social phenomenon:
“A religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to 
sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden beliefs 
and practices which unite into one single moral community called a 
Church, all those who adhere to them.”76
For Durkheim, religion is inseparable from the Church and it is a social 
experience rather than an individual one. Without a community of 
worshippers, according to Durkheim, there is no religion.
Berger, on the other hand, in The Sacred Canopy attempts to 
define religion as “the human enterprise by which a sacred cosmos is 
established.”77 In other words, through religion, social institutions are 
given a cosmic, universal status, which is transcendental to everyday life.78 
Davie points out two types of definitions, substantive and functional79. 
While substantive definitions deal with what religion is, functional 
definitions are concerned with what religion does. She observes various 
problems in the application of a definition. A substantive approach limits 
the scope of recognised religions by putting emphasis on beliefs in the 
75.  Evans-Pritchard, E.E. 1965, p 47.
76.  Durkheim, E., 1971, p 47.
77.  Berger PL., 1990, p 25.
78.  Ibid., p 36.
79.  Davie G., 2007, pp. 19-21.
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supernatural. Especially non-Western forms of the supernatural often “sit 
uneasy within frames of reference which derive from Western culture”80. 
Functional definitions, on the other hand, may not include all the aspects 
of religion81. In the study of religion, underlines Davie, one should look 
both at religious goals and the means of achieving them82.
Hervieu-Léger observes that in the era of modern belief all forms 
of religious syncretism are possible and thus the definition of religion 
must be dynamic and cannot refer either to particular articles of belief, 
nor to specific social observances83. A typical definition runs the risk of 
particularising certain features. Thus Hervieu-Léger proposes to abandon 
traditional definitions and concentrate on the type of legitimation applied 
to the act of believing. Her assumption is that there is no religion without 
an authority of tradition invoked — a religion in “a chain of memory” 84. 
One would describe any form of belief as religious, if the person holding 
it sees in it his or her commitment to a historical chain of belief85. 
Philosophers and theologians, though, in addition to the social aspect, 
recognise also the role of the individual religious experience. Ninian 
Smart86 underlines the necessity of identifying the individual aspect: 
“Though typically religion is a group affair of some sort, I do not deny 
that an individual can have his own, private faith.” Smart deals with all 
the difficulties of defining religion and he admits that the definition of 
religions need not be simple:
“The fact that we use a single word does not entail that the definition 
has to be simple. If it has to be disjunctive—to give alternative 
conditions for the application of the word in question—this is no 
 tragedy.”87
80.  Ibid., p 20.
81.  Ibid., p 42.
82.  Ibid., p 42.
83.  Hervieu-Léger, 2000.
84.  Ibid., p 76.
85.  Ibid., p 81.
86.  Smart N., 1979.
87.  Ibid., p 26.
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Thus, for him, religion may include both the experience of the 
Holy, as described by Rudolf Otto88, the ritual and the belief in the 
transcendental or after-life. Smart acknowledges that there are problems 
with the connections of the different aspects and some religions do not 
necessarily include all the elements. Therefore, he analyses all the parts 
of the definition and identifies examples which do not follow the general 
understandings, for instance the understanding of the Holy, which 
does not denote faith in God or any supreme being, like in the case of 
Theravada Buddhism. 
Derrida, on the other hand, in his Faith and Knowledge89, proposes 
three approaches, similar to some already mentioned before. The first 
approach is the etymological approach, which includes examination 
of the origins of the word. But Derrida, like Hoyt, admits that perhaps 
answering the question whether the word “religio” originates from 
“religare” or “relegare” might be impossible and thus not useful for 
understanding the concept itself.
The second approach is a search for historio-semantical filiations of 
genealogies in order to determine historical transformations of religion. 
This approach, according to Derrida, would lead to the conclusion that 
taking into consideration historical usage of the word and its origin, 
only Christians would be allowed to use the term “religion” or at least it 
would be useful only in the circle of Indo-European languages. Such an 
approach remains unsatisfactory.
Finally, the third approach is concerned with pragmatic and functional 
effects of religion. Derrida also considers the “religious” or “religiosity” to 
be associated with the experience of the sacredness of the divine, the holy 
and the unscathed as well as the belief in the possibility of the Holy itself. 
The emphasis here is put on the individual experience and individual 
belief in sacredness of some sort. 
Tillich devotes all of his work What is Religion? to the concept 
of religion and its interconnections with culture. In a religious act, 
the cultural is formal and religion is directed towards grasping the 
88.  Otto R.,1969. According to Otto, the experience of the Holy includes the sense of 
something which is a mysterium tremendum et fascinans.
89.  Derrida J., 2002.
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Unconditional, Tillich postulates90. Sacramental religion can use certain 
symbols but when symbols are dissolved, religion can be pushed into 
mysticism. Thus religions can take more or less organised and culturally 
conditioned forms. The distinguishing factor, however, for a “religion” 
is the intention of grasping the Unconditional and the Unconditional 
is something which is not bound by conditioned reality but includes 
something ultimate, something beyond the conditioned. 
2.3.2. The terms “religion” and “religious” as used in law
There are numerous occasions on which the term “religion” or “religious” 
appears in legal texts, be it laws concerning the registration of religious 
communities, the rights of individuals to the freedom of religion or 
concerning recognised grounds for granting a refugee status. Some 
concrete examples of laws existing in European states and dealing 
directly or indirectly with the concepts of “religion” and “religious” will be 
mentioned in this work, while discussing particular problems concerning 
religion in contemporary European society. 
It is useful to realise that the usage of the term “religion” in law may 
include either reference to an abstract notion, the one that I have been 
so far trying to clarify, or on some occasions to a specific religion or 
denomination. When, instead of a reference to an abstract term “religion”, 
which might include various religions or beliefs, the term is used to signify 
a concrete religion, further clarification or interpretation of the term is in 
most cases unnecessary. Such examples might be concordat treaties with 
the Holy See, where “religion” or “religious”, refer to a concrete recognised 
denomination of Christianity, namely Roman Catholicism and forms 
of religious pursuits characteristic of it. For instance, the text of the 
Portuguese concordat includes the following provision:
“The Holy See, the Portuguese Bishops’ Conference, dioceses and 
other ecclesiastical jurisdictions (…) appointed by competent 
ecclesiastical authorities for the pursuance of religious ends, (…), are 
exempt from any form of tax or general payment, regional or local, on 
90.  Tillich P, 1973, pp. 59-62.
64
(…) seminaries or other such institutions designated for ecclesiastical 
training or for the teaching of the Catholic religion (…)”91
In European-wide legal instruments, the notion “religion” appears 
in the first, abstract form, including a category which often requires 
interpretation and clarification. At present at least two European-wide 
legal acts use expressly the term “religion” and “belief ”. The first is the 
European Convention on Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, which 
establishes the right to freedom of religion in the member states of the 
Council of Europe in Article 9:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, 
and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public 
or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, 
practice and observance.
2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only 
to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection 
of public order, health or morals, or the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others.
The second is the Employment Equality Directive adopted in the year 
2000 and binding the countries belonging to the European Union:
“The purpose of this Directive is to lay down a general framework 
for combating discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief, 
disability, age or sexual orientation as regards employment and 
occupation, with a view to putting into effect in the Member States 
the principle of equal treatment.”92
As shown below, these terms remain undefined in the European context.
91.  Concordat with the Holy See and the Portuguese Republic, 2004, Article 26.2.
92.  Council Directive 2000/78/EC, Article 1 establishing a general framework for 
equal treatment in employment and occupation, emphasis added by this author.
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2.3.3. Direct interpretation of the term “religion”  
in the United Nations materials
The term “religion” has been a subject of interpretation by the Office of 
the United Nation’s High Commissioner for Refugees in the context 
of one international law document, namely the Refugee Convention93. 
In 2004 the UNHCR issued guidelines on international refugee 
protection based on religious claims94. The guidelines include the section 
titled Defining “Religion” and for the needs of the Refugee Convention 
include a definition of “religion” based on three aspects of the religious 
phenomenon.
First of all, religion should be understood as a “belief ”, which “should 
be interpreted so as to include theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs. 
Beliefs may take the form of convictions or values about the divine or 
ultimate reality or the spiritual destiny of mankind. Claimants may also 
be considered heretics, apostates, schismatic, pagans or superstitious, even 
by other adherents of their religious tradition and be persecuted for that 
reason.”95
Secondly, religion could be understood as “identity”. This aspect is 
connected with the sense of belonging and being identified as a member 
of a particular group or community and has less to do with theological 
beliefs, rituals or traditions.
Thirdly, the report observes, for some, religion is a “way of life”. This 
aspect should be understood in such a way, that the person relates to 
the world through particular religious activities, like wearing distinctive 
clothing, observing particular practices, observing particular holidays or 
dietary requirements.
Identifying one or more of these aspects should lead to recognition of 
religion as the ground for a refugee claim. However, finding only one of 
them is, according to the document, sufficient.
93.  Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951.
94.  Guidelines on International Protection: Religion-Based Refugee Claims under 
Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status 
of Refugees, HCR/GIP/04/06, 2004.
95.  Ibid.
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This model is based on the proposal prepared by Karen Musalo and 
Jeremy Gunn96. Later, the same concepts were developed further by 
Gunn in The Complexity of Religion and the Definition of “Religion” in 
International Law.
These three aspects of “religion” suggested in the guidelines and in the 
related articles attempt to include most of the formerly discussed scientific 
and legal approaches towards the notion of a “religion”. This definition 
might be considered as relatively universal and suitable for embracing 
all sorts of beliefs. It also embraces different forms of feeling about the 
individual’s religious or non-religious convictions. As the distinctive 
feature of “a belief ”, this definition concentrates on the notion of divine, 
ultimate reality and the spiritual destiny of humankind. These notions 
are based on the understanding of “a religion” in the traditional meaning 
related to understandings offered by Tillich, Otto or Smart. However, 
in order to include various modern types of religions, the definition 
postulates that the notion must include also non-theistic and atheistic 
beliefs, which do not necessarily include or by definition do not include 
faith in a divine, ultimate or spiritual destiny. Moreover, the important 
part of the definition is the emphasis on the fact that the “religion” of 
a claimant might not be considered “a religion” by other adherents, but 
instead it might be seen as heresy, superstition etc. This approach seems to 
recognise the individual aspect of the belief and attempts to broaden the 
traditional views in order to include notions not commonly recognised as 
religious as well as to sensitise those who apply the law to non-traditional 
views and beliefs. In addition, it includes two other aspects of religion as 
“identity” and religion as a “way of life”, which do not require theological 
considerations. Those two aspects, while on the surface correct in their 
attempt at reaching the ideal of universality and broadness, might still 
constitute certain problems.
This definition of religion seems to be well constructed so as to avoid 
exclusion of any form of modern or traditional belief or disbelief. It 
includes three important aspects of religious conducts. Yet, the problem 
96.  Gunn J, Musalo K., 2002, Claims for Protection Based on Religion or Belief: 
Analysis and Proposed Conclusions, Commissioned by the Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
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of the definition, as mentioned above concerns its two last parts, referring 
to “identities” and “ways of life”. Should every “identity” and every “way 
of life” count as religious? If only one of the three facets of religion is 
required to consider the views as religious, the last two facets allow for 
over-interpretation and over-inclusion. In order to avoid the protection 
of beliefs that are evidently not religious, interpreters in the process of 
applying the guidelines are likely to refer to the analogy to traditional 
beliefs so as to avoid misuse of the notion “religion”. Such a danger can 
limit significantly the usage of two other facets of recognition of a belief 
as “religious”. It can lead to a simple definition by analogy to traditional 
concepts. Not every identity or belief is religious. Can, for instance, a 
belief in the ultimate value of getting rich be considered “religious”? 
Certainly belonging to the club of millionaires can become an identity 
and way of life and certainly it can also be the ultimate concern of one’s 
life. Yet, hardly anyone would consider such a belief to be religious. This 
definition would be far more complete if it included the functional aspect, 
like the approach introduced in Seeger, which will be mentioned in the 
following sections. Belief or something considered as “religious” should 
play a role and occupy a place in the life of the adherent similar to that 
of religion in the life of an adherent of something that is undoubtedly 
religious. Including this aspect would require that the analogy be 
interpreted not strictly and narrowly but in such a way that the relevant 
function of the belief, identity or way of life be considered.
2.3.4. Examples from afar: American and Australian  
approaches towards defining religion
In his article Defining “Religion” in the First Amendment: A Functional 
Approach, Ben Clements97 summarises and evaluates weaknesses of the 
main legal theoretical definitions of “religion” based on an interpretation 
of the American First Amendment. Though these interpretations 
originate from a non-European system, they might be helpful for 
outlining possibilities of a legal understanding of “religion” in a religiously 
plural society.
97.  Clements B., 1989.
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The first approach called the “ultimate concern approach” is 
based on the previously mentioned approach of Paul Tillich. Such an 
approach should be tolerant and assure that no religion is excluded. Yet, 
Greenawalt98, and following him Clements, expresses a concern about 
the hierarchy of concerns in human life. In the ladder formed of different 
concerns, it might be impossible to determine the ultimate concern. 
Moreover, the ultimate concern need not be necessarily of a religious 
nature. Greenawalt, who in his Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law 
supports a different, so-called analogical approach, notes the following:
“Many people care a great deal about a number of things – their own 
happiness, the welfare of their family, their country, perhaps their 
religion, without any clear ordering between these and without any 
single ordering principle for clashes between them.”
Regarding the centrality of the ultimate concern in the person’s life, 
Greenawalt observes that the lives of people addicted to drugs may centre 
around using and obtaining drugs and they may be willing to do anything 
in order to obtain drugs. Nevertheless, such an ultimate concern will not 
be of a religious nature.
The second approach met in American scholarship is a “non-rational, 
transcendent approach”. According to this view a “religion” or “religious 
belief ” is faith in something beyond the mundane observable world 
– faith that some higher or deeper reality exists than that which can be 
established by ordinary existence or scientific observation. However, 
Clements underlines that it seems highly unlikely that an acceptable line 
could be drawn between the realm of scientific demonstrability and the 
realm of faith. Moreover, this might be an overly broad definition, since 
every view not subject to scientific proof could be classified as religious.
Another American constitutional approach is referred to as an 
“extratemporal consequences approach”. According to this approach, 
supported strongly by Choper99 in Defining “Religion” in the First 
Amendment, a person’s belief is of a religious nature if the effects of the 
98.  Greenawalt K., 1984.
99.  Choper J.H., 1982.
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action taken pursuant or contrary to the dictates of a person’s beliefs 
extend beyond his lifetime. However, Clements and Greenawalt approach 
this view critically for the primary reason that it excludes all the beliefs 
which do not include faith in an afterlife. 
A “non-definitional analogical approach” is supported by Greenawalt 
in Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law. Greenawalt claims that the 
mere concept of “definition” is potentially misleading and argues for the 
following solution:
“My basic thesis is that for constitutional purposes, religion should be 
determined by the closest of analogy in the relevant aspects between 
the disputed instance and what is indisputably religion”100.
This view has many strong points. Greenawalt claims that no single 
condition is necessary for religion. Thus the definition would encompass 
various religions. It also relates to modern, non-legal concepts of religion. 
However, this approach produces a few dangers. First of all, as Clements 
observes, the approach has little to offer to really determine which beliefs 
could be considered to be religious. The definition is potentially both 
overinclusive and underinclusive. Moreover, the danger of the analogy to 
only a very traditional understanding of religion also occurs. The judges 
might reject modern spirituality and religiosity concepts as non-religious 
on the basis of comparison to “what is indisputably religious” in their own 
views and thus this approach could bring about the effect exactly opposite 
to that intended.
Another analogical approach could be possible. Clements calls it an 
“analogical approach based on external manifestations of traditional 
religions”. Such an approach would recognise as religious those beliefs 
that show any formal, external or surface signs that might be analogised 
to accepted religions. Those signs might consist of the existence of formal 
services, ceremonial functions, clergy, structure, organization, observation 
of holidays, and other similar manifestations associated with traditional 
religions. The weakness of this approach lies, according to Clements, in 
favouring organised religions over individualised personal approaches. 
100.  Greenawalt K., 1984, p 762.
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Also those beliefs which are not shared by any of the major religions or 
sects might not receive protection. 
Finally, the approach accepted by the US Congress and strongly 
supported by Clements is named in the theory “functional approach”. 
This approach is based on the Seeger v. United States case and further 
developed in Welsh vs. United States. It defines religion on the basis of 
the function that it has in the life of the adherents. A “religion” for the 
purposes of the First Amendment should be understood as: 
“a sincere and meaningful belief, which occupies in the life of its 
possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly 
qualifying for the exemption.”101
Further development of this reasoning in Welsh vs. United States embraced 
also beliefs of a non-religious nature. The understanding of “religious” 
should be as broad as to embrace beliefs that “play the role of a religion 
and function as a religion in [a person’s] life”. To refer to the role that 
religion occupies, the justices turned again to Tillich’s ultimate concern 
concept. Clements supports the functional definition as the least 
discriminatory. Yet, he himself notices that the flaws of this definition are 
similar to the flaws of other definitions: the over-inclusiveness and under-
inclusiveness of the approach.
The Australian approach to the definition of religion has developed 
on the basis of article 116 of the Australian Constitution and the Church 
of the New Faith case. Article 116 provides non-establishment principle 
similarly to the American First Amendment. However, the understanding 
of religion is far narrower. In the Church of the New Faith judgment the 
Australian High Court stipulated a twofold criterion for religion. Firstly, 
it should be a belief in a supernatural Being, Thing or Principle and 
secondly, it should include acceptance of canons of conduct in order to 
give effect to that belief. 
Evans criticises generally narrow and rather conservative approach 
towards religion in the Australian Constitution102. She does not, however, 
101.  Seeger vs. United States.
102.  Evans C., 2008.
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find the definition too narrow and argues that the definition of this 
kind captures majority of recognised religions103. However, Sadurski104 
criticises this approach and observes that the word “supernatural” might 
exclude some of the minority religions and philosophical approaches. 
Taking into consideration the Australian Free Exercise Principle, seeking 
to eliminate coercive pressure imposed on the individual who is in pursuit 
of his or her moral choices, and the Non-Establishment Principle, 
securing the non-interference of the State in the actions of religious 
bodies, Sadurski proposes reference to the American theory. He argues 
in favour of the functional approach based on Seeger vs. United States. 
He justifies it, among other arguments, by referring to the fact that it 
may include both religious and non-religious beliefs, which when held 
sincerely by an individual, constitute motivating grounds for his or her 
actions.
2.3.5. European Court of Human Rights and avoidance of the definition
The European Convention on Fundamental Rights and Freedoms is the 
main document unifying the approach towards religion in European 
countries. The Convention uses, in addition to the concept of “religion”, 
another very important concept of “belief ” that is similarly difficult to 
define. Neither of the terms is defined in the text of the Convention itself 
or by the European Court of Human Rights.
The term “religion” is used in most cases as self-evident and not 
needing further elaboration. The Court rarely explicates what elements 
are constitutive for the existence of a religion or a belief, even though 
in their case law, they had to choose on many occasions what beliefs or 
religions should enjoy protection. 
The provision concerning the freedom of religion can per se be used as 
the first source for deriving features that characterise a “religion” or “belief ”. 
Activities characterising a “religion” or “belief ” include manifesting the 
“religion” or “belief ”, in worship, teaching, practice and observance alone or 
in community with others. However, all of these characteristics tell us little 
103.  Ibid., p 292.
104.  Sadurski W., 1989.
2
about the nature of the phenomenon in question and if separated from 
that specific provision could be used to describe various other activities of 
life than those which are connected to the sphere of religion and belief. 
One can manifest alone or in a community with others a particular taste 
in films or music or practice a particular lifestyle not determined by any 
particular belief or religion. One can, for example, teach others about one’s 
hobby, manifest a fondness for a particular kind music at a festival together 
with others or practice jogging every morning without the necessity of 
having any specific beliefs concerning these activities. Although at the 
same time similar activities might be motivated by a belief or a religion. 
Thus the characteristic activities proper for a worshiper of a religion can 
tell us little about the nature of the phenomenon itself. Perhaps, among 
all these protected activities only “worship” is an element which might 
be considered inseparably associated with a “religion” or a “belief ”. Yet, 
it is impossible to say that worship is exclusively of a religious nature. 
There might be instances of worship that is not religious in nature, like 
worshipping a person as an idol. 
One of the most relevant cases concerning religious freedom is the 
case of Kokkinakis vs. Greece. In this case, as well as in many later cases, 
the ECTHR outlined a few elements that are essential for the existence 
of a religion or a belief: 
“(…) the Convention protects acts of worship and devotion which are 
aspects of the practice of a religion or belief in a generally recognised 
form.”
Moreover:
“While religious freedom is primarily a matter of individual 
conscience, it also implies, inter alia, freedom to “manifest [one’s] 
religion”. Bearing witness in words and deeds is bound up with the 
existence of religious convictions.”
These elements, however, are just the same as discussed above and are 
already enumerated in the provision itself. A new term appearing is 
“devotion”, yet it can be similarly understood as “worship”. Moreover, one 
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can demonstrate one’s devotion to his or her work, for instance. The term 
religion itself thus remains undefined. 
Though religion has not been defined, the Court did admit that religion 
is a matter of individual conscience and thus should not be limited only to 
recognised religions. This view was also articulated in Kokkinakis vs. Greece:
“the religious dimension, [is] one the most vital elements that go to make 
up the identity of believers and their conception of life, but it is also a 
precious asset for atheists, agnostics, sceptics and the unconcerned.”
The same statement does refer to religious dimensions as the most vital 
elements concerning the conception of life. This is perhaps the closest to 
the definition that the Court has so far come. It underlines the connection 
of a “religion” or “belief ” with the conception of life. 
The Court, however, does not seem to follow fully its own views 
regarding equal protection for all beliefs. Atheists, agnostics, sceptics and 
the unconcerned should receive equal protection according to the above-
mentioned principle. However, in cases of less recognised beliefs, the 
Court’s statements usually refrain from recognising them as religions. 
In the case of X. vs. the United Kingdom105 the Commission refused to 
establish whether Wicca could be regarded as a protected religion or belief:
“In the present case the applicant has not mentioned any facts making 
it possible to establish the existence of the Wicca religion.”
This vague statement is at least sceptical towards recognising believers’ 
individual conceptions of life. It might be surprising, especially when 
varied and rich research on Wicca as a belief (or religion) has been 
conducted106. The studies have outlined basic elements of Wicca, the 
core of the belief, the ritual and historical sides and all the other elements 
helpful for determining the existence of a religion. On the other hand, we 
must take into consideration the time when this judgment was issued. In 
the 1970s the availability of information about various rare beliefs, among 
105.  X vs. the United Kingdom, Application 7291/75.
106.  E.g. Hutton R., 2000 or Kirkpatrick R.G., Rainey R., Rubi K., 1986..
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them Wicca, was far more limited than today and new beliefs were only 
starting to appear on the previously almost uniformly Christian scene. 
Therefore we might consider that back then the Court wanted to ensure 
that no fictional belief would be used as an instrument for misusing 
the Convention for other purposes. This tendency to underestimate the 
importance of minor religions, however, appears to be more general and 
the Court itself has emphasised the existence of advantages flowing from 
the fact of belonging to a well-recognised religion:
“Jehovah’s Witnesses accordingly enjoy both the status of a “known 
religion” and the advantages flowing from that as regards observance.”107
Well-known religions recognised by the Court without questioning 
are: the variety of Christian denominations108, Islam109, Hinduism110, 
Buddhism111 or Judaism112. The term “religion” ascribed to them is so self-
evident that it requires no further consideration or examination.
In cases of religions or beliefs which are not as commonly recognised 
as the above-mentioned ones, the Court has generally shown reluctance 
in establishing whether they constitute “religions” or protected “beliefs”. 
In the case concerning a Druidic order, the Commission refrained 
from admitting whether druidism was a religion. It stated briefly that 
for the purpose of the application, which was manifestly ill-founded, an 
examination whether druidism was a religion was not necessary. In a few 
cases, though, rare religious movements have been recognised, although 
usually not granted protection like the Divine Light Zentrum113 or 
The Church of Scientology114. In the case of scientology, however, 
107.  Kokkinakis vs. Greece.
108.  E.g. Knudsen vs. Norway, (1986) 8 EHRR 48.
109.  E.g. Serif vs. Greece, Application no. 38178/97.
110.  E.g. ISKCON and others vs. the United Kingdom 20490/92.
111.  E.g. X vs. the United Kingdom 5442/72.
112.  E.g. D. vs. France 10180/82.
113.  Swami Omkarananda and the Divine Light Zentrum vs. Switzerland, 
Application 8118/77.
114.  Church of Scientology Moscow and Others vs. Russia, Application no. 
18147/02.
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the approach is not uniform and it is once referred to as a religious 
movement115 and at other times as an organization116.
Neither has the Court put much emphasis on the differential points 
between religions and beliefs. In the case of Young, James and Webster vs. 
the United Kingdom117, the Commission referred to the opinion of the 
British government according to which a belief meant an opinion akin to 
religion but based on thought and conscience. The Commission refused 
to support or reject this opinion saying:
“Even if the Commission were to take the view that terms “belief ” 
and “manifesting his belief ” should be given a wider meaning, it 
could not possibly be so wide that the state was required to refrain 
from stopping a person doing anything he wanted regardless of the 
objections of others (…)”
Thus we can define the belief only negatively, as something which cannot 
be as wide as allowing doing anything that the person considers to be 
in the scope of a belief, regardless of the objection of others. Similarly 
to resisting defining “religion”, the Court offers no definition of “belief ” 
either. However, certain requirements for the existence of “philosophical 
convictions” have been outlined in this judgment:
“The term “philosophical convictions” denotes views that attain a 
certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance.”
No explanation is offered, however, whether the term “philosophical 
convictions” covers the term “belief ” or whether it is narrower. Can there 
be any protected beliefs which do not bear the nature of philosophical 
convictions? The term “philosophical convictions” covers at least non-
religious beliefs such as atheism, which is well-recognised in the case law 
of the Court. The important characteristics of seriousness, importance and 
115.  X. and Church of Scientology vs. Sweden 7805/77.
116.  Scientology Kirche Deutschland e. vs. v. Germany 34614/97.
117.  Young, James and Webster vs. the United Kingdom, Application no. 7601/76; 
7806/77.
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cohesion have been, however, established as the threshold for recognition 
of a protected “belief ”118.
2.3.6. The European Union and the lack of definition
The Treaty establishing the European Community and Treaty on the 
European Union both refer to human rights and non-discrimination 
on the grounds of religion. So does a special Employment Equality 
Directive119 from the year 2000. Yet, no judgements dealing with religious 
problems in particular have been issued by the European Court of Justice.
In November 2006, at the request of the European Commission and 
under the framework of the European Community Action Programme to 
combat discrimination, a special report “Religion and Belief Discrimination 
in Employment - the EU Law” by Lucy Vickers was published120. 
The report devotes an entire chapter to the definition of religion. 
Yet the author emphasises that there is currently no uniform definition 
of religion or belief in Europe. The Luxembourg court, similarly to the 
Strasbourg court, has refrained from getting tangled in the definitional 
cobweb. The report refers to American or Australian approaches to the 
definition, in search of an explanation for what “religion” or “belief ” means. 
It also presents some approaches in the EU countries. Yet, in itself, it does 
not propose any new approach. It refers to the dangers and advantages of 
avoiding a definition, but it does not strongly advocate in favour of any.
The case law based on the Employment Equality Directive does not 
yet include any case brought before the court on religious grounds. A 
vague reference to the religious dimension of the Directive was expressed 
118.  The same repeated in X,Y and Z vs. UK (1982) 31 D&R 50 and Campbell and 
Cosans vs. UK (1982) 4 EHHR 293.
119.  2000/78 EC.
120.  This report was drafted by Lucy Vickers on the authority of the European 
Network of Legal Experts in the non-discrimination field and its contents do not 
necessarily reflect the opinion of the European Commission: Vickers, L., 2006, 
Religion and Belief Discrimination in Employment - the EU law. 
Recently Vickers published a comprehensive monograph dealing with the issues 
of religious discrimination at the workplace, where she discusses problems of the 
definition, see: Vickers L., 2008.
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in the opinion of Poiares Maduro, the Advocate General, in S. Coleman 
vs. Attridge Law121 and Steve Law. Maduro referred to the possibility 
of the existence of discriminative provisions, which are dictated by the 
Directive, but in fact led towards completely the opposite effect. In this 
example, Maduro referred to the example of religion as a basis for the 
possible discriminatory nature of non-discrimination laws, e.g. a measure 
offering protection from discrimination based on religion to adherents of 
only some, but not all, religions. But this reference did not shed any light 
on the definitional problem itself.
2.4. Some European definitions
2.4.1. The Charity Commissioners on “religion” in light  
of the Charities Act in England and Wales
In 1999 The Charity Commissioners for England and Wales issued their 
widely discussed decision concerning the application of the Church of 
Scientology for registration as a charity. The Commissioners concluded 
that Scientology is not a religion for the purposes of charity law. 
According to the Commissioners, the core practices of scientology do 
not constitute religious worship as they “do not display the characteristic 
of reverence or veneration for a supreme being”. The Commissioners 
referred to other cases, and agreed that the definition of “religion” in 
English charity law was characterised by “a belief in a supreme being 
and expression of that belief though worship”. This definition has been 
criticised among others by Gunn122 on the grounds of evaluating and 
ranking some religions as better and some as worse.
The deficiency of this approach is limiting the notion of “religious” 
exclusively to traditional theistic religions. Any beliefs close to neo-
paganism or even Theravada Buddhism could not be classified as religions 
under this definition. 
121.  Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro, Case -303/06.
122.  Gunn J., 2003.
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2.4.2. German courts on the notion of “religion” and “religious”  
– the battle for the recognition of the Church of Scientology 
In their decisions concerning the Church of Scientology, the German 
Federal Constitutional court123, Federal Labour court124 and Federal 
Administrative court125expressed their opinion concerning the meaning 
of the word “religion” and “religious” in German law primarily in cases 
concerning recognition of the Church of Scientology as a religion. Like 
in England, Scientology had problems in having its beliefs recognised 
as religious in Germany. The courts, though, took a far less restrictive 
interpretation than the English Charity Commissioners. Religion and 
religious community, according to the German courts, should have spiritual 
content and assign transcendent value to human life. The active presence of a 
religious community in public life should be based on that spiritual content. 
According to the German courts, Scientology did not meet these conditions 
and their religious commitment was not objective and adequately verifiable 
and thus they were not a religion and the Church of Scientology was not a 
religious community. 
However, the latest decision of the Higher Administrative Court 
for North Rhine-Westphalia126 of 12th February 2008 changed this 
line of reasoning and recognised Scientology as a religion and the 
Church of Scientology as a religious community. The Federal Office 
for the Protection of the Constitution127 claimed that Scientology is an 
organization that has anti-constitutional ambitions. The court dismissed 
that claim and based their decision on a careful reading of the L. Ron 
Hubbard works and other documents on which the Church bases its 
activity. In this judgment, Scientology for the first time found recognition 
of their religious activity after a long wave of judicial battles.
123.  BVerfG 1 BvR 632/92.
124.  5 AZB 21/94.
125.  8 C 12/79.
126.  5 a 130/05.
127.  Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz.
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2.4.3. The Spanish Constitutional court  
and their strategy of avoiding a definition
Javier Martinez-Torrón128, in Freedom of religion in the case law of the 
Spanish Constitutional court, deals with the notion of religion in Spanish 
law and observes that the traditional understanding of “religion” in 
Spanish courts was rooted in the traditional and monotheistic heritage. 
A “religion” was characterised by three elements: the belief in a Supreme 
Being developed into tenets and commands, external worship and a 
certain institutional organization. The change in this understanding 
came together with the case of The Church of Unification, which upon 
being refused registration as a religious group, filed a complaint to 
the Constitutional Court. The Court ruled in favour of the Church 
and rendered the concept of “religion” inoperative. The Court simply 
decided that administrative authorities do not have any discretion, or 
margin of appreciation to examine the religious nature of any group. 
In practice, though, observes Martinez-Torrón, the authorities must 
refer to the Organic Law of Religious Freedom in order to determine 
whether the group is excluded from protection as stated in Article 3: 
“activities, purposes and entities relating to or engaging in the study of 
and experimentation with psychic or parapsychological phenomena 
or the dissemination of humanistic or spiritualistic values or other 
similar non-religious aims do not qualify for the protection”. Martinez-
Torrón observes that the lack of guidelines places the authorities in a 
difficult position where it is safest to avoid any control and accept every 
application. 
Such a strategy provides easy entry for any community to register 
as religious. The point of departure is correct from the point of view 
of religious pluralism. The communities wanting to register must 
themselves determine their religious character. This leads us into an 
absolutely individualistic approach, in which anything that the group 
of people considers to be of a religious character should be considered 
as such. Yet, this approach leads to an inevitable dilemma, how to avoid 
the registration of fictional applicants and communities which in fact do 
128.  Martinez-Tórron J., 2001. 
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not exist. On the other hand, there were no special benefits stemming 
from the fact of being placed in the register, the existence of fictional 
entities should not be considered a problem. In fact, however the mere 
existence of registries of religious communities is usually connected with 
acquiring a legal personality and the benefits stemming from such status. 
In a religiously plural society, in order to avoid the “otherisation” of any 
religious group, it is preferable to allow a fictional group to register than 
to prevent a genuine group from registering and enjoying the privileges 
that other religious communities enjoy. 
2.4.4. The Dutch Equal Treatment Commission on “religion” and “belief ”
The Dutch Equal Treatment Commission is responsible for the 
enforcement of equality and non-discrimination law. Dutch law 
recognises freedom from discrimination on the grounds of a religion 
or belief. In that context, the Commission in its opinions has taken a 
position concerning the definition of a “religion” or a “belief ”. In its 
opinions CGB 2003-114 and CGB 2004-06, the Commission defines a 
“religion” as convictions about life having a Supreme Being as a central 
point, while a belief is defined as existential convictions that do not 
necessarily recognise a Supreme Being. Moreover, recognition of a belief 
requires that the convictions be formed into a more or less coherent 
system of ideas concerning fundamental views on human existence. This 
definition is very exact and the definition of religion is rather narrow and 
limited to religions similar to traditional religions. The broad definition 
of belief compensates for it as long as a religion or belief enjoys equal 
protection, like it is in the Dutch anti-discrimination laws. In some 
opinions the Dutch Commission had to specify which beliefs are 
regarded as religions129 and which as beliefs130. 
129.  E.g. Rastafarianism was recognised as a religion in CGB 2005-162.
130.  E.g. Osho, beliefs formulated and named after Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh, 
concentrating to a large degree on meditation, were recognised as a “belief ” and not as 
a “religion” in CGB 2005-67.
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2.4.5. Polish and Austrian traditional approach  
towards “communities of faith” 
Like in most other countries, the definition of religion in Polish and 
Austrian law appears in the context of communities of faith. Polish 
Law on the Guarantees of Freedom of Conscience and Religious 
Denomination131 defines requirements that the community of faith must 
meet in order to be able to register in the Registry of Communities of 
Faith. Similar requirements can be found in the Austrian law on Legal 
Personality of Communities of Faith. These requirements in both of 
the countries are rather traditional and accept only very well organised 
religious communities. The approach does not bind the religious aspect 
with faith in a Supreme Being but instead bases it on an analogy to 
religious communities in the traditional meaning and their functioning. 
A community of faith, according to Polish law, is a “religious community 
founded for the purpose of worshipping and propagating a religious 
faith, which has got its own organization, doctrine and practices. Thus, 
in order to register as a religious community, it is necessary to provide, 
among others, the following: signatures and personal data of at least 
100 followers, information about forms of religious life and methods of 
functioning and a written statute of the community. The high number 
of followers excludes small communities from registering. Also the 
requirements of having a doctrine, organization and practices exclude 
less organised religions from registering. Although Pawel Borecki132 
underlines that small and less organised communities can register in other 
forms, like as public foundations, their status in my opinion is not the 
same. Before the amendment of the law, the required number of followers 
was only fifteen. The change increased the difficulty of the registration 
process. I disagree with Borecki that registration as a foundation or 
association can solve the problem. For an adherent of a certain faith it 
might be a matter of identity to have recognition as a religious adherent 
and not merely as a member of a foundation or association. 
In Austria the concerns are similar and the requirements are even 
131.  Dz.U.00.26.319.
132.  Borecki P, 2006.
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stricter133. Before being recognised as a religion, a community must be 
first recognised in a register of “confessional communities” and only after 
spending 10 years in the register, can it be recognised as a “religion”. 
In order to be entered into the register as a community, an application 
must be filed by at least 300 residents of Austria who must provide the 
description of their beliefs and other necessary documentation concerning 
their religious practices. In order to be recognised as a religion, the 
community must be organised for at least 20 years, during at least ten 
of which it must be registered in the register and moreover have a total 
number of members equal to 2 per every 1000 Austrians. Even though 
the possibility of acquiring legal personality is considered to be progress 
towards greater recognition134, the preconditions of acquiring legal 
personality have been criticised135.
This law was especially heavily criticised by Miner136, who notes that 
the requirements concerning the high numbers of followers and spending 
many years as a “confessional community” discriminates against minor 
and new religions. Miner observed that the discrimination occurred due 
to the fact that recognised religions enjoy benefits which non-recognised 
ones do not. Moreover, the non-recognised religions, according to the 
author, are exposed to being treated as “dangerous sects” and thus risk 
hostility and discrimination in the society.
Recently, in 2008, in regard to the Austrian law regulating the 
registration of a new religious community, the ECTHR found a violation 
of the Convention. Austria refused to register the Jehovah’s Witnesses 
despite the elapse of the statutory waiting period. The Court emphasised 
that:
“Indeed, the autonomous existence of religious communities is 
indispensable for pluralism in a democratic society and is, thus, an 
issue at the very heart of the protection which Article 9 affords.”
133.  Rechtspersönlichkeit von religiösen Bekenntnisgemeinschaften, BGBl. I Nr. 
19/1998.
134.  Schinkele B., 2001, p 570.
135.  See e.g. Kalb H., Potz R., Schinkele B., 1998, pp. 108-118 .
136.  Miner C., 1998.
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The judgement found the prolongation of the waiting period to be 
disproportional and thus illegitimate in a democratic society. The 
Court also stated that waiting periods might be justified in case of 
newly appearing religious movements, but not in the case of religious 
communities recognised internationally and with a long tradition. 
Moreover, the Court found that Jehovah’s Witnesses were discriminated 
against on the grounds of their religion. 137
2.5. Could a definition or a guideline help  
in European conditions?
Thinking about defining a “religion”, we must necessarily ask ourselves 
whether having a definition could help us. How is it possible to define 
a concept beyond definition and is such defining needed at all? Is the 
meaning it has in natural language perhaps enough?
I claim it is not. I would argue that for the purpose of safeguarding the 
equality of the rights of various believers and non-believers, an intuitive 
approach is not sufficient. Neither is an analogical approach or persistent 
avoidance of a definition. The silence about the meaning of the term leads 
to inconsistencies in the treatment of the same faiths in various European 
countries or to the favouring of well-established religions above those 
that are new. Similarly Vickers observes ambiguity in approach towards 
defining religion and argues in favour of a more limited definition 
of religion in the context of labour law regulations in Europe138. Her 
approach aims at greater coherence and eliminating singular beliefs like 
veganism or pacifism in contrast to comprehensive beliefs. 
In Europe, which strives for gradual integration on all levels, clear 
discrepancies in the approach towards the rights of individuals should not 
exist to such a degree. In order for the rights to be effective, an approach 
towards the freedom of religion and choice of those who can and cannot 
enjoy it should not be arbitrary. Leaving it dependant entirely on the local 
137.  Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas vs. Austria, Application no. 
40825/98.
138.  Vickers L., 2008, pp. 13-24.
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conditions, often based on traditional religious sentiments or affiliations, 
will not allow Europeans to enjoy freedom of religion equally and will 
lead to discrepancies in the functioning of the system of rights. Thus 
the Tyrolean population will be allowed to contest films on the grounds 
of having their religious feelings offended by those who do not share 
them139, Scientologists will be considered a religion in Hungary, but a sect 
in Austria, Belgium140 will be allowed to segregate who deserves to be 
protected as a religion and who needs to be placed on the list of existing 
sects. Without having guidelines concerning the notion of religion and 
belief, local authorities will be still bound to follow their traditional 
patterns of thinking, their traditional prejudices and their traditional 
conceptions of those who “deserve” freedom and those who do not. 
Now, one might ask why Europe needs uniformity on such a question. 
Why do we need unification in a matter which has been considered local 
since the time of the Reformation? Why create uniform norms when 
local conditions vary so greatly? In order to answer this question properly, 
we would have to go in detail into a discussion of the universality of 
human rights. Taking the very small segment of this discussion, referring 
to the current topic, I would argue that if uniform norms exist, and 
European countries profess to follow those uniform norms and moreover 
treat them as the fundamentals of democracy and a necessary condition 
of it, then the application of these norms should be uniform and allow 
as few exceptions as possible and only in circumstances which absolutely 
require those exceptions. If we allow for an innumerable number of local 
exceptions, the standard is lost and deprived of its meaning. I agree with 
the opinion expressed by Judge Spielmann in his dissenting opinion in the 
case Müller and others vs. Switzerland, that the margin of appreciation of 
countries should not be too broad, “otherwise, many of the guarantees laid 
down in the Convention might be in danger of remaining a dead letter, 
at least in practice”.141 If we do allow local communities to determine 
without any guidelines who “deserves” the protection on the basis of 
139.  Otto-Preminger Institut vs. Austria, Application no. 13470/87.
140.  Denaux A., 2002.
141.  Müller and others vs. Switzerland, 10737/84, Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Spielmann.
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“religion” or “belief ” then we are left at the point of departure. Everything 
that departs from the traditional for that particular community is likely 
to be deprived of the protection. The “right” becomes non-existent and 
the purpose for which the right was recognised remains unfulfilled. 
Moreover, in the growing number of issues based on religion, the 
growing fragmentation of legal systems creates chaos and difficulties in 
approaching common goals and integration on an axiological level.
For those reasons, I would opt for creating a definition or rather 
a guideline concerning the interpretation of the notions “religion” 
and “belief ” in the Convention and in the Directive, which are at this 
particular point the only unifying norms and the cornerstones of religious 
freedom in Europe.  
2.6. Universal or purpose-based definition?
The attempt at creating a universal definition might meet understandable 
resistance. Is it feasible to create one universal definition valid in any 
circumstance? Is it not more reasonable to define belief for the purpose 
of each individual legal act itself? Why not keep purpose-based norms in 
their wide variety? 
Again, this question leads me back to the argument on universality 
and the understanding of human rights as fundamental to European 
democracy. To go even further, I believe that a definition or a guideline 
should be created in order to strengthen religious pluralism, which is 
professed among others in recommendations of the COE regarding 
religious issues in Europe. “Religious pluralism is an inherent feature 
of the notion of a democratic society (…)”, states the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe and adds: “where religious pluralism 
gives rise to religious divisions, with attendant tensions, the public 
authorities’ response should not be to eliminate religious pluralism, 
but to strive to ensure that the various groups respect each other”142. 
The universal definition or guideline should facilitate achievement of 
the goal of a religiously plural society and prevent the “otherisation” of 
142.  Recommendation 1396 (1999).
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religions not traditional for the particular society. In order to create a 
religiously plural society where all the faiths and beliefs enjoy equal 
status, a universal guideline should be formulated in such a way as to 
serve the purpose of preventing arbitrary limitations concerning who 
should enjoy which privileges on the basis of his or her religion or belief. 
The universal guideline should be for that reason broad and useful for 
numerous purposes, and ensure that various uncommon, new or even not 
entirely systematised beliefs would enjoy the protection guaranteed in 
the Convention and the EU Directive. For the purpose of pluralism, all 
beliefs that only bear a sufficient degree of “cogency, seriousness, cohesion 
and importance”143 should be recognised and enjoy freedom on an equal 
basis.
2.. Problems with definitions: flexibility of the legal 
language and the need for preventing arbitrariness
The primary problem applying to legal definition is that no definition 
is ever perfect and in fact there can be many advantages of not having a 
formal definition. A lack of a definition allows for openness and prevents 
the law from becoming inflexible. Hart says: “(…)we should not cherish, 
even as an ideal, the conception of a rule so detailed that the question 
whether it applied or not to a particular case was always settled in 
advance and never involved, at any point of actual application, a fresh 
choice between open alternatives”144. He also underlines that human 
legislators can have no such knowledge of all the possible combinations 
of circumstances which the future may bring and since the legal language 
uses words of the real language, the indeterminate open texture is the 
price to pay145. Yet, Hacker disagreeing with Hart, asks: “Words such 
as ‘love’, ‘fear’, ‘anger’ stand for ‘things’ in a simple way. Are they not 
susceptible to analytic definition? (…) Is the notion of a person, event 
143.  Young, James and Webster vs. the United Kingdom, App.lication no. 7601/76; 
7806/77.
144.  Hart H.L.A., 1994, p 128.
145.  Ibid., p 33.
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or quality not in need of philosophical clarification? And if so, then in 
Hart’s view, all definition by genus and differentia is illegitimate. And 
is not this almost a reductio ad absurdum?”146 In a similar way, Mattila 
reminds that “accuracy and precision are considered fundamental 
characteristics of a legal language. (..) To avoid arbitrariness, legal rules 
should be formulated without ambiguity”147, even though he does not 
directly support or dismiss the need for definitions of legal concepts148. 
According to Hart, though, if, in order to define a word, we use a 
synonym which will equally puzzle us, then it means that some words 
cannot be defined149. This would seem to be the case with the puzzling 
word “religion”. Hart would opt rather for a definition in a context than 
for a definition of the word itself.
If we agree with Hart, it would be rather difficult to support the 
argument for needing a definition of “religion”. Religion as an ambiguous 
concept could only be replaced with another ambiguous synonym. Yet, in 
order to avoid arbitrariness, like Mattila reminds, I still support the need 
for at least guidelines on how the term “religion” should be understood. 
Those guidelines should be similar to those issued in the context of the 
Refugee Convention. The guidelines could remain more open and avoid 
strict limitation. As can be observed, all of the above-proposed definitions 
share the same danger of using rigorous analogies for determining what 
a “religion” or “belief ” is and what is not. All of them share also the same 
problem of limiting the scope of protection and creating rigorous frames 
that will be difficult to overcome later. Thus, perhaps, guidelines rather 
than a definition sensu stricto would be a better solution. The role of the 
guidelines is exactly the opposite of the definition and includes prevention 
of arbitrary limitations of the protection of “religion” and “belief ”. The 
guidelines (which are missing in regard to contemporary European-
wide documents unifying the approach to religions) could prevent 
uncontrolled arbitrariness in denying protection to those who belong to 
religions that are not commonly recognised and those who share rather 
146.  Hacker, P. M. S., 1969. p 345.
147.  Mattila, H. E. S., 2006, p 65.
148.  Ibid., at 36, pp. 66-67.
149.  Hart, H.L.A., 1954, p 47.
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individualistic beliefs. As Martinez-Torrón observes, the guarantee of 
behaviour consistent with the dictates of one’s conscience “should apply 
whether the individual is practising an institutionalised religion, or 
alternatively, simply acting upon a personal belief system. It should be 
irrelevant whether the individual’s conscience is grounded on religious or 
non-religious beliefs”150. The guidelines as how to understand belief and 
religions and what to include in the protected scope could prevent the 
under-protection of the individual aspect that Torrón criticised in the 
jurisprudence of the ECTHR. 
One could ask, however, how flexible guidelines, which in fact do not 
exclude anything, would differ from the lack of the definition. Vickers 
argues against too broad approach including singular beliefs151. I, on 
the contrary, claim that flexible guidelines could prevent too stringent 
analogies and too narrow interpretations, which are allowed in a situation 
when no definition exists at all. At this moment, when no definition or 
guideline exists, such rigorous frames and such analogies are applied152. 
And the other aspect of the lack of definition is that it prevents the 
judges and those who apply law from dealing with the concept itself and 
creates a fear of approaching the nature of the protected concepts153. On 
numerous occasions the determination of what is “religion” or “religious” 
remains avoided and considerations are based on other, rather formal and 
procedural arguments, without approaching the heart of the problem 
itself. The same could happen if purely procedural application of the EU 
non-discrimination law were applied, but the question whether or not 
that will guarantee sufficient non-discrimination protection remains to 
be discussed. Such “avoidance” strategies might be useful in a European 
forum, where no clear European identity yet exists, but they create the 
problem of disharmony and lack of coherence. Basing considerations on 
merely formal grounds deepens the differences between member states in 
religious matters and in the protection of religious freedom. As long as 
150.  Martinez-Torrón J., 2001a, p 197-198.
151.  Vickers L., pp. 13-24.
152.  E.g. in: X vs. the United Kingdom, Application no. 7291/75.
153.  This is visible in cases concerning Wicca or Druidism, when the nature of belief 
was not approached but instead the considerations were based on formalistic grounds.
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the formal side remains clear, the countries are free from violations of the 
rights. And since the European system as far as religion is concerned is 
based on rights, avoidance of inquires into the nature of problems and 
basing the argumentation on the formal side, is a slippery slope creating 
the way to inequalities, fragmentation and numerous inconsistencies in 
the system.
2.8. Guidelines of what kind? Some final observations 
regarding the nature of definitional considerations 
Definitional struggles appear mainly in the cases of new religious 
movements (NRM). NRMs are the test cases of flexibility and the 
openness of European legal systems and the European-wide rights 
instruments. In the case of Europe, the most often tested “guinea pig” 
is the Church of Scientology, which is treated as a church in some 
countries, while in others it still bears the stigma of a dangerous sect. I 
believe that the question of the limitations put on religious communities 
in order to protect public security should be separated from the argument 
whether any organization is of a “religious” nature and whether some 
claims are based on the “belief ” argument. The consideration of whether 
we deal with a belief or a religion should be primary and not confused 
with questions of public security. Application of article 9.2 ECHR ought 
not to be confused with the fact whether the case concerns a religious 
community. The protected nature of a religion or a belief should be 
established first. Only in the next step of the application of law should the 
issues of possible limitations prescribed in article 9.2 and their allowed 
democratic and proportional character be considered.
Also, as mentioned above, I agree with Martinez-Torrón that the 
individual religious aspect is often underestimated. The notion of 
“religion” is used as synonymous with the notion of “church”. In modern 
religiously plural society, such an understanding is no longer legitimate. 
New religious movements are not always organised, but they nevertheless 
provide life guidelines and sources of strong convictions for those who 
consider themselves their adherents. Durkheim’s sociological definition 
of “religion” as a community of believers is no longer justified in modern 
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society, where the boundaries of the religious and non-religious became 
far more blurred and far more flexible and where the individual aspect is 
often the most important. 
I believe that twofold guidelines could help in creating a more 
uniform standard of recognition. I would choose the one used in the 
Refugee Convention broadened by the functional aspect from American 
jurisprudence. The individualistic approach is nowadays necessary and 
in order to allow equal protection of religious beliefs of Europeans, it is 
advisable to see whether a sincere belief or conviction “occupies in the life 
of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by God” and whether it can 
or cannot “play the role of a religion and function as a religion in [his/
her] life”.154
154.  Welsh vs. United States.
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3. The mosaic of Europe: legal problems 
stemming from the current church and 
state relationships in European countries
3.1. The mosaic of Europe – national identities  
and various churches
Europe has been for long considered a secular continent by the majority 
of scholars looking at religious phenomena in Europe155. Declining 
church attendance rates have been considered as an inevitable indication 
of that tendency. Legally, however, this secularisation paradigm should 
be viewed more critically and undergo further scrutiny. In the process 
of analysing legal norms that are valid in particular in European 
countries, one is forced to face the European legal “potpourri” of 
different notions of religious freedom, religious confession, equality, 
laicism, secularism and state neutrality, as Machado named it156, or 
the “salad bowl” as Katzenstein did157. Taking a deeper look at Europe 
appears to be an unsolvable puzzle of principles aiming at achieving 
an increasingly pluralistic liberal democratic standard, mixed with 
tradition and national religious sentiments stemming still from the 
Reformation. The Reformation divided Europe’s House158 and over 
time led to the identification of national interests with particular 
religions. Religious wars and struggles for independence strengthened 
this tendency and on some occasions led to the development of strong 
155.  See among others: Anderson B.C., 2004, p 143 or: Keane J., 2000, pp. 5-19.
156.  Machado J.E.M. (2004-2005), pp. 451-535.
157.  Katzenstein P J., 2006.
158.  I paraphrase the title of MacCulloch’s historical research here: MacCulloch, D., 
2003, Reformation: Europe’s House Divided 1490-1700.
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national identities based on religions159. 
In the process of European integration, countries have avoided open 
confrontation between their religious traditions and newly developing 
democratic standards. This approach was confirmed in the declaration 
accompanying The Treaty of Amsterdam on the status of churches and 
non-confessional organizations160. The influence of traditional religions 
in particular states on democracy and developing standards of rights 
have not been legally questioned or challenged. The approach towards 
religious issues developed as the “freedom of religion” of particular 
religious adherents rather than as a “wall of separation” between states 
and churches, as understood in the American context of the First 
Amendment. Some nations developed a special commitment to their 
religions, elevating them to the level of national values and understanding 
the proper professing of them as patriotism. Such an attachment can 
be particularly visible in the traditionally Catholic countries, especially 
Ireland, Poland or Malta, where the Catholic religion became a part of 
national identity in the struggle for independence or freedom from 
oppression161. Some states even today endow certain religious value in 
their constitutions162.
But a state does not necessarily have to endow any religious value 
formally in order to favour certain religions above others. Countries 
like Poland, Spain, Austria or Portugal formally separate state and 
church, yet they are bound by concordat treaties with the Holy See, 
which factually strengthen the position of a certain religion in the 
society. In the case of Poland, the special position of the church is so 
clearly visible, that the constitutional principle of secularism and non-
endowment does not correspond at all to the situation de facto. The 
recent history of Polish politics and open referral to the Catholic values 
159.  More on the topic of connection between nationalism and religion see, e.g.: 
Rieffer B-A.J., 2003.
160.  See e.g.: Declaration on the status of churches and non-confessional 
organisations (Treaty of Amsterdam), which secures position of national churches and 
relations between states and religious communities.
161.  See among others: Rieffer, 2003 and, Casanova, 2006.
162.  Further in this volume, in part I and part II, I describe examples of Malta and 
Ireland in greater detail.
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as the leading political theme serves as one example163.
The institution of a state church as a concept is, though, primarily 
a Protestant one. Thus traditionally all the Nordic states, as well as 
England, had had the institution of a state church. The institution of the 
state church survived over time and is still established constitutionally, 
for instance in Denmark. The Nordic countries have despite this 
establishment become pioneers in the human rights area and are among 
the first states whose legal systems recognised the idea of women’s 
rights164, including reproductive rights165 and allowing for same-sex 
unions to be formally registered166. Soon progressive, liberal democratic 
changes in the Nordic countries were followed by democratisation 
inside church institutions. It became visible, for example, by allowing 
the ordination of women, including higher church positions like that 
of bishop167, or the recognition of gay marriages by the Church of 
Sweden168. Meanwhile, conservative tendencies among clergy have been 
discouraged169. The Catholic and Orthodox Churches in Europe have 
remained conservative and further condemn the majority of practices 
163.  See e.g.: Casanova, 2006, Ramet S.P, 2006. and Chapter 3 in part II in this 
volume.
164.  Finland was the notable pioneer in admitting universal suffrage for men and 
women as early as in the parliamentary elections of 1907.
165.  Sweden, Denmark and Iceland were among the first European countries to 
legalise therapeutic abortions already in the 1930s.
166.  Denmark was the first to introduce a law on registered partnerships through the 
Lov om registreret partnerskab (no. 372, 07.06.1989).
167.  The Church of Norway, Church of Sweden and Church of Denmark and the 
United Evangelical Lutheran Church of Germany began to allow women to become 
bishops in the 1990s.
168.  Homosexuella par kan vigas i kyrkan, Dagens Nyheter, 16.03.2007.
169.  The Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland openly condemned those male 
pastors who oppose working with female pastors. In a press release sent to the Finnish 
news agency, the Archbishop of Finland, Jukka Paarma, said that the Finnish church 
would no longer tolerate colleagues who refused to conduct services with female 
pastors. This declaration was also soon reinforced by the state, in the court sentence 
against a priest in Hyvinkää, who refused to work with a female pastor. Three persons 
were fined by the court for discrimination at work. For details see: Naispapit ovat 
tyytyväisiä arkkipiispan tukeen, Helsingin Sanomat 30.03.2007, Käräjäoikeus: Naispapin 
poistuminen kirkosta Hyvinkäällä oli syrjintää, Helsingin Sanomat 30.11.2007.
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that the Protestant churches nowadays allow for: reproductive freedom, 
divorces or gay marriages, for example.
The two most often mentioned countries maintaining very strong 
separation of state and church are France and Turkey. Although the 
Dutch system can be considered as a separation system, too, the French 
example will be used here since it has brought controversies and the 
French laïcité principle has been described as hostile towards religion, for 
example by Davie170 and Stepan171.
The present situation in regard to the regulation of religious issues 
indeed brings to mind the image of a puzzle. Within this European 
puzzle any discussion of the general limits of democracy and its 
capacity for multicultural inclusion appears extremely difficult. A 
“Europe of different speeds” is mentioned in the context of economic 
development. However, also in the sphere relating to religion, an image 
of a “Europe of different speeds” emerges. It is a Europe of different 
speeds in achieving goals of religious pluralism. While in some parts 
the discussion of the limits concentrates on post-secularism and 
multiculturalism, in other parts the discussion is rather how to reach 
secularism and liberalism first172. 
This chapter deals in more detail with the relations between the state 
and churches in European countries and their implications both for 
the individual believer and non-believer and for democratic principles 
as understood in Europe these days. It is, however, not an exhaustive 
comparative catalogue and should not be referred to as such. It introduces 
the understanding of democratic limits in Europe as the platform of 
common consensus and shows examples of solutions that are troublesome 
from the point of view of that consensus or that appear to be the closest 
to the agreed standard.
170.  Davie G., 2002.
171.  Stepan A., 2000.
172.  This difference is visible when comparing two studies. Loenen M.L.P, 
Goldschmidt J.E. (eds.), 2007 shows the problems of post-secular societies, while 
Eneyedi Z., Madeley J.T.S., 2003 shows the picture of a struggle to reach the liberal 
democratic standard and the conservative role of traditional European religions in that 
process.
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3.2. Europe on religion and equality  
- the ideal of religiously plural Europe
As mentioned above, Europe restricted itself from interference into 
the church-state matters of particular countries in the declaration 
supplementing the Treaty of Amsterdam. At the same time, however, it 
has committed itself to human rights and principles of equality and non-
discrimination, which can nowadays be considered as the cornerstone of 
European democracy. Although binding provisions concerning religion 
are not numerous, Article 9 of the ECHR and the EU Employment 
Equality Directive are important for sketching the democratic limits 
concerning religious problems in Europe. In addition to those norms, 
there are also other rules that can be applied to problems of a religious 
nature.
The first additional set of norms that can apply to religious beliefs 
are norms forbidding discrimination and supporting diversity and the 
equality of all persons in Europe. Except for Article 14 of the ECHR 
banning discrimination, which is to be read together with Article 9, 
also EU has committed itself to ideals of equality in legally binding 
agreements. 
As mentioned above, the Treaty of Nice confirms in Article 6 
the commitment to liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law. The Lisbon Treaty, which 
consolidates currently binding treaties and is at present in the difficult 
and stormy process of ratification, reaffirms the commitment to equality 
and non-discrimination. Article 2 of the Treaty underlines that:
“The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, 
freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human 
rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These 
values are common to the Member States in a society in which 
pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and 
equality between women and men prevail.”
Moreover, Article 3 places these values and the well-being of its peoples 
as the aims of the Union. It also establishes the obligation to combat 
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social exclusion and discrimination. In the latest communication from 
the Commission to the Parliament on non-discrimination and equal 
opportunities, the necessity of strengthening commitment to prevent 
discrimination was underlined:
“The European Union is founded on the shared principles of liberty, 
democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
Common to all our European societies is a fundamental recognition 
that every individual is of equal worth and should have fair access 
to the opportunities of life. Discrimination undermines these shared 
 values.”173
If the Lisbon Treaty comes to force, also the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union shall have the same legal value as the 
treaties and Article 10 shall become part of the Union’s law174. In regard 
to religion and freedom of conscience, Article 10 of the Charter provides 
the same rights as Article 9 of the ECHR and also includes a provision 
referring to conscientious objection, which should be recognised in 
accordance with national laws. 
The second kind of norms and sources concerning the position of 
religion in Europe is rooted in the recommendations and resolutions 
of the Council of Europe’s bodies. The Parliamentary Assembly of the 
COE has adopted a few recommendations and resolutions dealing with 
religious issues: Recommendation 1396 (1999), Religion and democracy; 
Recommendation 1720 (2005), Education and religion; Resolution 1580 
(2007), The dangers of creationism in education; Recommendation 1804 
(2007), State, religion, secularity and human rights, Recommendation 1804 
(2007), State, religion, secularity and human rights; or Recommendation 
1805 (2007) Blasphemy, religious insults and hate speech against persons on 
grounds of their religion.
In these recommendations the leading idea is the creation of a 
173.  Communication: Non-discrimination and equal opportunities: A renewed 
commitment, 2008
174.  With the exception of the United Kingdom and Poland, which did not agree to 
ratify the Charter.
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multicultural and religiously plural democratic society. They all emphasise 
that religious pluralism is an inherent feature of the notion of a democratic 
society and where it gives rise to religious divisions, public authorities 
should not eliminate religious pluralism but strive to ensure that the 
various groups respect each other175. They encourage religious diversity 
and discourage the demands of religious fundamentalism. In further 
chapters, I deal in detail with particular recommendations in connection 
with problem areas introduced in this volume. Recommendation 1804 
(2007), State, religion, secularity and human rights underlines in particular 
that: “one of Europe’s shared values, transcending national differences, 
is the separation of church and state” and that governance and religion 
should not mix. The recommendation expresses concern that legislation 
of several COE member states still contains anachronisms dating from 
times when religion played a more important part in European societies.
In my analysis of the relations between states and churches, I 
concentrate on these European legal and interpretative commitments. I 
look at state-church regulations from the perspective of an individual and 
religious pluralism. I include both the perspective of believers and non-
believers. As emphasised in the same Council of Europe recommendation, 
freedom of religion is the same important asset for non-believers as it is 
for believers. As mentioned in the introductory remarks concerning the 
method, I believe that multiculturalism requires taking such a perspective. 
The main recognised models in Europe are those of separation, 
neutrality, establishment and the so-called mixed system. In this analysis, 
I offer five models, which are based on the most often recognised models 
but differentiate them on the basis of the varying level of religiosity of the 
population. At the same time, these five models do not together create 
an exhaustive model and do not encompass an entire religious panorama. 
In regard to the method of this study, the examples referred to are aimed 
at showing practices which are the furthest and most controversial from 
the point of view of religious pluralism and European commitment to its 
basic values. At the same time, it attempts to show the best practices from 
the point of view of pluralism, when available.
175.  Recommendation 1396 (1999)
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Figure 2: Patterns of legal and social secularization.
Figure above shows an extended pattern of social and legal 
secularization. In the further analysis I have omitted the division into 
religious tradition based on various denominations of Christianity, which 
stem still from the era of Reformation and the Great Schism. This figure 
includes also division into various Christian traditions in order to give 
a better overview of the religious and legal patterns present in Europe. 
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The omission of this division in the further analysis is dictated by the 
methodological approach of this volume. This work’s critical objective is 
aiming at identifying problems of commitment to European democratic 
values or relativist interpretation of these values when non-traditional 
religions and beliefs are concerned. Therefore, in further part of this 
analysis, I have concentrated on the pattern of legal secularization vis-à-
vis the pattern of social secularization and their implications for a believer 
and a non-believer. 
The levels of legal secularization are graded from weak to strong. 
This degree corresponds to the degree of separation of church and state. 
Strong solutions mean full separation; weak solutions mean either the 
existence of a state church or high influence of traditional religion 
on the legal system. Medium solutions include seemingly secular 
systems, where certain traditional influence of religion is maintained, 
for instance thanks to the existence of concordat treaties. Weak/
medium and medium/strong show the tendency of change towards 
stronger secularization. It describes for instance those countries, where 
facilitation of multiculturalism and religious pluralism is recognised as a 
legal goal but where traditional state churches still exist. The pattern of 
legal secularization has been identified through analysis of national laws 
and their implications.
Social secularization corresponds to the degree of influence of the 
traditional Church over the population. It includes also a degree of its 
influence on public life. Strong secularization signifies also tendency 
of strengthening multiculturalism, religious pluralism and equality of 
various religions. The pattern of social secularization has been identified 
by usage of statistical data as well analysis conducted by other scholars. 
In this process, The Changing Religious Landscape of Europe by Hans 
Knippenberg176 and detailed analysis of social influence of religion 
conducted therein was the main source. 
176.  Knippenberg H., 2005.
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3.3. The established state Church in otherwise secular states
3.3.1. Legal foundations and historical roots
The United Kingdom, Denmark, Iceland and Norway can serve as 
examples of societies which have state churches and at the same time a 
high level of secularisation. While religion is not strongly present in 
public life or politics and the societies show signs of secularisation and 
growing pluralisation, the institutions of state churches dating back to the 
times of Reformation have been sustained. I will deal here with Denmark, 
the United Kingdom and Norway. Although Norway is not a part of 
European Union, it is an important member of the Council of Europe 
and the efforts for the revision of the legislation on the church-state 
relationship provide an important example of the current development of 
European democratic standards.
The Church of Denmark is constitutionally regulated. Article 4 of the 
Danish Constitution establishes the Evangelical Lutheran Church as the 
established church and gives the state responsibility for church matters. 
Article 6 obliges the King to belong to the Evangelical Lutheran Church, 
while Article 68 provided an obligation of regulation of the church’s 
status by law. In practice, though, the leadership of the church belongs to 
church authorities and the church enjoys a high degree of independence. 
In regard to the pluralism debate, the idea of the separation of church and 
state has also been disputed lately177, but no legal changes have yet been 
introduced. 
In the United Kingdom, the Church of England is the institution 
established since the Reformation and still strongly connected with the 
Crown. The Act of Supremacy of 1558 and the Bill of Rights of 1688178 
establish the position of the Church and the King or Queen’s relation 
to the Church. The Act of Supremacy179 guarantees that all spiritual 
jurisdiction is united in the Crown, while the Bill of Rights requires that 
the King or Queen must be protestant and cannot marry a Catholic. The 
177.  Når stat og kirke skilles, Kristeligt Dagblad, 28.08.2008.
178.  Bill of Rights 1688 c.2 1_Will_and_Mar_Sess_2.
179.  Act of Supremacy, 1558 c.1 1_Eliz_1.
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King or Queen is the Supreme Governor of the Church and as such 
approves the bishops and opens the meetings of the General Synod, 
which is the governing body of the Church of England.
Moreover, the legislature is influenced by the establishment of the 
Anglican Church. The House of Lords includes 26 so-called Lords 
Spiritual, who are the Archbishop of Canterbury and York, the Bishop 
of London, Durham and Winchester and 21 Bishops in order of 
appointment to a diocesan see. This regulation dates back to 1878. Their 
task in is to bring religious ethos to the legislative process. The planned 
reform of the House of Lords aims at reducing the amount of Lords 
Spiritual however “the Government believed that the Church could 
continue to be well represented with fewer Bishops”180.
In addition, non-written traditions connecting the Church and 
the state are present in British political life. Tony Blair was expected to 
avoid changing his religion to the religion of his wife and family during 
his term of office as Prime Minister. The position of Prime Minister is 
traditionally expected to be filled by a person connected with Anglican 
Church. Thus Blair converted to Catholicism only after his term of office 
elapsed181. 
In Norway, the position of the Church is established constitutionally 
and legal connections between the Church and the state remain strong. 
Articles 2 and 16 regulate the position of the Church. Article 2 declares 
the Evangelical Lutheran Church to be the state religion and Article 16 
gives the state the responsibility for the organization and financing of the 
Evangelical Lutheran Church. The authority for regulating the matters of 
the Church is mainly assigned to the King, who is responsible for the 
organization of the Church and ensuring that the Church follows the 
regulations. Using this authority is the King’s prerogative182. However, 
these privileges have been to a large degree delegated to the Church 
180.  The House of Lords: Reform, p 47.
181.  After 30 years as a closet Catholic, Blair finally puts faith before politics, The 
Guardian, 2007.
182.  See more on the meaning of this prerogative in: Samme Kirke- Ny Ordning, 
2002, p 38.
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authorities183. The bishops however, are still employees of the King and 
the King must belong to the Evangelical Lutheran Church.
In 2001 a committee appointed by the National Council of the 
state Church evaluated the state and church system in Norway. The 
Committee proposed new regulations for the relations between the state 
and the Church. On the 10th of April 2008, political parties present in the 
Parliament agreed to introduce a programme of democratic reform of the 
Church184. The programme proposed a reform of the Constitution in regard 
to the relation between the state and the Church. The current Article 2 
establishing the church is to be replaced with a new provision stating that:
“Basic values stem from Christian and humanist heritage. This 
Constitution guards democracy, rule of law and human rights.”
It was also proposed that Article 16 include provision concerning freedom 
of religious worship although the church would not to be entirely separated 
from the state and should be symbolically connected to the state. However, 
the “spiritual” leadership of the King, provided in article 21 and 22 of the 
Constitution shall be removed from the Constitution. The change was 
motivated in part by growing religious pluralism in Norwegian society and 
the obligation of a democratic state to safeguard religious equality185. The 
decision to change constitution was approved by Storting in September 
2008186. The changes will be introduced by the end of the year 2011.187
3.3.2. The social dimension of establishment countries  
— secularity and multiculturalism 
All of the societies with an established church show a high degree of 
secularisation and growing religious pluralisation. The church membership 
and church attendance rates are in decline and the number of new 
183.  Ibid., p 38.
184.  Innstilling fra kirke-, 2007–2008.
185.  Samme kirke- ny ordning, 2002, p 30.
186.  Dokument nr. 12:25 (2007–2008), www.stortinget.no.
187.  Innstilling fra kirke-, 2007–2008.
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religions and religiously neutral individuals is increasing, even though in 
the Nordic countries they remain seemingly high.
In Norway the Church observed again an increase in the number 
of persons who resigned from membership in the Church: from 6,038 
resignations in the year 2005 to 8,134 resignations in the year 2006. The 
total number of members of the Church of Norway was 3,871,006 in 
2006, which still comprises 81% of the population188.
In Denmark the decrease in Church membership has followed 
a similar pattern and declined since 1984, when the membership of 
the Church of Denmark totalled 91.4% of the population, to 84.3% in 
2002189.
In the United Kingdom, the percentage of the population that are 
members of the Church of England totals only 22.2%190, while the total 
amount of non-Christians has reached 28.2%191. The average Sunday 
church attendance in the Church of England is 983,000192, which equals 
about 1.67% of the total population of the United Kingdom193.
At the same time, the number of different religious beliefs in the UK 
has increased. The United Kingdom is far more multicultural compared 
to the Nordic countries. Even though 72% of the population, according 
to the census of 2001, still belonged to various Christian denominations 
including the Church of England, Church of Scotland, Church of Wales, 
Catholic, Protestant and all other Christian denominations, the number 
of non-believers and people of non-Christian faith is noticeable. People 
with no religion formed the second largest group, comprising 15 per cent 
of the population, and 5 per cent of the population belonged to a non-
Christian religious denomination. Among the non-Christians, Muslims 
were the largest religious group after Christians, comprising 3 per cent 
of the total population. Hindus were the second largest non-Christian 
188.  Statistisk sentralbyrå, Church of Norway 2005-2007: Members and church 
ceremonies, Church of Norway 2005-2007: Church services and participants.
189.  Folkekirkens medlemmer og de kirkelige handlinger, Danmarks Statistik.
190.  ”Religion by Year”. British Social Attitudes Surveys (2006).
191.  Census, April 2001, Office for National Statistics.
192.  Church Statistics 2006/7, Average weekly attendances 2006 and 2005.
193.  The total population of the United Kingdom according to the 2001 census 
equalled 58.800.000, Source: National Statistics Online: www.statistics.gov.uk.
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religious group, comprising 1 per cent of the total population. Other 
religious groups included Jews, Sikhs, Pagans, Wiccans, Baha’i, Jain and 
 others194. 
In Denmark, along with the established church, various other 
Christian churches are represented and have been accorded the status of 
officially recognised religious communities. These are (in order of size): 
the Roman Catholic Church, with approximately 35,000 members, 
the Danish Baptist Church with about 5500 adult members and the 
Pentecostal churches with approximately 5000 members. Communities 
with 3000 members or less are: the Seventh Day Adventists, the 
Catholic Apostolic Church, the Reformed Churches in Fredericia and 
Copenhagen, the Salvation Army, the Methodist Church, the Anglican 
Church and the Russian Orthodox Church in Copenhagen. In addition, 
the Jehovah’s Witnesses comprise approximately 15,000 members and 
the Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-Day Saints (Mormons) with 
about 4500 members. Outside the National Church, there are nine other 
independent, recognised Lutheran congregations of Grundtvigian origin. 
During the last decades of the 20th century, the largest of the non-
Christian communities has been dominated by Muslim immigrants. The 
number was estimated to be c. 119,000 in 1998195. 
In Norway, the population not belonging to the state church 
has mainly included Christians, comprising 56% of that population, 
Muslims (18.8%) and the population with non-religious philosophical 
beliefs (20%). The rest shown in statistical records includes adherents of 
Buddhism, Hinduism, Baha’I and Judaism.196
Although the statistics on church membership are seemingly high 
for the Nordic countries, it has been asserted that the level of religiosity 
is rather low and the church is simply a service place for performing 
ceremonies such as weddings, funerals and christenings. Halman has 
argued that being a church member in Scandinavia is less religiously 
194.  Census, April 2001, Office for National Statistics, National Statistics Online: 
www.statistics.gov.uk.
195.  The Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Denmark 2006.
196.  Statistisk sentralbyrå, Et mangfold av tro og livssyn.
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meaningful than in other countries197. According to Sundman, belonging 
to the Lutheran Church in the Nordic countries is seen as a natural 
part of citizenship and is not necessarily connected with religiosity. The 
countries differ between themselves in the level and seriousness of this 
identification but the general explanation for this high proportion of 
church members is the same in all Nordic countries198. 
Meanwhile, in the United Kingdom, multiculturalism has been 
the leading theme of the Labour government, and despite criticism 
from more conservative groups199, it is largely supported by the British 
 society200.
For these reasons, despite the establishment of a national church, the 
secularization of political life in these countries is high. All of them accept 
same-sex unions201, allow for abortion202, support gender equality203 as 
well as recognise growing multiculturalism204. Also many of the churches, 
as mentioned above support many of these stances.
3.3.3. Establishment and the principle of equality and religious pluralism
Since the official state religion does not usually interfere in the realm of 
legislation and politics and new religious groups enjoy freedom of religion 
197.  Halman L., 2004 .
198.  Sundman, S., 2007, pp.- 262-280 .
199.  Multicultural Britain is not working, says Tory chief, Daily Telegraph, 
04.08.2005 or Multiculturalism has betrayed the English, Archbishop says, The Times, 
22.11.2005.
200.  UK majority back multiculturalism, BBC News, 10.08.2005.
201.  The Civil Partnership Act (2004), Lov om registreret partnerskab (1989), Lov 
om ekteskap LOV-1991-07-04-47 with latest amendment: LOV-2008-06-27-53.
202.  Lov om svangerskapsavbrudd LOV-1975-06-13-50, The Abortion Act 1967, 
Lov nr. 177 af 23.06.1956. om foranstaltninger i anledning af svangerskab m.v., som 
senest ændret ved kongelig anordning nr. 151 af 21.03.1988.
203.  E.g. Ministry of Justice (UK): Gender Equality Scheme 2008-2011, London, 
March 2008; Norwegian Ministry of Children and Equality, Gender Equality 2009? 
Objectives, strategy and measures for ensuring gender equality, Oslo, 2009, Denmark 
establishes a special Ministry of Equality and the legislation includes special law on 
gender equality: Ligebehandlingsloven LBK nr 734 af 28.06.2006.
204.  See e.g. Knippenberg H., 2005.
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and confession in the establishment countries, it might be argued that the 
establishment of an official religion is not a problematic issue from the 
point of view of a religiously plural democracy. From the point of view of 
the ECHR, the establishment of a state church is not against democratic 
principles as long as freedom of religion is secured205. Also the declaration 
supplementing the Amsterdam Treaty suggests the same. Some scholars, 
like Adhar and Leigh, agree with this opinion, attempting to defend a 
‘mild establishment’ as they call it206. Also Modood has concluded 
that establishment does not have implications for the religiously plural 
society207. Meanwhile some, like Weller, have disagreed, arguing that 
establishment has substantial consequences for individuals as well as 
religious communities208. Weller ascertains that the symbolisation and 
operationalisation of the state are affected by the establishment of the 
church and it inevitably renders other traditions second-class.
I join the voices of those who speak against the principle of 
constitutional establishment for several reasons. My arguments are based 
primarily on the European commitment to principles of equality and 
religious pluralism. My arguments could be characterised as pragmatic 
pluralism in Adhar and Leigh’s classification of pluralistic conceptions209. 
This view takes into consideration primarily the need for harmony 
among the religious communities. I want to argue that even symbolic 
establishment introduces distortion in the equality of believers and non-
believers and thus constitutes sufficient reason for religious disharmony.
Firstly, the establishment is done through documents of a 
constitutional nature. Let us take into consideration the role of a 
constitution whether written or not. One of the functions of a constitution 
is to consolidate the people that are governed by it and provide a 
common platform of identification with the principles expressed by it. In 
a Rawlsian understanding, a constitutional consensus is the agreement of 
the society concerning principles that are of such a fundamental nature, 
205.  Darby vs. Sweden. Application no. 11581/85
206.  Adhar and Leigh, 2005, pp. 75-97.
207.  Moodod, 1992: 59-60.
208.  Weller P, 2000, p 62f.
209.  Adhar and Leigh, 2005, p 87.
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that they become chosen as the conception of justice. Citizens, despite 
their own moral doctrines, agree to follow these chosen principles as the 
foundation of their society210. The establishment of an official church 
puts certain faiths and beliefs in a symbolically stronger position than 
others. Such a consensus is at the outset unequal. In fact, establishment 
symbolically advances a religious conception of life. While in practice it 
might be of little meaning, in the symbolical context it creates privileged 
conceptions of life and “others”. “Otherness” never leads to peaceful 
coexistence. Embracement of a state religion creates symbolically an 
authoritative recognition of what conceptions are valuable. “Otherness” is 
usually feared and often rejected.
Secondly, establishment equates the interests of faith with the interest 
of the nation. While this was indeed the situation still a hundred years 
ago, broad changes towards toleration and equality have transformed 
the landscape of Europe. I disagree with Adhar and Leigh, who argue 
that to dismantle national churches in pursuit of an abstract notion 
of neutrality would do violence to history and the actual exigencies 
of religious life in certain nations. Firstly, as mentioned above, the 
relationship between actual religious life and the established churches 
is weakening. Secondly, religion became to a large degree a matter of 
private individuals and religious communities. This phenomenon has 
been called the “unchurching of Europe”211. Regardless of its practical 
importance, establishment symbolically imposes what religious identity 
a certain nation due to its history “ought to” have. In the conditions of 
postulated pluralism, such an equation places other faiths, beliefs or non-
beliefs out of the scope of national identification. Of course, an individual 
may leave the Church, which is usually easily possible in Protestant 
churches. However, does an individual remaining outside the Church 
remain unaffected by the fact that a specific religious conception is 
constitutionally advanced? Again, however symbolic this dimension may 
be, it should not be dismissed as unimportant on the modern religious 
map. The equilibrium of religious equality is disrupted between citizens 
who follow the basic national religious values and those who do not. 
210.  Rawls J., 2005, pp. 154-172.
211.  Davie, 2006.
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Adhar and Leigh argued that disestablishment reflects secular philosophy 
about religion and political life. I believe, however, and I will return to 
this argument later, that a religiously neutral constitution with strongly 
established freedom of religion guaranteed to all without discrimination 
offers the most balanced solution. It allows individuals to identify with 
the constitutional principles of their legal community.
Thirdly, these considerations lead to the problem of the connection 
between church and state organs. Is it legitimate today, in times when 
belief, disbelief, new religions or religions not traditionally connected 
with the state are present in modern European societies, to require that 
rulers not enjoy freedom of religion? As far as the king or the queen is 
concerned, the limitation of their religious liberty might be still defendable 
by tradition and cultural heritage, which are under the protection of 
European law212. Here, the argument on the violation of historical heritage 
could even today be plausible. The king or queen is still today a symbolic 
representative of the history of a nation and as such is the function of 
modern monarchies – to consolidate the symbolism of the nation and its 
history in the person of the monarch. But why should the queen’s or king’s 
spouse be limited in their religious freedom, as in the British case? Or why 
could not the Prime Minister convert to another denomination in secular 
Europe before the end of his term of office? The preservation of this 
historic heritage affects individuals even if they are individuals exercising 
special functions. Could not a Muslim become a British Prime Minister? 
Does religion different than the established religion hinder the capacities 
of persons to hold official positions? It appears discriminative to an unjust 
proportion to assume that believers of certain faiths are in a better position 
to act in a neutral manner consistent with the interests of the state than 
believers of other religions or non-believers. 
Fourthly, even though the influence of church organs on the legislative 
process may be limited or close to none, it again affects the symbolic 
aspect of such legitimacy. Europeans today defend themselves against 
212.  See: Treaty of Nice, article 6.3: “The Union shall respect the national identities 
of its Member states.” Or Treaty of Lisbon, article 3.3: “It [The Union] shall respect 
its rich cultural and linguistic diversity, and ensure that Europe’s cultural heritage is 
safeguarded and enhanced”.
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the influence of new religious on the democratic system. Defence against 
Islamic values is visible in the ECTHR’s judgements213, the Council of 
Europe’s declarations214 as well as in socio-political discourse215. However, 
if the traditional European religions are not separated from the state 
organs and continue to influence on legislative, even if only symbolically, 
why expect religions perceived as less democratic to refrain from attempts 
at influencing the law? When a privilege is given to one faith, it naturally 
raises the demands of other faiths to be privileged in the same way in 
accordance with equality and non-discrimination principles. While the 
establishment countries perceive their own churches as “civilised” and 
positive in their attitude towards democracy, they ignore the symbolic 
dimension that such establishment may have for those religions whose 
values are considered non-democratic. 
I agree with Weller that establishment systems do have implications 
in the wider European context and thus countries should re-evaluate 
their historical traditions and inheritances in the context of integration 
and religious pluralism216. In the later discussion on a theoretical model 
of European democracy and its relationship to religion, I will expand this 
argument further in light of liberal democratic theory. 
3.4. The state Church and homogeneous religious population
Another group of countries comprises those who maintain state churches 
and whose religious population is homogeneous compared to the previously 
mentioned secularised and multicultural societies. In this group of countries 
we can place two other countries with established churches which are not 
213.  For instance, in the cases concerning the veil: Dahlab vs. Switzerland, Application 
no. 42393/98 and Sahin v. Turkey, Application no. 44774/98. See also the discussion in 
the following chapters.
214.  See further references in the chapter concerning blasphemy and the justification 
for adopting the common European standpoint towards blasphemy as a result of the 
Mohammad caricature crisis.
215.  Bilefsky, D., Fisher I., Doubts on Muslim integration rise in Europe, 
International Herald Tribune, 12.10.2006.
216.  Edge, 2000, pp. 59-60.
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Protestant: Malta and Greece. In both of these cases, the identity of the 
church is closely connected with national values and the historical identity 
of the nation. At the same time, the influence of the church on political and 
social life is higher than in the countries previously mentioned.
The Maltese Constitution from the year 1964, with the latest 
amendments from the years 1994 and 1996, in Section 2 titled ‘State 
religion’ establishes that:
1. The religion of Malta is the Roman Catholic Apostolic Religion.
2. The authorities of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church have the 
duty and the right to teach which principles are right and which 
are wrong.
3. Religious teaching of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Faith shall be 
provided in all State schools as part of compulsory education.
At the same time, Article 1 of the constitution adheres to the democratic 
values of respect for human rights and freedoms of the individual. The 
establishment of the Catholic Church as the state church is connected 
with Maltese history and the conflict between British and Italian 
influences over the island. 217 As will be further discussed in the 
chapter on reproductive rights and abortion issues, the impact of this 
regulation on the life of the individual can be significant and the Maltese 
constitution is a true rarity on the European scene in legitimising 
religious authority in moral issues through constitutional provisions.
In Greece, the established church is the Eastern Orthodox Church. 
Similar to Malta, the Greek Constitution establishes in Article 3 of its 
basic provisions that:
1. The prevailing religion in Greece is that of the Eastern Orthodox 
Church of Christ. The Orthodox Church of Greece, acknowledging 
our Lord Jesus Christ as its head, is inseparably united in doctrine with 
the Great Church of Christ in Constantinople and with every other 
Church of Christ of the same doctrine, observing unwaveringly, as they 
do, the holy apostolic and synodal canons and sacred traditions.(…)
217.  Malta Church and State: 1930-1931.
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Moreover, the Constitution deals with certain internal regulations of the 
Church concerning scripture and the ecclesiastical regime. Even though 
the Greek regulation gives the church authorities the right and duty to 
teach about moral rights or wrongs, the establishment is not so strong in 
wording, like the Maltese.218 The influence of the Greek Church on Greek 
life has been extremely strong. It was summarised by Mavgrogordatos 
in the following wording: “Unless one is willing to bear very substantial 
costs, one can neither live nor die outside the churches: the Orthodox 
Church and the few others recognised or tolerated”219. The Church’s 
Archbishop Christodoulos himself expressed publicly his sentiment 
towards the equation of a religion with a nation in his comment in 2000:
“For Greeks, to be an Orthodox Christian is a defining attribute of 
our identity’220. 
Due to this prevailing understanding of nationality, attempts at separating 
church and state failed in the constitutional revision of 2001 even though 
some changes concerning the influence of religion have been introduced, 
for example in removing religious affiliation from identity cards221. As 
Alivizatos noted, these changes, while slow, happen because Greece, like 
all other European countries, is facing the challenge of converting itself 
from a monocultural to a multicultural society222. 
In the case of Greece and Malta, we see a religiously homogenous 
population and more conservative societies and churches than in 
the United Kingdom or Scandinavia. These churches protest against 
reproductive rights, birth control practices or rights concerning non-
discrimination on grounds of sexuality223. Thus the impact of the church 
218.  The Constitution uses the word “prevailing” religion, meaning dominant. It does 
not declare it as the religion of the country. 
219.  Mavgordatos, G.Th, Orthodoxy and nationalism in the Greek case, p123.
220.  Athens News Agency, Daily News Bulletin in English, 30.05.2000.
221.  This was dictated by the requirements concerning identity documents standards 
in the Schengen zone, see: Athens News Agency, Daily News Bulletin in English, 
18.05.2000.
222.  Alivizatos N.C., 1999, p 33.
223.  On the views of the Greek Church on reproduction matters including 
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on the rights of an individual is greater. The principle of pluralism and 
equality of faiths does not remain uninfluenced by the establishment 
of a conservative church, which is in fact dominant and whose values 
are associated strongly with national values. Whilst it is plausible to 
argue that in a multicultural and plural society like Great Britain, the 
establishment does not infringe the principle of equality, in the case of 
the Maltese and Greek churches, the situation is more complex. There is 
no doubt that the result of the equality between religious and other moral 
conceptions in these countries is entirely different. Moral ideas of certain 
religious doctrines are enforced by the social pressure of a religiously 
homogenous population. And such social pressure is additionally 
supported through the special recognition given to those religions by 
the law. Such a factual establishment reinforced by a legal one places 
adherents of other religions or non-believers in a discriminated position. 
It creates the religious “other”, which is distant from the accepted 
standard due to non-belonging to the dominant religion. Not without 
reason, one of the most important judgements concerning the violation 
of freedom of religion was issued against Greece. The Kokkinakis case 
established the first European standards in the approach towards religious 
freedom and challenged Greek religious conservatism. When a state 
chooses to actively protect the established religion through law and state 
actions, the principle of non-discrimination on the grounds of religion 
remains void and illusory towards non-believers and in some cases 
adherents of other minority religions. In Rawls’ theory, such a state would 
be characterised as ’sectarian’ in character224. 
The main arguments against establishment remain the same as those 
above. However, when a religion becomes the basis for social persecution 
or when law attempts to introduce legal sanctions against those who share 
a different belief, it becomes a tool of discrimination rather than a freedom. 
State support leads towards the differentiation of the country’s residents 
contraception and abortion, see: Georges E., 1996, pp. 509-519. Concerning the Greek 
Church’s stand on in vitro fertilization, read more: Paxson H., 2003, pp. 1853-1866. 
Wider concerning Greek Orthodox Church and its stance on European Values see: 
Payne D.P, 2003, pp. 261-271.
224.  Rawls J., 2005, p 179.
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into those whose religion is accepted and identified with patriotism and 
support for national values and “others” whose religion and philosophy 
are not welcome in the society. From the point of view of a democratic 
European standard of tolerance, equality and non-discrimination as well 
as religious pluralism, such support is nowadays questionable. 
Moreover, there is a substantial difference between the Catholic 
Church or the Orthodox Church and national Protestant churches. 
Democratic European principles and human rights are not always 
compliant with the teachings of these churches. The values of Protestant 
churches have evolved over time and are currently similar to European 
democratic commitments. This is especially true in Scandinavia. 
Meanwhile, more conservative Catholic and Orthodox churches 
remain resistant especially to sexual freedoms and rights stemming 
from it. Thus the delegation of the “duty to teach which principles are 
right and wrong”, in a European democratic country like Malta is 
troublesome from the perspective of its commitment to European values 
and standards. Constitutional reference to the power of the Church to 
establish moral norms creates a reference to a higher authority in the 
meaning of natural law doctrines. Such authority is understood as 
higher than the constitution or the law, both national and European. In 
the era of integration, such a delegation of power to a certain religious 
community undermines the Maltese commitment to European principles 
of democracy and the rule of law. European countries have agreed to 
follow certain common principles, which are not based on any religious 
moral doctrine but on values of democracy, equality and human rights, 
which might contradict some religious doctrines. 
3.5. Non-endowment and historical factual  
endorsement of religious values
Throughout most of the twentieth century Ireland was a country 
considered to be one of the most religious on the European scene and 
the Irish national identity developed as a Catholic identity225. The Irish 
225.  Ingils T., 2005, pp. 66-69.
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Constitution from the year 1937 ensured the dominant position of the 
Catholic Church, which lasted until the amendment of 1974. During that 
period, the doctrine of natural law was developed in the judicial review226. 
Further implications of this legal doctrine and its subsequent modifications 
are discussed in detail in the chapter concerning reproductive rights. In 
the Irish case, women’s reproductive rights became the main reason for 
changes in the understanding of the Church’s influence on law and social 
life. 
As of today, the Irish Constitution in Article 44.1 still prescribes that: 
“The State acknowledges that the homage of public worship is due to 
Almighty God. It shall hold His Name in reverence, and shall respect 
and honour religion.”
Moreover, it constitutionally forbids seditious, blasphemous and indecent 
publications and abortion. At the same time, as if in contrast to the first 
paragraph, Section 2 of Article 44 guarantees that the state shall not 
endow any religion and guarantee everyone’s freedom of religion:
2.1. Freedom of conscience and the free profession and practice of 
religion are, subject to public order and morality, guaranteed to every 
citizen.
2.2 The State guarantees not to endow any religion.
2.3. The State shall not impose any disabilities or make any 
discrimination on the ground of religious profession, belief or status.
In the context of state and church relations, the principle of non-
endowment combined at the same time with acknowledgement of the 
natural law’s doctrine, according to which the state’s authorities hold 
God’s name in reverence, is self-contradictory. The reference to God is an 
endowment in itself. It endows a certain religious conception, a theistic 
view of life. In light of the non-endowment principle, the state and thus 
the law should remain religiously neutral to religious conceptions. This 
paradox of including both the non-endowment principle and the factual 
226.  Whyte G., 1996-1997, pp. 725-746.
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endorsement can hardly be explained except by the above-mentioned 
historical factors. The inclusion of two contradicting provisions allows for 
the free choice of principles depending on the legal need. Theoretically 
speaking, in case of legislation supporting traditional religious 
conceptions, invocation to God could be used. In case of legislation 
introducing liberal changes and aiming at increasing democracy and 
pluralism, the non-endowment clause could. In today’s situation, however, 
in light of growing multiculturalism and religious pluralism and in 
light of growing European commitment to the value of equality, such 
ambiguity should be resolved in order to prevent the dominant position 
of any religion. Also legitimising such laws by appealing to majoritarian 
premises loses its support. Ireland seems to follow general European 
trends in regard to religiosity. The media have reported a change in 
the religiosity of the Irish population. A crisis is currently underway in 
Ireland in the vocation of the priesthood227 and religiosity in general is in 
decline. The census of 2002 for the first time showed that the proportion 
of Catholics is below 90%228. Moreover, further changes in the law, not 
complying with the teaching of the Church, are currently being prepared, 
like the bill on civil partnership, which would allow homosexual couples 
to register their relationships229. 
3.6. Concordats – the variety of approaches 
3.6.1. From factual endorsement to neutralism
Concordats are agreements between the Vatican state (the Holy See) 
and another state concerning the position of the Catholic Church in 
that particular state. From the perspective of international law, these 
agreements are of more importance than simple agreements between a 
state and a religious community within its territory. The Vatican enjoys 
227.  Catholic Church faces new crisis — Ireland is running out of priests, The Times, 
27.02.2008.
228.  Ireland’s changing religious face, BBC News, 11.04.2004.
229.  General Scheme of Civil Partnership Bill, Ireland, 2008.
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the international status of a state and such agreements enjoy the status of 
international bilateral treaties. The generalisation of problems connected 
with concordat treaties is difficult since countries bound by the treaties 
with the Vatican vary greatly in the degree of religiosity and religious 
influence of the church over their population. Also the position of such 
bilateral international treaties in their national systems varies230. Some 
general problems, however, can be pointed out here. European countries 
bound by these special agreements with the Vatican are currently: Italy, 
Austria, Portugal, Germany, Poland, Luxembourg231, Spain and Slovakia. 
In 2003 the Czech Republic, after reviewing constitutional principles, 
rejected the proposed concordat, basing the argumentation on the fact 
that it gave the Catholic Church preferential treatment and violated the 
state’s neutrality in regard to religious matters.232
The texts and the provisions of concordats differ as much as the 
countries that are bound by them, even though many provisions are 
repeated in numerous texts. Those repeating norms deal with especially 
the organization of the church and its internal regulation by Canon Law. 
Since it is impossible in this chapter to analyse each concordat in detail, 
I try to mention essential provisions characteristic of particular states and 
their concordats. 
The original Italian concordat dating back to 1929 initially gave the 
dominant position to the Catholic Church. Later amendments from 1984 
removed the dominant position of the Church. However, the concordat 
gives the Catholic Church, among others, the sole right to provide 
religious education in public schools; the authority to recognise marriages 
celebrated in the Church; the right to establish Catholic schools. The 
concordat also establishes an obligation to seek solutions to problems 
in its application by a joint commission appointed by the state and the 
Vatican.
The Austrian concordat from the year 1933 is among one of the 
230.  In some countries, like Poland or Slovakia, the constitution guarantees the 
international agreement’s position above ordinary laws.
231.  Luxembourg’s concordat applies more broadly to all Benelux countries.
232.  Kolar, P, 2003 or: Czech Cardinal Vlk not satisfied with President Klaus”, ČTK, 
Čseké Noviny, 13.03.2007.
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oldest in Europe and the latest amendment dates back to the year 1968. 
It guarantees, among other rights, that the Catholic Church may enjoy 
the freedom of worship, obliges the state to protect the exercise of 
spiritual responsibilities by the Church, and obliges the state to recognise 
the Church’s legal personality. It also guarantees compulsory Catholic 
religious instruction for Catholic students and recognises marriages 
celebrated in the Church as well as the right of the Church to legally 
dissolve marriages in accordance with Canon Law.
The Polish concordat from the year 1993 guarantees the Church 
privileges such as the right to provide compulsory Catholic religious 
education in public schools, a legal personality and the inviolability of 
religious places and the recognition of marriages celebrated in Church. 
It also obliges the state to cooperate with the Church in “protecting and 
respecting the institution of marriage and the family”. 
The Portuguese Concordat from the year 2004, supplementing the 
concordat of 1940, recognises the Church’s legal personality, its right to 
carry out its religious mission, its right to teach “Religion and Catholic 
Morality” in public educational institutions and obliges the state to 
recognise marriages celebrated in the Church as well as annulments. 
The state is also required to help with providing religious assistance 
to members of the Armed Forces as well as inmates. The novelties 
introduced by the concordat of 2004 are the provisions concerning the 
tax exemptions of the clergy and the Church and most importantly, those 
incorporating the Church into the state system of tax collection, like in 
Germany or Scandinavia.
However, there are also less elaborated concordat texts, like those 
concerning Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Hungary, which 
provide only basic regulation concerning the appointment of Catholic 
bishops and communication between the Church and the Vatican233 or 
the position of the Nunciature in the country234. 
More complicated concordat systems are found in Germany and 
Slovakia, where more than one concordat exists. Germany is bound by 
the concordat concluded during the Third Reich and by local concordats 
233.  Dutch Concordat 1827.
234.  Hungarian Concordat 1990.
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with particular states, like Bavaria or North-Rhine Westphalia. This 
localization of concordats is dictated by the tradition of religious 
coexistence of the Catholic and Protestant ‘länder’. 
Slovakia, on the other hand, is bound by a set of concordats referring 
to different issues: the Basic Concordat (2000), the Concordat on the 
armed forces (2002) and the Concordat on Catholic education (2004). 
3.6.2. Regulating matters of religion by an international agreement
The concordats, like the state church systems, pose several interesting 
questions from the point of view of religious diversity and equality. 
The main issue is whether de facto privileges given to a certain church 
constitute discrimination against other religions and non-believers. In 
2005 the Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights was 
set up by the European Commission to examine the issue of the influence 
of concordats on the right to conscientious objection235. The document 
was issued in 2004 and dealt with the question of adopting another 
Slovak Concordat on Conscientious Objectors arose. The document is, 
though, broader than the Slovak issue and examines various questions 
concerning the influence of concordats in general on the international 
obligations of states, including human rights obligations.
The draft concerning conscientious objectors emphasised the right of 
various professionals to object to performing certain services especially 
in areas concerning health, dignity, family and marriage. It would allow 
refusing to perform an abortion or distributing contraceptives. The 
Network experts agreed that such a broad interpretation of conscience 
clause, legalised through international agreement, could in some 
circumstances, like those of a legally allowed abortion, endanger human 
health or life. Thus they found the text of the draft incompatible with 
the existing international and European law. The Experts estimated that 
the violations would result from restrictions being imposed on access to 
counselling in the field of reproductive health and to access to certain 
medical services, including in particular abortion and contraception. They 
agreed that such a regulation would disproportionately affect women.
235.  E.U. Network of Independent Experts on fundamental Rights, Opinion 4-2005.
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However, the questions concerning concordats are broader than those 
connected with the conscience clause. Are any other concordats except 
those binding Luxembourg and Hungary compatible with principles of 
European law, particularly those of equality and non-discrimination? 
In many ways, concordats resemble the establishment of state churches, 
even though they are not constitutional. The argumentation against 
the maintenance of state churches could be evoked here again. When a 
certain religion receives greater support from the state, it symbolically 
affects non-believers and adherents of other religions. However, in the 
case of concordats, the issue goes even deeper. Countries maintaining 
state churches are in their sole competency to regulate these relations 
and legislative bodies are in a position to change these regulations and 
agree on conducting constitutional amendments. The case of Norway 
shows recent activity of this kind. Amending a concordat, on the other 
hand, takes two parties – the state in question and the Vatican. And 
because of principles of international law affirmed explicitly in the 
Vienna Convention236 “pacta sund servanda”, it is practically speaking 
impossible for the state to cancel the agreement of its own will without 
breaking this legal principle. Conundrum of international law poses a 
question regarding the legitimacy of a state to become bound by such 
agreements with a religious state. If a concordat gives certain privileges to 
the Catholic faith, like that of conducting classes of religious instruction 
in schools or the right to conscientious objection of professionals, which 
other religions do not enjoy due to a lack of similar agreements, it creates 
disparity between this faith and other faiths that are not enjoying these 
benefits. In instances when such disparity is disproportional, it could 
amount to discrimination. In any case, it introduces privileged religion 
and those less privileged “others”. At the same time, this situation is 
legitimised by an international agreement, which in some countries 
enjoys a higher position in the hierarchy than national laws. In some 
constitutional systems, human rights obligations belong to the same 
236.  Vienna Convention on the law of treaties, Articles 26 and 27. These provisions 
apply to those Concordats concluded after entry into force of the Convention, that is 
1980.
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category, since they are concluded in a similar manner.237 In a situation of 
conflict of norms, both the concordat and, for example the ECHR would 
be placed on an equal level in the hierarchy of legal sources.
The legitimacy of a state to become bound by such an agreement is 
questionable. The state becomes bound by international agreements as a 
representative of the totality of the inhabitants. If a country chooses to 
become bound by an agreement with a Catholic state concerning that faith’s 
privileges on its own territory, it chooses to act on behalf of its Catholic 
population. However, the effects of this agreement extend beyond the 
religious population concerned, since the agreement becomes one of the 
international obligations of the entire state representing both Catholics and 
other adherents and non-believers. And, more importantly, from the moment 
of ratifying such an agreement, it cannot be dissolved by the sole will of the 
state like it is in the case of national churches. In case of disproportionate 
privileges given to the Catholic denomination in comparison to other faiths, 
such a situation is legitimised by an international agreement. In summary, 
in addition to its establishment-like nature, concordats pose problems of 
legitimacy, stemming from their nature as treaties under international law.
3.. The separation or French laïcité 
3..1. Legal grounds and historical roots
France is the member state of the European Union that adheres 
particularly strongly to the principle of full separation between the state 
and religions. In that approach France resembles the United States and 
the approach could be described similarly as relations based on the “wall 
of separation”. 
The law on the separation of the churches and the state from the year 
1905238 establishes the principle of laïcité, which could be translated as 
237.  E.g. Polish concordat enjoys the position of an international agreement higher 
than national law, in accordance to article 91.2.
238.  Loi du 9 décembre 1905 concernant la séparation des Églises et de l’État.
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secularism or laicisation. Torfs239, following Bauberot240, distinguishes 
secularisation from laicisation. Secularisation, assumes Torfs, has a social 
dimension while laicisation has a legal dimension, concerning the position 
of religion in the legal system. Laicisation means separation of the state 
apparatus from any religion. The level of laicisation of a country does not 
necessarily correspond to the level of secularisation. A country following 
the principle of laicisation can be still very religious, for instance the 
United States, while a comparatively secular country can still embrace a 
state church system, for example Norway or Denmark. This understanding 
would be compatible with Keane’s analysis of the word ‘secularisation’ or 
to ‘secularise’ meaning to reduce the influence of religion241. Separation 
does not necessarily mean secularisation. The French laïcité could be in 
Torfs’ terms described as laicisation although in the English language, it 
is most often referred to as ‘secularisation’. 
The principle of laïcité is historically rooted in the French Revolution 
and the first attempt at separating the state from the Catholic Church. 
As Gunn242 reminds, at that time laïcité did not embody the principles of 
tolerance, neutrality and equality as understood today, but emerged rather 
from periods of violent conflict with the Catholic Church. The Church 
and the clergy, as one of the estates against whom the Revolution was 
directed, were put under the control of the state. During the period of 
the French Revolution, the Church’s property was first nationalised 
in 1789. In the following year, the Church’s influence was minimised 
by the adoption of the Civil Constitution for the Clergy. The Civil 
Constitution placed clergy under the control of the government and 
required priests to swear an oath of allegiance to the state. In 1791, 
during the rule of the Legislative Assembly, divorce was legalised and 
the state took control of population registers. In the most radical phase 
of the Revolution, Christianity was replaced by the cult of the Supreme 
Being, with Robespierre as high priest. After Bonaparte’s victory in 1801, 
239.  Torfs R., 1996, pp. 964-965.
240.  Bauberot J., Laïcité, laicisation, secularisation as cited in : Torfs R., 1996.
241.  Keane J., 2000.
242.  Gunn J., 2004, p 433.
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France signed a concordat with the Vatican243. The law of 1905 ended the 
concordat era and started the period of laïcité as understood today. 
The period of the French Revolution produced, however, one of the 
foundations of today’s approach to religion in France. In 1789 the National 
Assembly adopted the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, 
which were revolutionary at the time. Article 10 of the Declaration included 
a provision that could be compared to the current freedom of religion 
regulations. It forbade disturbing anyone’s peace on the grounds of their 
religious opinions and could be compared to today’s freedom of religion and 
the non-discrimination on religious grounds included in the ECHR. 
Laïcité is understood in French political life as one of the basic 
foundations of the French Republic and the source of religious tolerance 
and understanding. The legal system, according to Article 1 of the law 
on separation, guarantees everyone freedom of religion, but according to 
Article 2, the state does not recognise, support or subsidise any faith244. 
Furthermore, Article 1 of the 1958 Constitution declares that:
“France shall be an indivisible, secular, democratic and social Republic. 
It shall ensure the equality of all citizens before the law, without 
distinction of origin, race or religion. It shall respect all beliefs.”
In addition, the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen 
was recognised by the Constitution of 1958 as a part of the French 
constitutional system. Article 10 is thus binding also today.
Contemporary French politicians have referred to laïcité as the basis 
for religious respect and tolerance, the foundation of French democracy 
and the non-negotiable principle. Former president Chirac underlined in 
his address to the nation in 2003, that: 
“It is the neutrality of the public sphere which enables the harmonious 
existence side by side of different religions. Like all freedoms, the 
freedom to express one’s faith can only have limits in the freedom of 
others, and in the compliance with rules of life in society. Religious 
243.  Stearns P.M., Langer W.L., 2001, pp. 431-435.
244.  In French: “La République ne reconnaît, ne salarie ni ne subventionne aucun culte.”
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freedom, which our country respects and protects, must not be abused, 
it must not call general rules into question, and it must not infringe 
the freedom of belief of others. This subtle, precious and fragile 
balance, constructed patiently over decades, is ensured by respect for 
the principle of secularism... This is why it is included in Article 1 of 
our constitution. This is why it is not negotiable.” 245
Scholars have been, though, more sceptical as to the actual effect of the 
principle on individual freedom and tolerance. The principle has been 
characterised by Gunn as a utopian founding myth246. Davie, on the 
other hand, underlined the intolerant nature of laïcité, manifested in 
discouragement from developing any cultural or religious group identity247. 
3..2. Discussion of the French headscarf ban
One of the contexts in which laïcité was used as an argument was banning 
wearing religious symbols in public schools. Since the legislation was aimed 
primarily at headscarves, the ban echoed the discussion concerning the 
limits of religious freedom all around Europe and has been both criticised 
and defended248. The problem started in 1989 when three Muslim girls 
in Creil refused to remove their headscarves in school and were therefore 
expelled. The scandal ultimately brought the issue to the Conseil d’Etat, 
which is the body advising the government on the preparation of 
governmental bills and is the judge of last instance for cases regarding 
executive power, local authorities or independent public authorities. One 
of its roles is to protect individual liberties and freedoms. Regarding school 
regulations banning headscarves in school, Conseil answered that laïcité in 
state education means that students are allowed to express and manifest 
their religious beliefs in schools, while respecting pluralism and the 
245.  Chirac on the secular society, BBC News, 18.12.2003.
246.  Gunn J., 2005-2006.
247.  Davie G., 2006, p 31.
248.  See further references in this chapter: Gunn J., 2005-2006 or Gey S.G., 2004-
2005.
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freedom of others249. This decision did not, however, end the discussion on 
the issue. After years of intensive disputes250, President Chirac created a 
commission to study the issue, called the Stasi Commission251. The tasks 
assigned to the commission were summarised as “conducting an analysis 
of the principle of laïcité in the Republic”252. After the report of the 
Commission had been issued, the National Assembly adopted the law on 
secularity and conspicuous religious symbols in schools253. The law banned 
wearing “conspicuous religious symbols in schools” and targeted mainly 
Muslim girls wearing various head-covering garments, usually referred 
to as “headscarves”. The findings of the Commission referred primarily 
to Muslim girls and concentrated on the examples of those girls who are 
forced to wear a headscarf by their religious community254. 
Some scholars like Gey255 have attempted to defend the new law using 
arguments similar to those of the Stasi Commission’s. Gey argues that 
the French ban creates a religion-free zone, which is aimed at protecting 
the religious freedom of students. This religion-free zone provides an 
environment in which a student can choose his/her beliefs and decide 
which views to adopt. Gey, like the Stasi Commission, expresses concern 
for Muslim girls living under the coercion of the fundamentalist Muslim 
community and expresses the view that a school free from religious 
symbols offers a kind of safe “shelter” from that coercion. He understands 
the ban as the state’s responsibility to ensure freedom of conscience. 
The state chooses to defend the principle of secularism by ensuring that 
citizens are able to freely choose from among the various options available 
249.  Conseil d’Etat no. 346893, 27.22.1989.
250.  See further analysis of the political discourse connected with drafting this law in: 
Gunn J., 2004 and on further social dimensions of the veil issue: Freedman J., 2004.
251.  Named after the chairman Bernard Stasi.
252.  Decret no. 2003-607, 03.07.2003
253.  Loi no. 2004-228 du 15 mars 2004 encadrant, en application du principe de 
laïcité, le port de signes ou de tenues manifestant une appartenance religieuse dans les 
écoles, collèges et lycées publics.
254.  French National Assembly, Report no. 1381 fait au nom de la Commission 
des Lois Constitutionnelles, de la Législation et de L’Administration Générale de la 
République sur le projet de loi (no. 1378) relatif à l’application du principe de laïcité 
dans les écoles, collèges et lycées publics, 28.01.2004.
255.  Gey S.G., 2004-2005.
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and are not forced by their religious community to follow religious norms. 
However, in regard to the protection of the freedom of choice, which 
Gey believes to be the foundation of the new law, other commentators 
have remained less enthusiastic. In his critical response to Gey, Gunn 
pointed out that Gey’s vision is the utopian version of laïcité and not the 
doctrine as it exists in practice256. For Gunn, a state that interferes into 
religious expression and the right of parents to decide their children’s 
religious expression is in fact the coercer. He reminds that alongside those 
girls forced to wear a headscarf and facing persecution from their religious 
community, there are other girls who voluntarily wear a headscarf257. 
Moreover, Gunn addresses another question, how the banning could 
possibly reduce violence and coercion instead of increasing the number of 
girls expelled from school. He equates the Stasi Commission and the law 
drafters as well as law’s supporters with the fundamentalists:
“While proudly exclaiming that the desire to give the schoolgirls 
the freedom to explore their identity and values and to question 
the religious beliefs of the community, they do exactly what the 
fundamentalists are doing: deny the girls the freedom of choice”.258
Also Freedman259 saw the veil legislation as a barrier and an instrument of 
exclusion rather than integration. There is a danger, underlines Freedman, 
that the exclusion faced by Muslim immigrants will be multiplied and 
intensified and with time lead to further exclusion. The real problem, 
Freedman continues, is not the religious symbol but the economic and 
social handicaps, which carry risks of growing cultural conflicts.
3..3. Laïcité and democratic religious pluralism?
Although the main discussion concerning the topic of the veil and general 
relations between the state and religion in education will be subject to 
256.  Gunn J., 2005-2006, p 84.
257.  Ibid., p 99.
258.  Ibid., p 99.
259.  Freedman, 2004.
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further scrutiny in later chapters, the question of the relationship between 
the French laïcité and democracy in the context of religion should be 
addressed here.
The current French president Sarkozy, unlike his predecessor Chirac, 
has expressed the view that French secularism should change in order to 
become friendlier towards religions and see religions not as a danger but 
as an asset. He has been strongly criticised for expressing this opinion and 
accused of compromising the principle of laïcité and the fundamentals of 
the French state260.
Is the French version of radical separation hostile towards religions? 
At first glance, the French solution, similar in certain aspects to that of 
the United States261, appears to be the answer to the tensions between 
the state and religions. Complete separation of the institutions of the 
state from religious influence and no subsidies for religious organizations 
appear to keep the state out of any possible religious disputes or conflicts. 
It creates a religion free zone, which separates public issues from religious 
arguments and places religion in the private sphere. Such absolute 
separation at first glance appears to be the best method for dealing with 
inevitable tensions. When religions remain in private and the public space 
is free from religious manifestations, all should theoretically enjoy equality. 
To a large degree, this model resembles the Rawlsian reasonable 
consensus, which I support as a model262. However, the ban on wearing 
a headscarf brings distortion to this otherwise harmonious picture. 
We need to look at this situation from the perspective of a believer as 
well as a non-believer. As the state coerces an individual to give up an 
item constituting a part of his/her religious identity when present in an 
institution which is as unavoidable as school, and directs the legislation 
towards as vulnerable a group of its residents as school children, the 
religious non-involvement of the state is no longer valid. Such coercion 
260.  See e.g.: McNicoll T., The President’s Passion Play: Nicolas Sarkozy embraces 
God as good for society , igniting debate over church and state in France, Newsweek, 
18.02.2008.
261.  Comparisons of these two systems are not uncommon, see for instance previously 
mentioned: Gey S. G., 2004.
262.  See further analysis of the current democratic models for Europe in Part III, 
Chapter 1.
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pushes the pendulum of equality towards a model of secular coercive 
ideology, which creates a visible inequality and imbalance between the 
believer and non-believer. Although the ECTHR’s decisions such as 
Dahlab and Sahin legitimised the French approach263, I believe the 
balance between believers and non-believers was distorted. Even though 
the legislation appears to create equal treatment for all, since no one is 
allowed to wear religious symbols, the burden of this ban does not affect 
the believer and the non-believer in the same way. It differentiates not 
only between non-belief and belief but also between different beliefs. 
For some, wearing religious symbols is not necessary and constitutes a 
matter of choice, like for the majority of Christians, while for others, like 
some Muslim groups, wearing a headscarf constitutes part of a broader 
dimension of religion, namely identity. 
Coercion preventing individuals from manifesting religion increases 
inequality among them. In a religiously plural democratic society, the key 
is to create a balance between believers and non-believers and between 
various forms of religious belief. Naturally, creating an absolute state of 
balance is utopian and unachievable in practice. However, in a democratic 
society, the principle of equality is a goal, the objective of which is 
safeguarding democracy and protecting individuals from the coercion of an 
arbitrary state targeting any group of individuals in particular. Limitations 
and differentiations should be allowed only for a just purpose and 
conducted in a proportional manner. Only such discrimination could be 
justified and found to be non-discriminatory. But Sadurski reminds that: 
“a ‘working’ test of non-discriminatory discrimination should be capable 
of being accepted by people who are on different sides in disagreements 
about justice’264. Actively preventing someone from manifesting his/
her own belief through clothing, which can hardly be found harmful to 
anyone, is certainly difficult to accept by those on the religious side of this 
argument about justice. French “secularism” expressed in legislation such as 
the headscarf ban employs the equality arguments to support actions that 
can be characterised rather as ideological coercion than neutral democratic 
263.  See further discussion concerning these decisions as well as other issues 
concerning education in Part II, Chapter 3.
264.  Sadurski W., 2008, p 110.
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non-involvement in the struggle between faiths. Justification of the law, 
which is supposed to introduce an equal burden on all, using arguments 
directed against a particular religious group, remains doubtful as just in 
purpose and disproportional in regards to burdens put on various religious 
and non-religious believers. Denial of the freedom of choice is one of the 
essential characteristics of non-democratic systems265. 
Moreover, when a state arbitrarily chooses to influence a particular 
group of residents due to their religious convictions, it creates selective 
discrimination and the “othering” of that particular belief. And in such a 
situation those discriminated against have indeed difficulty in identifying 
with the common core of principles and values. The effect gained is 
exactly the opposite of the one attempted. The “secular democrat” becomes 
a “secular terrorist” when he or she chooses a particular faith to target and 
in doing so becomes as fundamentalist as the religious fundamentalist 
that is feared. Religious pluralism becomes impossible when religions on 
the level of individual practice are perceived as a threat to the democratic 
system. The balance between believers and non-believers is shaken deeply 
and draws analogies to those systems which choose to persecute non-
believers for not complying with religious dogma.
3.8. Pluralism and neutralism
3.8.1. Changes on the legal level in the Church of Sweden
Sweden used to belong to the countries having an established state church. 
Like in Denmark, Norway, Finland and Iceland, the tradition of the state 
church dated back to the times of the Reformation and Swedish national 
identity and participation in the church were naturally connected. As 
Gustafsson notes, it was a criminal offence to leave the Church as late as 
1858 and still until 1951 it was impossible to exit the Church without 
joining another Christian denomination266. The year 2000, however, 
brought a historical change in the relations between the state and the 
265.  Gunn J., 2004-2005.
266.  Gustafsson G., 2003, pp. 51-52.
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church in Sweden. The novelty of the law, which entered into force on the 
1st of January 2000, separated the state from the church and, although the 
church still enjoys certain support from the state, it is no longer part of the 
state system as such. The new law was the result of long preparations, during 
which there were many phases and reaching the conclusive version was not 
done without compromises both on the part of the state and the church267.
The current legal setting puts all the faiths in a similar position and 
is primarily regulated by the Freedom of Religion Act and the Religious 
Denomination Act. Freedom of religion guaranteed in those acts 
concentrates on the individual religious aspect, which is similar to the 
regulation of the ECHR on freedom of religion. It allows an individual 
to freely belong to or resign from belonging to a religious community and 
both the joining and the resignation from the participation in a religious 
community are matters between the individual and the community itself. 
The Religious Denomination Act provides general protection for religious 
freedom and refers in that aspect to the ECHR268. Moreover, it allows a 
religious denomination to register in order to protect their right to perform 
religious activities269. The purpose of the law was to allow as many religious 
denominations to apply for protection as possible; so the law does not 
require any special conditions, unlike the Austrian law, which recognises 
only a limited number of denominations that have to meet special 
requirements in order to be registered270. At the same time, there is still a 
special law governing the status of the Evangelical Lutheran Church, which 
was drafted in order to preserve the historical continuity of the Church of 
Sweden and prevent too harsh and too rapid a break between the tradition 
and modernity. The Church of Sweden Act regulates the status of the 
Church of Sweden (Folkkyrka), which is a common church open to all 
and based on democratic organization. It regulates organizational aspects 
of the Church but leaves the right to decide the details of doctrines and 
267.  For detailed historical and political background on the reform, see: Stegeby K., 
1999, pp. 703-768 or Gustafsson G., 2003.
268.  The Religious Denomination Act, Section 1.
269.  Ibid., Section 2.
270.  For more on this issue, see the chapter on the definition of religion in this volume 
or: Miner C.J, 1998.
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teachings to the Church, leaving the state out of the process. The pastors of 
the Evangelical Lutheran Church are no longer the employees of the state 
and the government no longer has any influence in the process of choosing 
bishops. The new regulation did not, however remove the requirement that 
the King shall belong to the Evangelical Lutheran Church and as Stegeby 
reminds, this anachronism was a result of a political compromise, which 
made the reform possible in the first place271. 
The Church, moreover, continues to receive some support form the 
state. The state still collects Church taxation on behalf of the Church and 
it allows the Church to administer the graveyards.
3.8.2. The ambiguous nature of the Finnish Church
The Constitution of Finland from the year 2000 does not recognise any 
state church. Instead, in Article 76 it refers to the special enacted laws 
concerning these churches traditionally considered as national. The 
law on the Church272 and the law on the organization of the Orthodox 
Church273 are the main laws that regulate the position and organization 
of traditional churches in Finland. The state supports partially these two 
churches, for example in the collection of church taxes. In addition, there 
are numerous specialised laws issued by the state concerning employment 
in the Lutheran Church, maintaining cemeteries, financing and other 
organizational matters. Pekka Leino observes that the Church Council 
is the main law legislative body drafting laws applying to the Church and 
the state is in the position of either rejecting the law or accepting it, but is 
not allowed to introduce amendments274. 
In addition to regulations concerning the two traditional churches, a 
new law on religious freedom was introduced and entered to force on the 
1st of August 2003275. According to that law, a religious association of at 
least 20 members can register as a religious community. The legal position 
271.  Stegeby K., 1999, p 765.
272.  Kirkkolaki 26.11.1993/1054.
273.  Ortodoksisen kirkon kirkkojärjestys 12.12.2006/174 vs. 2007 .
274.  Leino P, 2005, p33.
275.  Uskonnonvapauslaki 06.06.2003/453.
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of the Evangelical Lutheran Church as well as the Orthodox Church 
is equal to the position of registered communities, although these two 
churches do not need to register. Everyone above the age of 15 can enter 
or exit a religious community. 
The Evangelical Lutheran and Orthodox Churches are, due to tradition, 
considered to be national churches but according to their current legal 
status they cannot be considered state churches. The nature of the churches 
remains ambiguous – on the one hand they are considered traditional 
national churches, but on the other hand their current legal position is on a 
par with other churches and associations. As Sundback notes, participation 
in national churches in Finland, like in other Nordic countries, is connected 
to an understanding of nationality and identification with nationality276. 
Thus such an ambiguous nature and certain privileges enjoyed by the 
traditional churches are explained by history and tradition.
At the same time, however, secularization of life is high and in 
Finland, as in other countries, the number of people belonging to 
the church and participating in religious activities is on the decrease. 
According to research on the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Finland, 
the percentage of the Church membership decreased from about 92% 
in the 1970s to about 81% in 2007277. Furthermore, church attendance 
remains low and starting in the early 1990s, the share of church members 
who attend church services more rarely than once a year or never dropped 
to about 50%278. The influence of the church on political life remains 
small and the church follows the general trends of democratization 
mentioned previously in the context of other Scandinavian countries. 
3.8.3. Neutrality regulation and the principle of religious pluralism
The reform in Sweden was inspired by growing religious pluralism 
and multiculturalism. One of the main principles followed in the long 
negotiation process was that the state must not favour any denomination 
276.  Sundback S., 2007, pp. 265-272.
277.  Monikasvoinen kirkko, pp. 26.-28, These estimates are based both on the 
statistical data of the Church and the Statistical Office of Finland (Tilastokeskus).
278.  Monikasvoinen kirkko, p 33.
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and remain as neutral as possible in its regulations in the religious 
arena279. It was motivated by the fact that Swedish society had become 
more pluralistic and thus no denomination should receive preferential 
treatment above others280. Gustafsson asserts that also the church was 
seeking greater liberty and thus was ready to pay the price for it281.
Despite the fact that the traditional churches enjoy certain benefits, 
like tax collection by the state, both Swedish and Finnish regulations 
remain neutral towards religious denominations as far as possible. This 
neutralism rather than strict separationism, like in the French case, is a 
more favourable approach towards reaching the democratic goals of 
religious pluralism, equality and freedom of religion. A state that does 
not defend itself against religion, but instead is ready to allow protection 
for as many denominations as possible without advancing any of them 
through law is perhaps the closest to the European goals of equality, non-
discrimination and religious pluralism. Such neutralism also affects the 
individual dimension of the belief in an affirmative way. No individual 
can feel less or more appreciated by the state because of his or her secular 
or religious beliefs, regardless of whether it is the belief of the majority or 
a minority. The religious factor becomes irrelevant for the identification 
with the state and its policies and various approaches to life remain 
equally valuable and thus cultivate the growth of pluralism itself. This 
approach resembles again the Rawlsian constructivist approach to social 
justice and the position of different doctrines in a democratic vision of a 
society. Doctrinal views of particular citizens do not disrupt the creation 
of common rules of justice that do not prioritise any doctrine, but instead 
offer a reasonable consensus and principle of treating citizens as equal.
Of course, two lines of objections may appear. Firstly, that the 
functioning of the Church of Sweden and the Finnish churches did not 
really change, as Gustafsson observes regarding the Swedish Church.282. 
Thus it might be asserted that the change was not important. However, 
since the focus here is on legal principles and abstract constructs such as 
279.  Stageby K., 1999, p 726.
280.  Ibid., p 722.
281.  Gustafsson G., 2003, p70.
282.  Ibid., pp. 70-71.
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equality, I do ascertain again that symbolism in law does have meaning. 
Symbolic separation and neutrality on the legal level is of major 
importance for achieving equality and pluralism. The law must remain 
neutral to religious conceptions, so that none is placed above others solely 
on the grounds of tradition. 
Secondly, another objection claiming that traditional churches receive 
greater support may appear. And that objection is valid. However, the 
support is mainly support of a technical and administrative nature. These 
issues could be, of course, the subject of further scrutiny regarding their 
proportional and non-discriminative nature. But since in this volume 
I deal primarily with principles, this important quality of neutralism 
towards religious beliefs as a continuously developing principle of liberal 
democracy is the main focus.
Thirdly, it might be argued that the state does not truly remain neutral 
but chooses a certain secular conception of life which is not value-free 
and thus discriminatory towards individuals sharing a religious view 
of life. But democracy is not a value-free concept in itself, but rather a 
concept that is highly value-based. And I argue later in this volume that 
the current notion of European democracy is a specific concept that has 
lately developed into a particular form of liberal democracy and which 
has integrated into its meaning values such as human rights, equality, 
non-discrimination and rule of law as inherent and unquestionable. And 
such a conception is not a value-free construct but rather a construction 
based on particular values and principles. I return to these problems in 
the last part of this volume.
3.. Democracy and the current setting  
– the religious puzzle as the source of problems 
This panorama does not serve the purpose of drawing a full picture of 
religious regulation in Europe. Such an attempt would be a topic for a full 
comparative project requiring a few volumes. These pictures are solely to 
show the systems that fall far from the paradigm of secularization on the 
legal level and those that seem to be the closest to the goals of reaching 
religious pluralism and equality in religious and other beliefs. The last 
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paragraph is to show the systems that were reformed lately in order to 
fulfil better the democratic ideal as understood today. In the majority of 
these pictures a tendency towards separation or rather neutralism between 
state and church or state and religions emerges slowly as a necessary 
condition of democracy. The expanding area of rights, including sexual 
minorities’ rights or female reproductive rights or freedom of expression, 
cannot be reconciled with some of the objections of certain religions 
or states’ endorsement of any particular set of religious values283. The 
contemporary set of European values, which the countries taking part in 
the integration processes agreed to affirm, includes democracy, tolerance 
and the idea of rights as fundamentals of their systems. Endorsement of 
any religious system will lead to increasing fragmentation of integration 
law and human rights standards and will uphold situations in which 
religious interest is identified with national interest and placed above 
the common European commitment to rights and equality principles. 
Religious pluralism and religious equality in a multicultural society 
comprise a new democratic credo in an era when European societies 
are becoming increasingly heterogeneous. Even countries traditionally 
considered to be culturally uniform are slowly experiencing the influence 
of multiculturalism. Increased migration within the European Union, 
both internal and external, makes values, cultures and religions collide. As 
I further attempt to show in part III, the main issue in this multicultural 
era is how to adapt liberalism to the requirements of a multicultural 
society and strengthen internal commitment to those values. 
Later chapters of this dissertation illustrate the plurality of standards 
and lack of effective means to achieve a common standard of commitment 
to values considered to be European. While interpretative documents 
concerning these values are currently being issued with increasing 
frequency, the internal commitment of particular countries to those 
standards remains uncontrolled and in regard to some issues is extremely 
diverse. In some cases, the liberal democratic standard is rather far from 
being achieved. Europe doesn’t always “practice what it preaches” when it 
comes to liberal values. While reproaching other cultures and exporting 
283.  See the above mentioned: E.U. Network of Independent Experts on fundamental 
Rights, Opinion 4-2005.
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democratic values, the issues of internal commitment remain currently an 
internal challenge. Part II includes three chapters which serve the purpose 
of illustrating these diversities and which I hope can form a starting point 
for further theoretical discussion in Part III of this volume regarding a 
model of European democracy.

Part II:  
Critical Analysis of Contemporary  
problems of law and religion in Europe
138
Introduction
The aim of this part is not to provide a full or overall view of all 
contemporary problems of a religious nature in contemporary European 
society. Such a full overview is impossible due to the limits of this 
volume. It is designed merely to highlight certain inconsistencies in the 
contemporary European approach towards religion and law. The practices 
and conservatism of newly growing religions, in particular Islam, are 
usually strongly addressed and opposed and lead to legal changes.284 
The same strong actions, however, are not taken in regard to traditional 
European religions and their conservatism. As illustrated above, in some 
cases the bonds between state and church in Europe are still strong and 
influential. In this part I chose three different areas where law and religion 
collide and which are at the moment sources of what I would call a “double 
standard” in approach towards problems emerging due to friction between 
law and religion. This double standard is shown in different approaches 
to traditional European conservatism and new religious conservatism. 
These sketches are not meant to draw a full picture of problems. They were 
selected based on the fact that in those very areas the legal and political 
discourse is inconsistent and creates different standards for different 
religions. First of all, I approach problems of women’s rights and in 
particular reproductive rights. Furthermore, I analyse issues of blasphemy 
and hate-speech and finally I move into areas of friction between religion 
and education.
284.  E.g. the rights of Muslim women in Europe are often used as political rhetoric, 
as, e.g., in the case of the French headscarf ban.
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4. Relationship between religions  
and women’s rights
4.1. Women’s rights as the foundation of the European polity 
and the complicated nature of reproductive rights
Women’s rights are at the foundation of the European Union and 
the Council of Europe. The legal and political discourse in Europe 
is concentrated on achieving gender equality. As the European 
Commission’s Unit for Equality between Men and Women informs the 
reader on their official pages: “EU policy as regards equality between 
women and men takes a comprehensive approach which includes 
legislation, mainstreaming and positive actions”285. And indeed the 
legislation of the Community as well as the case law of the ECJ 
concerning gender equality comprise an enormous number of norms and 
rules. 
Sexual morality, on the other hand, has traditionally been influenced 
by religion. For centuries, the dominant sexual morality in Europe 
was Christian morality. And it was a Christian morality which 
produced traditional attitudes towards questions of family role division, 
motherhood, abortion and contraception. Traditionally, Christian 
morality perceived sexual acts as acceptable only for the purpose of 
having children286. In the twentieth century, with the development of 
effective contraception, like the birth control pill, traditional attitudes 
were challenged and women were given the opportunity to change their 
285.  European Commission; Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities; 
Gender Equality: http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=418&langId=en.
286.  Fleishman R., 2000.
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passive family role. Also the international human rights instruments 
expressed the ideas of women’s equality and challenged discrimination on 
the grounds of sex.
On the international level, the year 1979 brought the adoption of the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (further: CEDAW), which explicitly challenged the traditional 
family patterns and introduced the legal obligation of assuring equality 
of men and women in all aspects of life, including family life. In order to 
reach this goal, CEDAW included the obligation to ensure individuals 
the possibility of deciding on the number and spacing of their children 
and to have access to the information, education and means to enable 
them to exercise these rights. Meanwhile in Europe, similar aims of 
gender equality were phrased in new European documents. The ECHR 
in Article 14 forbade discrimination in applying the rights included 
in the convention, among others, on the grounds of sex. In 1997 the 
ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty elevated gender equality to the 
level of a fundamental principle of the Community287. These documents 
did not, however, make any specific reference to reproductive rights or 
the possibility of deciding about the number and spacing of children in 
a manner similar to the CEDAW. Reproductive rights in Europe were 
not embraced by any common policy, even though feminist scholars have 
ascertained that reproductive rights are necessary for advancing gender 
equality. Freedman and Isaacs, for instance, have insisted that, without 
the right to reproductive choice, other economic or social rights have only 
limited power to advance the well-being of women288. 
On the international level, firm commitment to the idea of 
reproductive rights as the necessary corollary of gender equality was 
expressly reaffirmed only as late as during the world summits in Cairo 
in 1994 and Beijing 1995. The Beijing Platform for Action specifies that, 
“The explicit recognition and reaffirmation of the right of all women to 
control all aspects of their health, in particular their own fertility, is basic 
to their empowerment;.”289
287.  Treaty of Amsterdam, Official Journal C 340, see: changes concerning Article 13.
288.  Freedman L.P, 1993, p19.
289.  United Nations, A/CONF.177/20, 1995. 
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However, religious opposition to the idea of reproductive rights has 
prevented any decisive development in that area worldwide. Next to Muslim 
countries, in particular the Catholic Church, who through the Vatican has a 
status of a permanent observer in the United Nations, was in firm opposition 
to recognising reproductive rights and especially abortion and obstructed 
the discussion290. Also the traditional influence of religion on reproductive 
matters in European countries did not change within a day’s time. 
4.2. Europe’s new commitment to a female’s rights
During the 10 years following the agreements of the Beijing platform, 
Europe did not firmly approve of the existence and importance of 
reproductive rights within its own territory even though the European 
Union’s countries are parties to the CEDAW and were present at the 
drafting of the Beijing Platform’s goals. In 2002, two years before the 
2004 accession of a new group of 10 countries, the European Parliament’s 
Committee on Women’s Rights and Equal Opportunities adopted a 
report on sexual and reproductive health and rights. It was called the Van 
Lancker report, from the name of the Rapporteur. The adopted report 
called for a common resolution on the matters in question. The motion 
for a resolution was accepted but the adoption of an actual resolution 
never followed. The report considered all relevant international documents 
and actions and the state of disparities in sexual and reproductive health 
and rights within the EU, especially in matters relating to women’s access 
to health services, contraception and abortion. It called for common 
action that would urge the governments to engage in efforts in providing 
contraceptives at low cost or free of charge for less privileged groups in 
the society, promoting sexual education in a gender-sensitive way and 
with special attention to the problem of sexually transmitted diseases, 
ensuring counselling for pregnant women and making abortion legal, safe 
and accessible to all.
In 2004 also the Council of Europe adopted a resolution291 and 
290.  Fleishman R., 2000.
291.  Resolution 1399 (2004).
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recommendation292 observing that there is an enormous disparity of 
standards between member states in matters of reproductive health and 
called to develop a comprehensive European strategy for the promotion 
of reproductive health and rights. 
In 2008, facing the difficult question of abortion, the Council of 
Europe adopted a report293 and resolution294, calling countries which 
uphold the abortion ban to decriminalise abortion, guarantee the effective 
exercise of the right to abortion and adopt appropriate strategies to 
promote sexual and reproductive health and rights as well as access to 
contraception in order to prevent unwanted pregnancies and abortions. 
The report and resolution underlined that abortion is not a family planning 
method and it should be avoided but the ban on abortion does not result 
in fewer abortions but leads to clandestine abortions and abortion tourism, 
which are costly and endanger women’s lives and health. 
The necessity of further commitment to rights inside Europe was also 
acknowledged by the European Union. In January 2009, the European 
Parliament adopted a resolution on the status of fundamental rights 
in the European Union295. The resolution contained many important 
acknowledgements concerning, among others, relationships between 
traditions, religions and rights inside the Union as well as the Union’s 
commitment to the rights and its credibility as a promoter of a rights-
based democracy. All of these issues will be subject to further scrutiny 
in the later chapters of this volume. In regard to women, however, the 
resolution stated that member states should withdraw their reservations 
to the CEDAW296 and assure that women can fully enjoy reproductive 
rights, access to contraception and avoid high-risk illegal abortions. 
In regard to women’s rights, the resolution in particular stressed that 
invoking customs, tradition or religious considerations to justify any form 
of discrimination against women, including adoption of any policies that 
292.  Recommendation 1675 (2004).
293.  Report, Access to safe and legal abortion, Doc. 11537 rev., 08.04.2008.
294.  Resolution 1607 (2008).
295.  Resolution 2007 (2145) (INI), 2009 and: Report on the situation of fundamental 
rights, 2008.
296.  As analysed below, among others, Malta included a reservation that the 
Convention would not challenge the Maltese ban on abortion.
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might endanger their lives, is unacceptable in a democratic state based on 
the principle of gender equality.
While the amount of interpretative and advisory documents like 
reports and resolutions has grown recently, none of the European-wide 
binding legal documents includes specifically reproductive rights. Most 
competence for action in the field of health is held by member states, but 
the EU has the responsibility, set out in the Treaty, to undertake certain 
actions which complement the work done by member states, for example in 
relation to cross-border health threats, patient mobility, and reducing health 
inequalities. The question of reproductive rights, though, is treated mainly 
from the perspective of health issues rather than rights issues. The variety is 
thus still enormous. Reproductive rights have been, however, recognised in 
another area of competence of the entire Union, namely in regard to foreign 
relations. Regulation 1567/2003297 obliges the Community to support 
actions to improve reproductive and sexual health and rights as defined 
in the Beijing Platform Programme for Action in developing countries. 
Thus the Union as such has a competence to promote and aid reproductive 
rights outside its territory, but no competence to interfere with the internal 
regulations of its own member states in this area. 
A binding interpretation of legal principles is, however, provided 
in the judgements of the European Court of Human Rights and the 
European Court of Justice. In regard to abortion, two such judgments 
will be introduced in the section dealing with the Irish ban on abortion. 
Lately, the ECTHR issued another judgment on this matter in the case 
of Tysiac vs. Poland298, which is analysed in the chapter concerning the 
Polish commitment to reproductive rights.
4.3. Discourse versus practice in the European countries
These general aims mentioned in the section above, do not meet a 
favourable reception in some member states like Malta or Poland299. 
297.  Regulation 1567/2003.
298.  Case of Tysiac vs. Poland, Application no. 5410/03.
299.  Maltese MEPs oppose move promoting abortion and same-sex marriages, 
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Ireland, on the other hand, as one of the states with the longest 
membership in the EU and the COE, is the perfect historical example 
of how strongly the religious factor can influence women’s rights, and 
that such influence does not prevent membership in the Union or in the 
Council. Throughout its membership in the Union and in the ECHR 
system, Ireland has successfully maintained its absolute ban on abortion, 
which has been softened mainly due to internally arising cases.
The adoption of the Van Lecken Report aimed at preventing further 
fragmentation of policies within the Union in regard to reproductive 
rights and in particular in the accessing countries. It did not, however, 
manage to pressure Malta or Poland to change their policies and laws 
in order to conform to the postulated standards. The example of Ireland 
and its former restrictive rights concerning access to contraception or 
maintenance of the ban on abortion could be used as justifying arguments 
by the accessing countries. The accessing countries could use references 
to the Irish policies and history in order to avoid European pressure to 
change their own conservative laws and policies.
The following sections analyse the influence of Catholicism in Ireland 
on the sphere of women’s reproductive rights and their development 
through case law. Then I analyse the Maltese absolute ban on abortion and 
the complicated situation of Poland in regard to abortion and women’s 
reproductive rights. In the case of Poland, the conservative government 
between the years 2005-2007 challenged the idea of reproductive rights 
as a whole and instead attempted to introduce Catholic family values into 
the realm of law and reproductive mainstreaming in Poland. Thus the 
chapter regarding Poland employs less legal methods but instead methods 
of analysis of the political discourse in order to estimate the potential and 
actual impact of those policies on rights.
4.3.1. The situation in Ireland
Almost 60 years of membership in the Council of Europe and 35 years of 
membership in the European Community have not managed to significantly 
The Times of Malta, Saturday, 17.01.2009., Europejska rezolucja w sprawie aborcji 
[European Abortion Resolution], Gazeta Wyborcza, 16.04.2008.
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change the position of the Catholic Church in Irish law as far as reproductive 
rights are concerned, or at least as far as the issue of abortion is. 
Ireland’s complicated history, including the struggle with the British 
Empire for independence, strengthened the position of the Catholic 
Church in the society. The Church became a unifying characteristic 
of Irish society during the independence struggle300. Thus the new 
constitution of the independent Republic (Bunreacht na hÉireann) 
drafted in 1937 was implemented in the spirit of Catholicism. It affirmed 
its position and legitimised the impact of religious values on the legal 
system. 
Originally Catholicism received a constitutionally privileged position 
and held it until the amendment of the Constitution in 1973. Regardless 
of the amendment, though, most of the history of the legal interpretation 
of the Constitution has been occupied by the Thomistic understanding of 
natural law. Some of the Justices of the Irish Supreme Court, like Gavan 
Duffy, have been particularly devoted to the idea of protecting this Catholic 
understanding of natural law and amending common law where it did not 
conform to Catholic ideology301. The Irish Constitution has since evolved 
and experienced many amendments, including the amendment removing 
the special position of the Catholic Church302. However, certain natural law 
elements of the Constitution itself have still not changed until now. The 
Preamble of the Constitution still proclaims that it is drafted “in the Name 
of the Most Holy Trinity, from Whom is all authority and to Whom, as 
our final end, all actions both of men and States must be referred.” A similar 
affirmation can be found in the text of the Constitution itself in Article 44, 
which confirms that: “The State acknowledges that the homage of public 
worship is due to Almighty God. It shall hold His Name in reverence, and 
shall respect and honour religion.” 
Until the case of McGee, the natural law interpretation of the 
Constitution was valid also in areas pertaining to private life, including 
reproductive life and choices. The legal order of Ireland for many 
years considered practices found to be morally sinful by the Roman 
300.  See: Whyte G., 1996-1997.
301.  Ibid., pp.729-739.
302.  Amendment no. 5/1972, 1973.
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Catholic Church to be illegal. The prime examples are divorce303, 
contraception304, gay relationships305 and abortion. Abortion has always 
been illegal in Ireland, yet the explicit ban on abortion was introduced 
to the Irish constitution in 1983 by the Eighth Amendment, which was 
incorporated into the text of the Constitution as Article 40.3.3306. The 
article protects the life of the unborn, which can be compromised only 
by danger to the life of the mother307. The protection of the unborn 
life in addition imposes an obligation on the state “to defend and 
vindicate that right”. The Irish authorities have been active in fulfilling 
that obligation as the cases mentioned later will show. Through its 
jurisprudence, however, the Highest Court has with time introduced 
certain changes to the strict interpretation of this provision and shaped 
the current understanding of the abortion ban in Ireland. Pro-feminist 
scholars have argued that this ban is non-conforming to the standard 
of human rights and seen it as an instrument of women’s oppression 
and a hindrance to the successful implementation of the reproductive 
as well as other rights of pregnant women308. The violations seen by 
the feminist scholars are foremost those of the right to privacy, health 
and non-discrimination. They have been also seen as an expression 
of nationalism309. Meanwhile, the defenders of natural law have been 
arguing that states should be allowed to decide on matters of morality 
and that the right of the life of the unborn must override the right to 
privacy of a pregnant woman310. 
303.  Allowed by introduction of Amendment no. 15/1995, 1996. This amendment 
was a result of a referendum conducted in November 1995.
304.  Amended by: McGee vs. the Attorney General and the Revenue Commissioners, 
[1974] IR 284 at 298.
305.  Norris vs. Ireland, Application no. 10581/83.
306.  Amendment no. 8/1983, 1983. The ban on abortion existed even before but did 
not enjoy constitutional status and was sanctioned by very old provisions from the 
time of British rule: Offences Against the Person Act, 1861.
307.  The exceptions to the law were developed in the judicial review. See below.
308.  See more on feminist discourse in regard to abortion: Smyth L., 2002.
309.  Fletcher, R., 2005.
310.  See more on the pro-life discourse and its contemporary impact: Oaks L., 2003.
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4.3.2. The cases before the Supreme court of Ireland that influenced the 
contemporary understanding of the reproductive rights of Irish women
The McGee case311 from the year 1973 was the first case which could 
be called “revolutionary” in the history of tensions between natural 
law and women’s reproductive rights in Ireland. The case addressed 
a married woman’s right to use contraceptives. Mrs. McGee was a 
married woman and a mother of four. Her second and third pregnancies, 
the latter of which was a twin pregnancy, were complicated by serious 
attacks of cerebral thrombosis, which caused complications such as 
temporary paralysis. Mrs. McGee’s medical adviser warned her that 
further pregnancies could cause danger to her life. Thus, the McGees 
decided to resort to the use of contraceptives and attempted to import a 
contraceptive jelly. The jelly was seized by the authorities in accordance 
with Section 17 of the Act of 1935, which prohibited the sale and 
importation of contraceptives. The use of the contraceptives per se was 
not considered illegal. Yet, due to the sales ban, the Irish population was 
effectively prevented from using them. 
The judges in this case departed from the natural law interpretation of 
the Irish law and Constitution. They ruled against the Catholic Church’s 
views on reproductive issues and legalised usage of contraceptives in 
marriage. The judges agreed that the regulation of such private matters 
of intimacy as those concerning the choice between sexual abstinence 
and usage of contraceptives in marriage is not a matter which should be 
regulated by the State. The departure from the religious stance was not 
absolute, though, as none of the justices went far enough to extend the 
same rules to non-marital relationships. 
Justice Fitzgerald drew a distinction between the legal and religious 
aspects of the case, expressing the opinion that the religion of the plaintiff 
was not the issue in the case, but rather the privacy aspect. Justice Walsh, 
on the other hand, ruled in favour of the couple and departed from the 
interpretation, which upheld the State’s obligation to vindicate natural 
law doctrine:
311.  McGee vs. Attorney General.
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“It is a matter exclusively for the husband and wife to decide how 
many children they wish to have; it would be outside the competence 
of the State to dictate or prescribe the number of children which they 
might have or should have. (…)What may be permissible to husband 
and wife is not necessarily permissible to the State. For example, 
the husband and wife may mutually agree to practice either total or 
partial abstinence in their sexual relations. If the State were to attempt 
to intervene to compel such abstinence, it would be intolerable and 
unjustifiable intrusion into the privacy of the matrimonial bedroom.”
In this judgement, the issue of reproductive rights and the choices 
of a married woman challenged the traditionalist and conservative 
interpretation of the Irish law. The judges deciding on the case for the 
first time departed so clearly from the teaching of the Catholic Church 
and separated the issue of religion from the issue of the law’s application.
The next important case, connected with women’s reproductive rights 
and the constitutional ban on abortion, was the shocking case from the 
year 1992, named the X case312. X was a 14-year-old girl who was raped by 
her friend’s father. Her parents arranged an appointment in an abortion 
clinic in London and issued a formal question to the authorities if the 
foetal tissue could be used as evidence in the rape case. The response was 
negative and the authorities referred the case to the Attorney General, 
who obtained an order to restrain the girl from leaving the country for 
the period of 9 months. Although the girl was already in London, she 
and her parents returned to Ireland. The girl however, displayed suicidal 
tendencies and according to the opinion of a clinical psychologist, 
experienced in similar cases, was ready to end her life to avoid bringing 
her pregnancy to full term. Thus the legal issue that arose in this case was 
balancing between the right to life of the mother and the right to life 
of the unborn. The legal dispute was based on the mother’s freedom to 
travel. The majority of judges agreed that the life of the mother required 
protection equal to that of the foetus and in circumstances when it 
was possible to establish a substantial danger to the life of the mother, 
abortion should be allowed. Justice McCarthy observed that when the life 
312.  The Attorney General vs. X and Others.
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of a mother is in danger, there might be no possibility to vindicate the 
life of the unborn. Only one of the justices objected to this interpretation. 
Justice Hederman sustained the opinion that the state must secure 
the mother’s duty to carry the pregnancy to term as a moral duty. The 
judgment in the X case established a new constitutional exception, which 
allowed for the termination of pregnancy in cases of real, imminent and 
substantial risk to the life of the mother, including the risk of death by 
self-destruction, which could be avoided by terminating her pregnancy. 
The X case was followed by the C case313, which considered a raped 
Traveller girl. Travellers are an old ethnic minority distinguished by 
a nomadic lifestyle and own language – Shelta. The rape victim was 13 
years old and she was initially supported by her parents in their wish to 
terminate her pregnancy. Initially, it had been decided with the approval 
of the parents that the Health Board would not seek a further interim 
care order but that instead the parents would take her to England so that 
she could have her pregnancy terminated there. The arrangements were 
to be made by the parents, but they were subsequently approached by 
pro-life activists and changed their mind. The issue at stake was whether 
such a situation put an affirmative obligation on the state to arrange the 
procedure in order to protect the girl’s life. The victim’s parents tried 
to stop her from travelling and stop the Eastern Health Board from 
arranging the abortion procedure for their daughter. 
The High Court decided, however, that there was strong evidence that 
a pregnant child is likely to commit suicide unless she has her pregnancy 
terminated. In this case, termination of the pregnancy was in the view of 
the Court a medical treatment for C.’s mental condition. Since C. showed 
clear suicidal tendencies, the Court established a real an imminent danger 
to her life, which now allowed abortion. In accordance with the Child 
Care Act of 1991, the Court regarded the welfare of the pregnant child 
and protection of her life as the first and paramount consideration. As 
a result of this judgement, C was allowed to travel and it was in practice 
the Eastern Health Board who arranged for her travel and procedure in 
England. The ban was slightly re-interpreted towards the understanding 
of abortion as a medical treatment, which must be provided in case of 
313.  A. and B. vs. Eastern Health Board.
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danger to the life of the mother.
Meanwhile, the cases discussed below, Open Door and Grogan, found 
their way to the ECTHR and ECJ and brought further amendments to 
the Constitution. As a result of these judgments, the Constitution was 
amended by the addition of two further subsections to the paragraph 
dealing with the life of the unborn. The thirteenth Amendment 
introduced a provision which forbade limitations on the right to travel 
of pregnant women314 while the Fourteenth Amendment stated that the 
ban on abortion “(…) shall not limit freedom to obtain or make available, 
in the State (…) information relating to services lawfully available in 
another state.”315
Despite the introduction of these provisions, another dramatic case 
occurred as recently as in 2007. A 17-year-old girl known only as Miss 
D. won a case against the Health Service Executive (further HSE), who 
attempted to prevent her from travelling abroad for an abortion316. Miss 
D.’s foetus was diagnosed with anencephaly, a condition in which the 
head or part of it is missing. Facing the situation that the baby would 
survive no more than a few hours, Miss D. decided on an abortion to be 
performed in England. However, the HSE considered that she had no 
right to travel to obtain an abortion if her life was not in danger. The case 
received wide coverage in the media and an analysis of the majority of 
the commentaries showed that the society was very understanding and 
compassionate towards the applicant, sometimes referring to the “cruelty” 
of HSE professionals317. 
The case was ultimately resolved in the High Court of Dublin on 
the 9th of May 2007. The judgement underlined the responsible attitude 
of Miss D., who did not claim she was suicidal. Justice McKechnie 
emphasised in the judgement that the case considered the right to travel 
and not the rights or wrongs of abortion. The constitutional position 
314.  Amendment no. 13/1992, 1992.
315.  Amendment no. 14/1992, 1992.
316.  Due to unavailability of the judgment’s text, references to press materials and 
scientific articles are used in this section, e.g.: Irish teen in court abortion plea, BBC 
News, 03.05.2007 or: Bowcott O., Irish judge stirs up abortion debate by ruling 17-
year-old can travel to UK for termination, The Guardian, 10.05.2007.
317.  More on the analysis of the press discourse: Smyth L., 2008.
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concerning the established right to travel was thus reaffirmed. However, 
a precedent which would modify the law in order to include the right to 
abortion in cases of severe foetal abnormality was not made. 
4.3.3. Open Door and Grogan – Europe’s word on Irish abortion law
The Grogan and Open Door cases introduced the Thirteenth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the Irish Constitution. They both concern 
similar situations, namely delivering information on abortion, but with 
different actors involved. The cases were considered nearly simultaneously 
but before different Courts on the European level. The ECTHR dealt 
with Open Door vs. Ireland in the issue of freedom of expression and 
the ECJ with The Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland vs. 
Grogan in the issue of the nature of abortion as a service.
A short time before the X case, the Irish High Court was faced 
with a case brought by the Attorney General on behalf of the Society 
for the Protection of Unborn Children (SPUC) against Open Door 
Counselling. The question considered the lawfulness of providing 
information and counselling for women seeking abortion abroad. Open 
Door Counselling and another organisation named Dublin Well Women 
were providing a broad range of services for pregnant women, from 
health tests through information on abortion services in the United 
Kingdom to occasionally arranging the procedure for women willing to 
undergo abortion abroad. The SPUC claimed that the activity of Open 
Door and Dublin Well Women violated the constitutional protection of 
the unborn and applied to the High Court to restrain the organizations 
from distributing information and leaflets. The High Court referred this 
issue to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling according to Article 177 of the 
EEC Treaty in regard to the nature of abortion under Community law 
(SPUC vs. Grogan). The SPUC appealed the High Court decision to 
the Supreme Court318. The Supreme Court agreed with the SPUC and 
granted an injunction restraining the organizations from publishing or 
distributing, or assisting in the publication or distribution, of information 
on the identity and location of clinics where abortions were performed. 
318.  A.G. (S.PU.C.) vs. Open Door Counselling Ltd.
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The judges saw the restraint as the necessary corollary of the ban on 
abortion expressed in Article 40.3.3 of the Constitution and as Justice 
McCarthy commented in the case, the court was obliged to enforce the 
constitutional ban. 
In SPUC vs. Grogan, the ECJ agreed that abortion as a medical service 
provided legally in another Member State for remuneration should be 
considered as a “service” in the meaning of Article 60 of the EEC Treaty. 
The arguments on a moral plane, explained the Court, cannot influence 
the judgement, since the assessment deals with legal systems in which the 
activities in question are provided legally. The termination of pregnancy, 
where it is practiced lawfully, is provided in exchange for remuneration 
and is a part of professional activity and thus meets the definition of a 
“service” under Community law. 
However, the information provided by Steven Grogan and other 
organizations included in the case was provided free of charge and was 
not a representation of the economic activity of the clinics in the United 
Kingdom. Thus, spreading such information, the ECJ underlined, should 
be treated exclusively as freedom of expression. And judging on the 
matter of freedom of expression was considered to fall out of the scope 
of the ECJ’s jurisdiction. Thus, the ban on the distribution of information 
was not found illegal under the Community law. This judgment was 
criticised, both by those who contested the nature of abortion as a service 
and by those who agreed with the judgement in this matter. If abortion 
was considered a service, why should the information concerning 
obtaining this service not be considered a necessary corollary of the 
freedom to receive services, asked Colvin319.
The aspect concerning freedom of expression was ultimately decided 
before the ECTHR. Open Door Ltd, another organization providing 
free information on abortion services, filed a complaint concerning the 
ban on providing information to the European Commission of Human 
Rights. The case was admissible. The Court delivered its judgment in 
October 1992 and found a violation of the right to freedom of expression, 
as embodied in Article 10 of the Convention. The ECTHR refused to 
examine further complaints whether Irish law was violating the right to 
319.  Colvin C.M., 1991-1992, p 525.
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privacy and freedom from discrimination of pregnant women willing 
to undergo abortion. The Court found that the absolute and perpetual 
restraint on the provision of information to pregnant women concerning 
abortion failed to meet the requirement of proportionality of legal 
limitations necessary in a democratic society. The Court underlined 
that the State’s discretion in the field of the protection of morals is not 
unfettered and unreviewable even though the ECTHR once more, like in 
multiple other judgements, underlined the “wide margin of appreciation” 
of states in moral matters. However, restrictions introduced on moral 
grounds must be necessary and proportional, which was not the case here 
in the Court’s conclusion. 
Mrs X and Ms Geraghty, who applied together with Open Door on 
behalf of women of child-bearing age who were prevented from receiving 
information concerning their reproductive health, e.g. information 
necessary for pregnant women, were also found to be victims in the 
meaning of Article 25.1 of the Convention:
“Although it has not been asserted that Mrs X and Ms Geraghty are 
pregnant it is not disputed that they belong to a class of women of 
child-bearing age which may be adversely affected by the restrictions.”
The Court also agreed that their complaint was not done in abstracto. 
The decision affirmed that the content of the questioned law put the 
applicants at risk of being directly prejudiced by its provisions. Therefore, 
the complaint was made in concreto.
Thus, the Open Door/Grogan case together with the previously described 
X case influenced the change introduced to the Irish Constitution. Local 
restrictions on information and access to services abroad were found illegal 
and incompatible with Irish international obligations in two different 
European legal fora. The ban on abortion inside the state’s territory 
remained, however, to be considered as an internal matter. Neither of the 
Courts decided to deliberate on the morality or immorality of abortion. 
No considerations of the influence of the ban on the privacy of women or 
the influence of abortion on the right to life of the unborn were made in 
either of the cases. However, a slight movement towards recognising the 
importance of a woman’s choice occurred in the Open Door judgement:
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“…the corporate applicants were engaged in the counselling of 
pregnant women in the course of which counsellors neither advocated 
nor encouraged abortion, but confined themselves to an explanation 
of the available options. The decision as to whether or not act on the 
information was that of the woman concerned.”320
The conclusions reached in the cases were not unanimous. The Open Door 
judgement was issued with a total of five dissenting or partially dissenting 
opinions, one separate opinion and one concurring opinion signed 
together by ten of the twenty-three judges. The legal protection of the 
right to life of the foetus was not dismissed as incompatible with women’s 
rights and the incorporation of the religious values of the moral majority 
into the national legal system was not found to be per se incompliant 
with the requirements of the Convention.
4.3.4. Malta’s absolute ban on abortion and the state  
of reproductive health and rights
Ireland is nowadays not the only country belonging to the European 
Union that maintains strict law concerning abortion. Malta, member of 
EU since the year 2004 and a member of the COE since the year 1965, 
maintains an even stronger ban than the Irish one. 
Malta has been an independent republic since 1964. This previous 
British colony is almost uniformly Catholic with as much as 98% of 
the population professes the Roman Catholic faith. The Constitution 
of Malta proclaims that the state religion of Malta is Roman Catholic 
and, as previously mentioned, constitutionally legitimises the authority of 
the Catholic Church to teach on the rightness and wrongness of moral 
principles. 
With this particular socio-religious and legal setting, it is no 
wonder that the Catholic principles regarding reproductive rights are, 
like in Ireland, legally sanctioned in law. Malta forbids abortion in all 
circumstances. Article 241 of the Criminal Code bans abortion without 
any legal exceptions and imposes imprisonment ranging from 18 months 
320.  Open Door vs. Ireland, Application no. 14234/88, paragraph 75.
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to 3 years both for the person administering the procedure and the 
woman undergoing it. Moreover, Article 243 imposes the same penalty 
for prescribing medical means which might cause a miscarriage. In 
addition, it foresees a penalty of perpetual interdiction from the exercise 
of the profession for the administering doctor. Recently, debate on 
entrenching the ban in the Constitution has been taking place321 but no 
action towards introducing such an amendment has taken place. 
Malta has also protected its system from international pressure 
concerning the matter of abortion by including reservations to its 
international obligations. Maltese reservation to CEDAW’s Article 16 
states that:
“The Government of Malta does not consider itself bound by sub-
paragraph (e) of paragraph (1) of article 16 in so far as the same 
may be interpreted as imposing an obligation on Malta to legalize 
abortion.”
Amending the legislation and decriminalising abortion seems to be 
out of discussion and Malta opposes any suggestions of international 
organizations appealing for such decriminalisation. In 2004, the UN 
Committee for Social, Cultural and Economic Rights urged Malta 
to liberalise its abortion law. In the same year, the UN Committee on 
the Elimination of Discrimination against Women urged the proper 
implementation of the CEDAW, pointing out numerous concerns, 
including the position of women in the family and domestic violence. The 
Committee also called for withdrawal of the reservations, including the 
reservation concerning abortion322. 
The Permanent Representative of Malta to the United Nations 
underlined again in 2008 in his statement on the advancement of women 
that abortion is illegal in Malta and is not considered a method of 
321.  See e.g.: Ameen J., Government proposes abortion ban to be included in 
the Constitution, The Malta Independent, 07.05.2005, or: Updated: Muscat has 
reservations on proposed Constitutional ban on abortion, The Times of Malta, 
18.09.2008.
322.  CEDAW: Malta A/59/38(SUPP).
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family planning and thus all use of terms such as “reproductive health” 
or “reproductive services” to cover abortion are treated with reservation 
by Malta323. As mentioned above, also the recent resolutions by the 
COE and the European Parliament called for decriminalising abortion 
and withdrawing reservations but Malta is firmly opposing taking such 
steps324. 
Also the state of other reproductive rights in Malta has followed the 
traditional teaching of Catholic countries. The importation of condoms 
was prohibited still in the 1970s and pharmacies were prohibited from 
selling them and could lose their license for doing so325. Nowadays, the 
school curriculum includes minimum sexual education and the usage of 
contraception is allowed, but Camilleri-Cassar observed that information 
on sexual health is scattered and sporadic and the usage and accessibility 
of contraceptives follows irregular patterns326.
4.3.5. Reproductive rights in Poland – return to conservative Catholic family 
values as the core of Polish politics between the years 2005-200
The question of reproductive rights has since 1989 been a problematic 
issue in Poland. The Catholic Church played an important role in the re-
establishment of the democratic system in Poland in 1989. In a country 
where above 90% of the population is considered to be Catholic327, 
the Church naturally supported the movements leading to the fall 
of the former Eastern Bloc. The election of a pope from Poland also 
strongly reinforced the role of religion in Polish society and politics. At 
the time of the Solidarity movement, the involvement of the Church 
in the processes leading to the fall of the old regime was seen as a 
political victory of freedom of religion rather than as a danger to other 
323.  Statement by Permanent Representative of Malta to the United Nations, 2008.
324.  Maltese MEPs oppose move promoting abortion and same-sex marriages, The 
Times of Malta, 17.01.2009.
325.  Milne R.G., 1973, pp.378-379.
326.  Cammileri-Cassar F., 2005.
327.  According to the Statistical Centre of the Catholic Church (SAC), the 
proportion of Catholics in the Polish population in 2006 was 95.4%, http://www.iskk.
ecclesia.org.pl/statystyka_2006.htm.
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democratic freedoms328. After the re-establishment of the democratic 
system, the Church started gaining more and more political power. The 
political parties originating from the Solidarity movement declared their 
Catholic commitment and during the period of their domination in the 
parliament brought into force new laws introducing Catholic religious 
instruction to schools and tightening abortion regulations. During the 
19 years of democratic changes in Poland, the centre and right-wing 
parties affirmed their origins in the Solidarity movement and their 
commitment to Catholicism and Catholic values or at least Christianity 
and Christian values. The post-Solidarity political bloc refused cooperation 
with the social democratic bloc, advocating for human rights, including 
reproductive rights and the de facto separation of church and state. This 
political polarisation became particularly visible in the pre-electoral 
discourse in 2005. During their election campaign, PiS [pl: Prawo i 
Sprawiedliwosc – eng. Law and Justice] and other right-wing parties in 
their programmes gave an even stronger role than before to Catholic values 
as one of the means of reaffirming Polish national interests and opposition 
to the “communist” and “anti-national” values professed by the socialists. 
In the political discourse led by right wing parties, Catholic values 
became synonymous for patriotic values and opposed to socialist, “post-
communist” and even European values, seen as foreign and oppressive. The 
Church itself did not oppose the right wing’s usage of Catholic slogans 
and in the instance of the Catholic radio station discussed below, Radio 
Maryja openly supported PiS and other right-wing parties.
From the autumn 2005 to the autumn 2007 the reproductive rights 
of Polish women were under the influence of conservative and religious 
ideology promoted by the governing parties. When the conservative 
party PiS won the parliamentary elections in September 2005 in Poland 
and subsequently succeeded to lead their candidate to the position of 
the President of the Republic, their first step was closing down the 
institution of the Governmental Plenipotentiary for Gender Equality 
in November 2005. The conservative politicians found the institution 
to be highly controversial. The right wing, strongly affiliated with the 
Catholic Church, could not forgive the speech of Professor Sroda, the 
328.  See: Sila-Nowicki W., 1984-1986, pp. 703-707.
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former Plenipotentiary, at a conference in Stockholm in 2004, where she 
stated that Catholicism, by influencing culture, might have an indirect 
influence on increasing family violence against women. These words met 
an immediate reaction after the elections were won. The first political 
decision of the government led by PiS was closing down the institution. 
Some of the tasks of the Plenipotentiary were transferred to a division in 
the Ministry of Labour. The other “institution” was, however, created — 
the Parliamentary Committee for Family Matters and Women’s Rights, 
led by the ultra-conservative MP Alina Sobecka (LPR). 
The exceptionality of this political “experiment” requires a fuller 
analysis of the political content as well as the legal. Unlike Malta or 
Ireland, where old traditions, based on Catholic morality, are protected, 
Poland before 1989 had liberal reproductive health policies. Only after 
the 1989, did the return to Catholic values begin. Yet, even though 
present in Polish politics ever since 1989, the pressure towards the re-
institution of Catholic morality into law had never been as strong and 
open as during the years 2005-2007. The governing politicians of the 
time spoke primarily of “Catholic” or “Christian family values” and the 
“traditional role of the family”, sometimes openly opposing the idea of 
gender equality.
4.3.6. Catholic values as a political programme
The situation of Polish women in the context of the pressure of the 
Catholic Church and its role in the abortion issues has been thoroughly 
researched329. The perspectives on gender equality development in 
Poland outlined by researchers before its accession to the EU were 
usually optimistic and underlined the growing importance of the activist 
movement and future accession. These processes were seen as hope for 
improvement in the sphere of women’s equality. 
The victory of the ultra-conservative powers came as a shock to those 
with such expectations. The official political programme document of PiS 
affirmed that: 
329.  See among others: Nowicka W., 1996, pp. 21-29; Girard F., Nowicka W., 2002, 
pp. 22-30 or Heinen, J., Matuchniak-Krasuska, A., 1991, pp.27-33.
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“PiS considers Christian values the basis of our culture and the 
fundamental basis of a strong family. We therefore oppose abortion, 
euthanasia, cloning or embryo cell research (…) We want to propagate 
these values supporting the family and proper family models and 
 ethics.”330
During their governance PiS also actively tried to maintain and 
strengthen the belief that Poland had always been Catholic and true 
Polish values equalled Catholic values. This equation of Catholicism 
with patriotism has always been very common among right-wing Polish 
parties. PiS affirmed it in another programme document titled “Catholic 
Poland in Christian Europe”:
“Throughout all our history – from the baptism of Mieszko the First, 
through the coronation of Boleslaw Chrobry, death of priest Popieluszko 
to the pontificate of John Paul II and the existence of the Solidarity 
movement, Christianity has been an essential part of our nationality.[. . . ]
100 years ago Catholicism was considered to be the Truth for the 
believers and civilization for non-believers. Unfortunately, nowadays we 
live in a reality where this civilization is questioned and subject to attack.”
Basing their political programme on the last of the above-quoted 
sentences, PiS chose defending Catholicism as one of their political aims. 
Politicians of the PiS intensified their connections with the Church, 
partly by cooperating actively with the fundamentalist Catholic radio 
station Radio Maryja and the television channel Trwam, belonging to the 
convent of Redemptorists.
The conservative programme and ideological fundamentals became 
even stronger when another ultra-conservative and ultra-Catholic party, 
Liga Polskich Rodzin (LPR, eng. The League of Polish Families), joined 
the governmental coalition together with the populist party Samoobrona 
(Self-defence) in May 2006. The leader of the LPR was appointed to the 
position of Minister of Education, which shocked intellectuals, teachers and 
330.  See: Programme of PiS, 2005, p 81.
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students and resulted in many protests.331 The ideologisation of the school 
programmes had been ever since widely feared and numerous initiatives 
proposed by the Minister, like that of introducing patriotic education or the 
final high school examination in religion, proved the fears to be justified. 
The LPR had been always considered to be ultra-nationalistic and an ultra-
Catholic party that never supported the neutrality of the state in ideological 
matters and promoted Catholicism in the public sphere in manner similar 
to that expressed in the Irish constitution. Among the main aims of the 
LPR, one can find the following:
“Political, professional and social activity should be a service to God, 
Poland and Nation (…) We must protect the traditional Polish family 
(…) We oppose abortion, euthanasia, cloning, homosexual relations 
and all laws that are contrary to Christian ethics and morality”332
Women’s rights were hardly ever mentioned during the governance of the 
conservatives or even openly criticised together with the idea of human 
rights in general333. The former Prime Minister Kaczynski said directly in 
his speech opening the activity of his government:
“We differ from other countries (…). I want to emphasize that as far 
as gender equality is concerned, the position of women in the society 
and their role in the family, I support everything that should lead to 
protection of women from oppression that they often meet. But we 
are against gender equality as far as other questions are concerned. I 
sustain my former opinion on this.”334
The legal discourse on rights was thus replaced by a discourse on values 
during the time of the conservative government. The issue of rights was 
331.  Keczkowska B., Nauczyciele i studenci idą na Sejm przeciw Giertychowi 
[Teachers and students march against Giertych], Gazeta Wyborcza, 08.06.2006.
332.  Programme of LPR, 2005, pp. 1 and 7.
333.  See: We mnie jest czyste dobro [There is pure good inside me], Interview with 
Jaroslaw Kaczynski: Gazeta Wyborcza 4-5.02.2006, p12-14.
334.  See: Opening Speech of Prime Minister Kaczynski, 2006, p 8.
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not addressed or re-interpreted according to Catholic understanding. This 
shift could be seen as typical for religiously inspired revolutions or social 
movements, where the pressure is moved from the tangible and identifiable 
individual to intangible and vague moral rules. The primary values 
promoted officially by the authorities in Poland were Catholic family values 
as those integral to the existence of the Polish nation. As dangers to the 
development of the Polish society, the conservatives mentioned proposals 
concerning gay marriage or the growing number of divorces, non-marital 
relationships and children born out of wedlock335. And therefore, the 
emphasis was put on the traditional Catholic family and the cooperation 
with the Church as the method of restoring the traditional family model. 
4.3.. Visions of changes in law in regard to reproductive rights and the activity 
of the Parliamentary Committee on Family Matters and Women’s Rights
One of the first changes aiming at strengthening the role of motherhood 
was passing the bill on social support for mothers of newborn babies 
and lengthening maternal leave without lengthening parental leave. It 
was only partially introduced by the amendment of the Labour Code 
passed in October 2006 but in the long-term plan the government aimed 
at introducing maternal leaves as long as 52 weeks by the year 2011. 
However, the plan did not offer the possibility of equal sharing of the 
leave between both parents. Had the amendment been introduced in full, 
it would have likely influenced women’s chances in the difficult Polish 
labour market rather negatively. 
Further proposals of legal amendments were of an even more 
serious nature in regard to the reproductive rights of Polish women and 
they concerned the Constitution. LPR put to the vote a proposal for 
introducing a provision on the protection of life from the moment of 
conception. This amendment would have led to introducing an absolute 
ban on abortion, which was one of the political aims of the LPR. The 
child would have been considered superior in every case and the health or 
life of the mother would no longer be grounds for allowing abortion. The 
proposal failed in the voting even though the majority of the Parliament 
335.  See: Political Programmes of PiS and LPR.
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members voted in favour of it. 269 out of 443 supported the motion. This 
was, however, not enough to meet the qualified majority of 2/3 of all votes 
required for accepting constitutional amendments. But only 27 votes were 
missing in order to pass this requirement and as many as 24 out of 90 
members of the PO, the party that won the elections in October 2007 
and formed the new government, supported the motion336. 
Another proposal, which was widely and for a long time discussed, 
was initiated by the chair of the Parliamentary Committee for 
Family Matters, Alina Sobecka, together with the above-mentioned 
Parliamentary Member, Marian Pilka. Sobecka and Pilka proposed at 
first changing the pharmacy law by either expressly limiting access to 
contraceptives or by introducing a conscience clause for pharmacists. 
The conscience clause would allow refusing to sell contraceptives on 
the basis of religious convictions. Later, knowing that no such radical 
limitation proposal would be passed and that, as a matter of fact, the 
pharmacists agreed to use the conscience clause in their professional 
code in 2006337 , Sobecka and Pilka intended to propose a bill that would 
label contraceptives as “hazardous to health”338. The warning would have 
been placed on contraceptives, in manner analogous to the warnings on 
cigarette packages. This proposal was drawn up during the preparation 
of the law proposal of the National Programme for Family Support and 
approved of by the Sejm through a resolution concerning the preparation 
of the Programme. The justification for preparing the Programme 
included the growing number of relationships other than marriage, 
divorces and the demographic crisis. Its introduction, however, was never 
finished due to the collapse of the government and new elections.
The Parliamentary Committee for Family supported the general line of 
336.  See: Details concerning ROD’s voting on the Parliament’s pages under  
http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/SQL.nsf/glosowania?OpenAgent&5&39&79.
337.  Kodeks Etyki Farmaceuty-Aptekarza Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej [The Ethical 
Code of Pharmacists] Naczelna Izba Aptekarska, Warszawa 2006, article 4. The 
legality of using such a clause to refuse selling medication, which is legally approved for 
sale in a democratic country, could be disputed here in manner similar to Conscience 
Concord Slovakia’: see previous discussion in Part I of this dissertation.
338.  Klauzula ”niebezpieczne dla zdrowia” na lekach antykoncepcyjnych?” [Heath 
Hazardous Warning on Contraceptives], Gazeta Wyborcza, 10.11.2006.
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the chosen political course and put the main emphasis in its activities on the 
protection of unborn life. During numerous meetings concerning this subject, 
most of the experts providing opinion in front of the Committee could 
hardly be called impartial. They were representatives of Catholic hospitals, 
schools and the Episcopate of Poland. Most of the opinions presented 
included negative conclusions concerning abortion and contraception339. 
During the time of the conservative coalition’s governance, the 
Committee also debated on a proposed parliamentary resolution on the 
defence of life, family and the rights of nations, which included three 
clauses. The first stated that abortion is evil and should be forbidden in 
every country. The second opposed the “propaganda of homosexuality” 
as a phenomenon harming a natural family, while the third affirmed that 
all nations of Europe should have the right to self-determination. The 
resolution was never accepted by the Parliament340.
4.3.8. International community on the Polish situation
Ratified international treaties are one of the constitutional sources of law 
in Poland. A ratified international agreement is a part of the domestic 
legal order and is to be applied directly. International agreements of major 
importance take precedence over statutes if they cannot be reconciled 
with the provisions of such statutes.
However, the problem in applying international obligations in 
situations like that of Poland between 2005 and 2007 is such that it 
might be very difficult to show an infringement of any specific rights. 
As far as education, abortion or reproductive rights are concerned, there 
are so far no binding rules that could effectively prevent introducing 
ideology to school programmes or law. The recommendations and recent 
developments are not yet firmly entrenched in the legal sphere. On the 
EU level, effective measures could be only taken in the cases of laws and 
339.  See details of the ROD minutes: http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/Biuletyn.nsf/
fkskr5?OpenForm&ROD
The exact minutes of these meetings are available as well as each of the provided 
opinions.
340.  For a more comprehensive analysis of this situation see: Gozdecka D. A., 2009
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actions affecting women’s working conditions. No strong actions were 
taken against Poland regarding the negative gender mainstreaming. The 
concerns about the situation of European women that the organs of the 
Community expressed, concerned primarily labour market conditions.341 
No particular actions were taken or recommendations made in the 
context of Poland.
As far as human rights are concerned, one case against Poland 
concerning the refusal of legally allowed abortion was won before the 
Tribunal during the time of the conservative coalition.342 The judgment, 
however, concerned a situation which occurred before their electoral 
victory. In their judgement, the Tribunal agreed with the complaint 
of A. Tysiac against Poland and affirmed that the Polish system lacked 
an effective mechanism for securing her right to privacy in the decision 
whether she was entitled to an abortion due to the substantial danger to 
her health. The Court acknowledged that the system did not ensure that 
the right provided by Polish law would be practical and effective and not 
only theoretical and illusory. The Court refused to examine the question 
of whether the applicant was discriminated against in her right to privacy 
on the grounds of being a woman. Nor did the decision construct the 
right to abortion on the basis of the right to privacy. The judgment stated 
only that the applicant had no way of exercising effectively her legal 
right to abortion, which Polish law theoretically granted her. Denying 
the procedure in the situation when it was legally allowed infringed 
upon her right to privacy. However, conservative politicians took that 
judgment as a decision creating the right to abortion and the government 
appealed the decision of the Tribunal. The appeal was rejected and the 
judgment sustained just a month before the elections ending the era of 
the conservative coalition’s governance. The applicant was later a victim 
of stigmatisation by religious organizations such as the Committee for 
the Promotion of Marriage, Family and Life supported by the Episcopate 
of Poland, which distributed a protest appeal among Church members 
to condemn the decision and mount a social protest against the Tribunal 
and the President of the Republic. In their speeches, the priests compared 
341.  Communication from the Commission, COM/2008/0760.
342.  Tysiac vs. Poland, Application no. 5410/03.
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the judges of the Tribunal to Josef Mengele and Rudolf Hess343. 
International community has, however, expressed some concern 
over the situation of Polish women. In February 2007 the Committee 
on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, in the 
monitoring process of the implementation of the Convention, issued 
their Concluding Comments on Poland’s report. Comments included 
numerous critical remarks, concerns and recommendations. Among 
others, the Committee regretted that the Polish Parliament rejected 
the comprehensive law on gender equality and abolished the institution 
of the Plenipotentiary for Gender Equality. Moreover, the Committee 
expressed their deepest concern at the persistence of deep-rooted 
prejudice and stereotypical attitudes regarding the traditional division 
of roles and responsibilities of women and men in the family and in 
society and the lack of gender studies at Polish universities. Further, 
the Committee urged Poland to ensure access to health care and to 
strengthen measures aimed at the prevention of unwanted pregnancies, 
including providing extensive availability of contraceptives at an 
affordable price and increasing knowledge and awareness about different 
methods of family planning by providing age-appropriate sex education 
as a part of educational curricula. The Committee condemned the use 
of a conscience clause for refusing legally allowed abortion. In addition, 
the Committee recommended cooperation between the government 
and the NGO sector promoting gender equality and requested wide 
dissemination of their Concluding Comments in the country. 
The abortion situation in Poland has also been a subject of interest 
of the UN Committee on Human Rights. The observations concerning 
the Polish report submitted to the Committee in 2004 included advice 
on the liberalisation of abortion laws and practices. The Committee also 
expressed concern at the high costs of contraceptives.
343 Alicja Tysiąc skarży do sądu księdza i kurię [Alicja Tysiac is suing the priest and 
the parish], Gazeta Wyborcza, 08.07.2008.
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4.4. Why are some life-endangering practices less tolerated 
than others? – life-hazardous abortion laws versus 
condemnation of female genital mutilation (fgm)
Abortion and the lack of reproductive choices can be dangerous for 
the life and health of women. Such are the findings in the European 
documents and international bodies’ comments on conservative national 
abortion policies. Nevertheless, certain European countries still refuse to 
recognise this standard and maintain very strict abortion laws without 
meeting strong condemnation from the European community.
However, these practices are not the only dangerous practices against 
women’s health. Practices inspired by other religions than traditionally 
European have been, on the contrary, very easily condemned. The 
universal condemnation of FGM, as a practice dangerous to life and 
health led to a common resolution of the Council of Europe on banning 
FGM in Europe already in 2001. Already then the Assembly declared 
that the universal principles of respect for individuals and their inalienable 
right to bodily integrity, as well as complete equality between men and 
women, must take precedence over customs and traditions. The European 
Parliament also took action in the same year by drafting a resolution on 
female genital mutilation344. Special proposals sponsored by the European 
Union’s Daphne Programme to prevent and combat violence against 
children, young people and women allocated funds for research preparing 
a common European approach towards condemnation of FGM already 
in 1997345 and has ever since been very active. Meanwhile the same kinds 
of strong actions have not been taken in regard to securing reproductive 
freedom and access to safe abortion in all of Europe.
Whereas I in no way attempt to defend practices dangerous to life and 
health, such as FGM, I want to pay attention to certain relativist aspects 
in the European approach towards practices that are dangerous to the life 
and health of women. FGM is a practice that is alien in the European 
tradition, but from a medical point of view as risky as forcing a woman 
to carry to term a pregnancy that was medically evaluated as likely to 
344.  Resolution A5-0285/2001 on female genital mutilation, 20.09.2001.
345.  Female Genital Mutiliation (FGM), 1997-096-WC.
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result in the death of both her and the baby. Both the condemnation 
of abortion and the requirement of carrying out FGM are religiously 
inspired and in the arguments of their defenders the custom, tradition, 
religion or even broader morality standards are invoked. Developing a 
common strategy and commitment against the legal maintenance of the 
abortion ban is far harder to achieve than a condemnation of FGM. The 
ban on abortion, which is only now expressly condemned in the new 
documents as dangerous to the life of women, has been usually justified 
by the European religious traditions. These traditions have been protected 
as a part of national traditions and not openly confronted. Even though 
European judgements have allowed travelling to obtain abortion, and 
provided that information about such services should be available and in 
cases when abortion is allowed, should be practically available, none of 
the judgement approached the core of the problem of “a right to abortion” 
as a corollary to the right to privacy and life. None of the judgements ever 
condemned the implications of Irish or Maltese legislation for pregnant 
women and none approached the concept of bodily integrity and the right 
to privacy of women. European religious and moral tradition invoked to 
defend abortion bans has been so far tolerated and not openly challenged. 
The readiness to exclude foreign religious tradition and custom was far 
greater than the readiness to condemn traditional European religious and 
moral customs. 
But such cultural relativism, as shown later in this work, is visible 
also in other areas where religions and laws collide. It is easier to defend 
what is considered as traditional, and condemn what is considered 
foreign. Meanwhile, the principle of equality and the lack of preferential 
treatment of any of the religious group would suggest, rather, that one 
coherent approach should be adopted in regard to the relation between 
religions and women’s rights. The European approach should not favour 
influence of traditional European religions on the grounds of their 
historical connections with the legal system, and openly condemn only 
such religiously inspired practices which are culturally alien. Women’s 
rights are not to be circumscribed by religious traditions and morals, as 
the European Parliament observed. It is essential for both women and 
all religions traditions that an equality of approach is maintained. Of 
course, further considerations may be brought up here about the different 
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nature of these two practices and the matters of choice connected with 
them. My point was, however, to highlight certain bigger problems, 
which I see appearing in the European approach to issues of religion. 
Religion understood as traditional for a European state does not receive 
great condemnation in regard to its impact on the rights of individuals, 
whereas religious customs considered new and alien are always carefully 
scrutinised and easily condemned.
4.5. Religions, religious pluralism  
and the reproductive rights of women
The area of reproductive rights is a relatively new one and its relation to 
religious and philosophical beliefs very strong. Where liberal European 
policies and strategies see rights, religions see the domain of their 
traditional control. And without a doubt, many if not the majority of 
people will give the religious aspect an important role in their sexual 
choices. The question is, though, whether religions should influence the 
legislator in making moral choices possible or impossible for everyone. 
I do not want to approach this area from a feminist point of view but 
from the point of view of religious pluralism. The activity of a state that 
aims at producing and enlarging the variety of choices can, in my opinion, 
be hardly objected to from the point of view of religious pluralism and 
freedom of religion. Maximally broad possibility of moral choice does not 
impose any ideology on individuals. Women — both those adhering to 
any religious community equally with those who do not — are able to 
decide in accordance with their own conscience. The state allowing for 
choice does not coerce anybody to choose the secular option. No religious 
woman is coerced to undergo an abortion. A deeply religious person is 
free to choose not to use contraception and not undergo an abortion. The 
principle of religious pluralism remains maintained.
However, if the contrary is true and the state’s activity aims at 
restraining the choice or mainstreaming according to any religious ideology, 
such a situation, in my opinion, raises concerns for a variety of reasons.
Of course, the opponents to the freedom of choice will refer to matters 
of morality and the fact that pro-choice options might be considered 
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just one of the available ideologies to select from. I disagree with such a 
view. Selection of any other option than that allowing for free choice 
limits the equality of citizens having different conceptions of life. The 
decision on abortion or the usage of contraception is a personal decision 
dictated by personal convictions. Regardless of how much the religious 
adherents would like to convince the entire population of the validity of the 
arguments on the right to life from the moment of conception, there is no 
moral agreement of the entire society on when the foetus becomes a person. 
Even in various religious doctrines themselves the agreement on this issue 
is a matter of doctrinal discussion. Even in the Catholic Church abortion 
was not always considered illegal.346 In order to prevent the destruction 
of a well-developed foetus, the majority of legal systems allowing for 
abortion establish a limited period for taking such a decision. Invoking a 
moral argument calling to accept the foetus as a person from the moment 
of conception is not valid for every citizen. In a religiously plural society, 
the state, in order to avoid silencing any views, should avoid getting into 
doctrinal disputes on when a life begins. When the state chooses to ban 
abortion or limit access to contraception, it chooses to impose a moral or 
religious doctrine on non-religious or differently religious individuals. 
Following the Rawlsian conception of citizens as free and equal in their 
moral choices347, I believe that the ideological coercion in matters that are 
clearly regulated by individual conscience, is not acceptable. By denying a 
choice, it discriminates disproportionally between citizens following the 
religious or moral conception defended by the state, and those who do not. 
In a democratic society, with freedom of religion and belief and adhering to 
the principle of equality and religious pluralism, the plurality of choice must 
be available. Otherwise, equality remains illusory and in fact, only certain 
religious and moral conceptions can enjoy freedom. 
A state which remains neutral and allows different religious and 
secular communities to take part in a debate on moral issues, but does 
not impose any moral stance, maintains in the best way the ideal of a 
religiously plural democracy. Conceptions of neutrality will be discussed 
further in the theoretical part of this dissertation. 
346.  See e.g., Rhode D.L., 1993, pp. 305-321.
347.  Rawls J., 2005, p 15f.
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5. Freedom of expression versus  
freedom of religion and discussion  
of the essence of democracy
5.1. Introduction: the struggle between  
faith and reason and between faiths
It has been almost 150 years since John Stuart Mill, one of the founders 
of what is contemporarily considered a model of a liberal democracy, 
published his essay On Liberty348 in which he deplored the fact that still 
in the year 1857 “an unfortunate man” was sentenced to 21 months of 
imprisonment for writing some offensive words against Christianity349. 
In his essay, Mill portrayed, bringing the examples of Socrates and Saint 
Paul, how easily the protection of a religion can change into persecution 
and on the other hand how easily the persecutor can become the 
persecuted during the same lifetime350. Yet, still 150 years after, in liberal 
and secularised Europe, the offence of blasphemy has not everywhere 
been discarded as a legal archaism. On the contrary, together with a 
religious resurgence, the debate on the limits of freedom of expression 
and its borderline with freedom of religion gained new importance.
While in some of the European countries, those who speak against 
religion or speak critically of religion, still meet prosecution351, in others, 
those who pursue their religious goals and speak against issues they 
consider as improper or immoral, meet the same consequences. The legal 
standards applied in the case of pastor Åke Green are in vivid contrast 
348.  Mill J.S., 1859.
349.  Ibid., p 30.
350.  Ibid., pp. 25-30.
351.  See: following chapter concerning the cases after the year 2000.
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to legal standards applied, for example, in Haderer’s conviction for 
blasphemy in Greece for the publication of his caricature book The life 
of Jesus. Whereas Swedish hate-speech bans aim to protect all groups in 
society from discrimination, the Greek ban still protects the deity from 
offense.
The attempt at replacing the offence of blasphemy with an offence 
of hate speech has also entered the realm of legal dispute. While some 
countries are eager to extend the hate speech bans in order to protect a 
possibly wide range of persons from discrimination, others are not willing 
to give up their blasphemy laws. Although the COE Parliamentary 
Assembly recommended replacing blasphemy with hate speech bans, 
hate speech in itself has also been treated critically. As shown below, 
commentators have approached it as another potential impediment to 
freedom of expression and a likely pretext for instrumental usage in the 
struggle between faiths352. 
Both blasphemy and hate speech can result in a struggle between 
those who dismiss religious arguments as irrelevant and irrational, and 
believers. They can as well provoke tensions between those who hold 
beliefs incompatible with the dominant religious views present in a 
society and the religious majority. In this struggle the question at this 
moment is not only whether religion as such or religious believers should 
be or should not be protected, but whether the dominance of secular 
reason in public law over religion is justified? Post-secular debate begins 
to question whether the liberal state is in a position to impose the secular 
humanist view over the religious views of people. Whom to censor and 
why to censor any speech at all? The debate concerning these issues in 
particular puts forward questions of how far liberalism can go and what 
the essence of democracy is.
In this chapter, I deal with the issue of blasphemy and hate speech. 
I analyse first older blasphemy cases including their critique and later 
discuss the new European approach towards blasphemy and speech 
against religion. Later I will the offence of hate speech and discuss 
whether blasphemy or hate speech offences are necessary in a democratic 
society. I will compare the essence of the two offences and analyse their 
352.  See: Heinze E., 2007, pp. 295-309.
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effect on both religious and non-religious individuals. Finally, I try to 
answer the question if and why a common European approach is welcome 
and needed for achieving the goal of a religiously plural Europe. 
5.2. Older blasphemy and morality cases  
- the judicial principles of the ecthr
Blasphemy on a European-wide level has been approached strictly from 
the perspective of human rights. For that reason, the principles of the 
European approach have been shaped by the case law of the ECTHR.
In order to trace current changes in the European approach, it 
is necessary first to describe briefly the ‘old’ blasphemy cases that were 
brought before the ECTHR353 and the arguments of the State Parties 
accepted by the Court. Only later do I proceed chronologically to 
today’s new approach. In all of the older cases, the Court allowed for a 
wide margin of appreciation of the member states and let them decide 
in matters of morals. The key cases concerning blasphemy included 
Wingrove vs. the United Kingdom, Gay News and Lemon vs. the United 
Kingdom, Otto-Preminger Institut vs. Austria and Choudhury vs. the 
United Kingdom. Similar principles concerning other forms of offensive 
expression were established in Müller and others vs. Switzerland and 
Handyside vs. the United Kingdom.
In Wingrove354 the decision of the British Board of Film Classification 
preventing a blasphemous film from distribution was found lawful and 
compliant with the principles of the Convention. The film Visions of 
Ecstasy portrayed a woman dressed as a nun and having erotic experiences 
with the body of Christ. There was also another almost naked woman 
appearing in the picture. According to the author, the film portrayed St. 
Theresa of Avila and her Psyche (the other woman) and was a metaphor 
of St. Theresa’s ecstatic visions. The Board did not agree with the author’s 
353.  I use ECTHR to indicate the European Court of Human Rights and in some 
instances also the European Commission of Human Rights as it existed before the 
amendment introduced by Protocol 11.
354.  Wingrove vs. United Kingdom, Application no. 17419/90.
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argumentation and prevented the film from being distributed. In the 
final stage of the proceedings concerning this case, the ECTHR found 
that the state party had a right to do that in order to protect the religious 
sensitivities of people. It did not agree with the applicant that the law 
on blasphemy was impossible to foresee and thus subject to unlimited 
discretion. The ECTHR did not question the law on blasphemy as such. 
Quite the opposite, it affirmed that such an offence is by nature subject to 
a state’s discretion and the state was in position to act on this margin of 
discretion, called hereafter the ‘margin of appreciation’355.
In an earlier case, Gay News and Lemon356, an issue arose around 
a poem by James Kirkup The Love That Dares to Speak Its Name, 
imagining a Roman centurion having gay sex with Jesus of Nazareth. 
The publisher, Denis Lemon, was given a £500 fine and a nine-month 
prison sentence, suspended for eighteen months by a national court. The 
proceeding was initiated by a private prosecutor, Mary Whitehouse. The 
EComHR, deciding back then on the admissibility of the case, found the 
application of the publisher and the newspaper to be heard by the Court 
to be inadmissible. In the decision on inadmissibility, the Commission 
expressed the view that the offence of blasphemous libel is constructed 
to protect the rights of the private prosecutor not to be offended in 
her religious feelings. The nature of the offence as such and its possible 
contradiction with the right to freedom of expression was again not 
questioned.
In the Otto-Preminger Institute357 case, a film, Das Liebeskonzil by 
Werner Schroeter358, was seized and forfeited by Austrian authorities on 
the grounds of violating section 188 of the Penal Code on the criminal 
offence of disparaging religious precepts. The film showed God the 
Father as a senile, impotent idiot, Christ as a cretin and Mother Mary 
as a wanton who together decided to punish the world for immortality. 
The punishment was achieved through the devil’s daughter, who was 
355.  Ibid., para 53.
356.  X Ltd. and Y vs. United Kingdom, Application No 8710/79.
357.  Otto-Preminger-Institut vs. Austria, Application no. 13470/87.
358.  The film was based on the play of Oskar Panizza , Das Liebeskonzil (The Love 
Council),1894.
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spreading syphilis by having sexual relations with, among others, leaders 
of the church. The Commission initially found a possible violation of the 
freedom of expression but the Court disagreed and found that the state 
was in the best position to evaluate whether the rights of others required 
protection. In this case, Austria was allowed to execute a wide margin 
of appreciation in order to protect the religious feelings of the Tyrolean 
Roman Catholics, who instigated the proceedings. 
Similar conclusions on the ‘wide margin of appreciation’ were reached 
in two other cases, which did not deal expressly with blasphemy, but 
with related offences concerning morally offending art. Both in Müller 
and others vs. Switzerland359 and in Handyside360 the Court applied the 
same rules as in the three cases described above and decided that the state 
parties had the right to limit freedom of expression on moral grounds. 
Both of the cases concerned sexually explicit art.
At the same time, in all those cases the Court applied a solution 
contrary to the proposed principle that, in a democratic society, not only 
expressions that are favourable but also those which shock and offend 
should enjoy protection. 
In only one case concerning blasphemy that appeared before the 
ECTHR were the religious feelings of the applicant not given protection. 
The case of Choudhury was found inadmissible. The case concerned the 
book by Salman Rushdie, Satanic Verses. Because British law recognised 
blasphemy as an offence exclusively directed against Christianity, 
the claims of the applicant that the book offended Allah, Prophet 
Mohammed and Prophet’s wives and thus interfered with the applicants’ 
freedom of religion were not accepted. The decision of the Commission 
was correct in the sense of protecting the principle nullum crimen sine lege. 
It did not extend the law to actions that were not covered by the scope 
of penal prohibition. However, the commentaries on the discriminative 
nature of the British offence of blasphemy and the necessity of a reform 
appeared361. 
359.  Müller and others vs. Switzerland, Application no. 10737/84.
360.  Handyside vs. United Kingdom, Application no. 5493/72.
361.  More of the critique concerning these issues can be read in articles referred to 
below. As a natural consequence of the fact that most of the blasphemy cases before 
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As a consequence of refusing to examine the nature of blasphemy 
law as such, the Court’s jurisprudence created a ‘right’ – which does not 
exist in the text of the Convention – the right ‘not to be offended’ in 
one’s religious beliefs362. The freedom of expression was limited in order 
to protect national and regional religious sensitivities and particularly 
Christian religious sentiments. The margin of appreciation of the states 
became very wide and the rules according to which the countries could 
use it as an excuse to limit rights difficult to foresee. I agree with the 
opinion expressed by Judge Spielmann in his dissenting opinion in the 
case Müller and others vs. Switzerland, that the margin of appreciation 
of countries became too broad and it should not be as wide as to allow 
any kinds of limitations prescribed by local law, ‘otherwise, many of the 
guarantees laid down in the Convention might be in danger of remaining 
a dead letter, at least in practice’.363 Meanwhile, the ‘right’ to be offended 
could be shaped and used rather freely by national authorities, including 
the choice of which religious groups should or should not enjoy legal 
protection. Such an authoritative choice as to which denominations 
should be protected did not lead to the facilitation of religious pluralism.
5.3. Legal critique concerning the ecthr’s  
judicial principles in blasphemy cases
The commentators of the blasphemy and morality cases in mainly 
advocated for the revision of the laws, basing their argument on various 
rationalisations and pointing out various problems. Even authors 
attempting to find justification for the existence of the offence admitted 
that contemporary opinion seemed almost uniformly against retaining 
a legal prohibition against blasphemy364. The critics appealed to various 
the ECTHR were directed against the United Kingdom, the critiques dealt largely 
with the nature of the British law on blasphemy.
362.  See: Leader S., 1983.
363.  Müller and others vs. Switzerland, Application no. 10737/84, Dissenting 
Opinion of Judge Spielmann.
364.  Mongomery, J.W., 2000.
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arguments against the offence itself or against the argumentation of the 
ECTHR, which in practice led to sustaining it.
Shealdon Leader365 in his commentary on blasphemy and human 
rights pointed out difficulties arising from the above-mentioned cases 
and the creation of ‘the right of citizens not to be offended in their religious 
feelings’366. Problems pointed out by Leader included the extension of the 
interpretation of the ‘rights of others’ to a right that the convention did 
not recognise, namely freedom from being offended in one’s religious 
feelings367. The creation of such a right constitutes a dangerous precedent 
and allows for creating other “rights” not present in the Convention. The 
creation of such a right is also in visible contrast with another principle 
recognised by the Court, namely that protection of freedom of expression 
extends not only to favoured publications but also “to those that offend, 
shock or disturb the State or any sector of the population. Such are the 
demands of that pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without 
which there is no ‘democratic society’”368. Moreover, the justification 
of the necessity of protection from blasphemy by its mere existence as 
an offence in the domestic law was also questioned by Leader. “How 
does one then indentify restrictions arising from successful domestic 
prosecutions that are not necessary in a democratic society”, asks the 
author? 369 If the mere existence of criminal provisions in domestic law is 
recognised as sufficient justification for limitations of rights, how should 
one challenge regulations that are essentially unjustified in a democratic 
society? In this respect, Leader’s comment follows the argument of 
judge Spielmann, mentioned above and is similar to my own concern 
about the approach of the Court. A too wide margin of appreciation and 
concentration on procedural grounds solely leads to a situation in which 
rights become illusory. Leader noticed that problems concerning the 
legal interpretation arose from the fact that the Court (and before 1998 
the Commission) refused to examine the merits of a domestic court’s 
365.  Leader S., 1983.
366.  Ibid., p 339.
367.  Ibid., p 340.
368.  See eg: Handyside vs. United Kingdom, Application no. 5493/72, para 49.
369.  Leader S., 1983, p 342.
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decision in terms of domestic law370. The refusal to examine national law 
as to its compliance with the standards of the Convention, and basing the 
arguments solely on procedural grounds, seriously endangers the existence 
of the rights included in the Convention and may lead to a situation in 
which they become illusory. The Court in the blasphemy cases examined 
only whether the application of domestic laws and not their essence was 
meeting the requirements of necessity in a democratic society371. I agree 
with Leader’s concerns regarding the lack of examination of the nature of 
the domestic law and its impact on the right in question.
Clive Unsworth372 identified the nature of the offence, and the 
ECTHR’s argumentation leading to the prolongation of its existence, as 
a legal archaism and pointed out that the offence’s existence is possible 
grounds for future cultural conflicts:
“The law of blasphemy provides a coercive weapon which can be 
deployed in this kind of struggle within and between faiths. It is a 
legal trump card in a contest over how far the sacred images and 
myths which are the heritage of different elements within the broader 
culture can be adapted in the depiction of meaning.”373
He also identified blasphemy as one of the most decisive indicators of 
the future cultural direction of the British state374. Looking from the 
perspective of 13 years since the publication of his observations, one 
can only agree that the case of blasphemy grew to be an indicator of not 
only the cultural direction of the British state but also Europe as a whole 
and its approach towards liberalism, secularism, rights and the growing 
importance of the religious factor on the European cultural stage.
Christopher Nowlin375 in his article concerning the protection of 
morals under the ECHR system criticised the ECTHR’s contrariety 
370.  Ibid., p 344.
371.  Ibid., p 342.
372.  Unsworth C., 1995.
373.  Ibid., p 677.
374.  Ibid., p 677.
375.  Nowlin C., 2000.
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professing broadmindedness, pluralism and tolerance on the one hand and 
maintaining legal moralism on the other. Nowlin argued that restricting 
freedom of expression in order to protect morality was problematic 
first of all due to the fact that the judges rely upon an ‘undefined, ill-
defined, or simply contentious notion of morals’376 that traditionally have 
a distinctive sexual bearing377. He argues that the Court should rather 
adopt Mill’s definition of morals, which is concerned primarily with social 
relations and disassociated from sexual morality378. He relies on Mill’s 
notion that moral interest is directed to such behaviours that affect others 
without their free, voluntary and undeceived consent and participation379.
Nowlin firmly disagreed with the argumentation of the Court in the 
‘moral’ cases, seeing Mill’s definition of morals as the only option for a 
pluralist society:
“(…) the ECHR has not clearly rejected legal moralism as being 
inappropriate to civil and human rights analyses. The Strasbourg 
Court will not likely do this until it wholeheartedly accepts that in 
a tolerant and pluralistic society, the very idea of protecting morals 
can be incompatible with genuine recognition of various rights and 
freedoms, such as the right to privacy, freedom of expression, and the 
right to equal treatment under the law.”380
The blasphemy cases before the ECTHR seem to confirm Nowlin’s 
observation regarding the perception of morality by the Court. The cases 
discussed above concentrated primarily on sexual notions. I agree with 
Nowlin on the usefulness of Mill’s approach in a democratic society. 
Especially in regard to the sphere of sexuality, different moral standards 
can be found in a modern plural society. What for one religion is sexually 
immoral and offensive, for a believer of another religion might even be 
of spiritual or ritualistic value and for a non-believer might be absolutely 
376.  Ibid., p 265.
377.  Ibid., p 265.
378.  Ibid., p 270.
379.  Mill J.S., 1992, p 54.
380.  Ibid., p 285-290.
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irrelevant. The value of tolerance and broadmindedness is best applied 
when the limits of what is permissible protect from deception and abuse 
but not from facing another point of view or another opinion. 
Adhar and Leigh also rejected the existence of the offence of 
blasphemy on the grounds of its incompatibility with values of tolerance, 
non-discrimination and religious liberty:
“Our argument… is strongly in favour of free speech. We believe that 
this is the best defence for a tolerant open society in which diversity 
of religious expression flourishes. There are clear signs, however, that 
these values are under threat, both for reasons concerned ostensibly 
with protecting public order, non-discrimination and paradoxically, 
religious liberty itself.”381
They also found it peculiar that blasphemy is often justified by the 
protection of religious liberty itself. In fact, they saw the effect of the offence 
as being exactly opposite and resulting in the loss of religious free speech. 
They found it essential for liberal democracy to open up the discussion and 
criticism for everyone382. The abolition of the offence of blasphemy would, 
according to Adhar and Leigh383, produce equal treatment of religions, since 
none would be protected to a greater extent than others and only general 
laws preserving public order should be applied to the cases of blasphemous 
expression384. Concerning the offence of incitement to religious hatred, 
which is postulated to replace the offence of blasphemy, the authors found 
it to be potential grounds for abuse and silencing free speech. The offence 
might, they argue, have an effect similar to blasphemy in provoking religious 
disharmony and silencing religious criticism, dissent and debate385.
Javier Garcia Oliva386, on the other hand, noticed that many morally 
regrettable practices do not receive criminal punishment, and the law 
381.  Ahdar R., Leigh I., 2005, pp. 365-366.
382.  Ibid., p 396.
383.  Ibid., p 374.
384.  Ibid., p 374.
385.  Ibid., p 374.
386.  Garcia O. J., 2007.
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is in certain cases not the best regulator of social conduct. Especially in 
matters affecting freedom of speech, the limitations should be applied 
extremely carefully and as far as possible freedom of speech should never 
be compromised387.
I agree with the observations of the majority of critics concerning the 
older judicial principles of the ECTHR in blasphemy cases. From the 
point of view of equality of religions and non-religions, I particularly agree 
with those who find the argumentation of the Court to lead to unnecessary 
and disproportional differentiation between beliefs and hindering the 
development of religious pluralism. This differentiation can be seen on two 
levels. First of all, religious beliefs were given greater protection than non-
beliefs. The believers were granted the “right not to be offended”. A similar 
right could not be practically stretched over to cover non-believers. The 
justification of such a “right” based on an unequal approach to belief and 
non-belief by necessity is dubious in a democratic society. Secondly, the 
Christian belief in particular was given protection. The case of Choudhury, 
although procedurally correct, showed a reluctance to accept other beliefs 
than Christian as worthy of protection. 
5.4. Silence before the storm  
- new cases arising after the year 2000
However, in spite of all the arguments of theoreticians, the offence of 
blasphemy remained in many European states388. After Otto-Preminger 
Institut, no spectacular prosecutions took place for a while. Advocates of 
free speech seemed to celebrate a victory in events such as re-reading the 
poem that was in question in the Gay News case, in public in Trafalgar 
Square in 2002389, without facing any legal response or prosecution. The 
387.  Ibid., p 86.
388.  See: Council of Europe Report, Doc. 11296, 08.06.2007 or: European 
Commission For Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), Report 17-
18.10.2008.
389.  This took place on the stairs of St. Martins-in-the-Fields Church, London, on 
11.07.2002.
182
offence seemed obsolete for awhile.
However, quiet always precedes a storm. It was no sooner than 2001 
that the prosecution of blasphemy-related offences was revived. Proud of 
its religious Catholic revival, Poland became a pioneer in the 21st century’s 
growing number of charges and prosecutions on blasphemy in Europe.
In 2001, Dorota Nieznalska exhibited her installation Pasja in the 
gallery Wyspa in Gdansk. The installation was composed of a metal cross 
of equal arm-lengths (Greek). One side of the cross contained a photo 
revealing the lower part of a male body - stomach, abdomen, loins and 
genitals. The other part of the installation showed a close-up film of the 
face of a male exercising in a gym. The film provided a background for 
the cross, which was suspended by a chain.
The artist was prosecuted and convicted390 of ridiculing and offending 
an object of worship and the court in its justification of the decision 
stated that in a Catholic country like Poland, a person with an academic 
education should be aware what sort of repercussions are connected with 
placing genitals on a cross. The intent was constructed not as an intent to 
commit an offence and offend. Instead it was constructed as an awareness 
of the religious feelings of the audience. The appeal re-directed the case 
for a new proceeding in the first instance. Nieznalska received support 
from European artists and artistic associations, who collected signatures 
on various open letters against the conviction of the artist391.
Another prosecution within a very short period followed the Nieznalska 
case. In 2002, Jerzy Urban, the editor in chief of a critical and often 
shocking weekly magazine, NIE, was charged with offending a head of a 
state, Pope John Paul II. In one of his articles, Urban described the Pope 
as sędziwy bożek’ (old worship idol), ‘gasnący starzec’ (fading old man) and 
‘Breżniew Watykanu’ (Brezhnev of the Vatican)392. The prosecution brought 
subsequent conviction. Although the legal grounds were the offence against 
the head of a state, the proceeding had the nature of a blasphemy case. 
390.  Judgment of a Regional Court in Gdansk, 4K638/02.
391.  Art Liberated was one of the organizations collecting signatures of support for 
the artist, www.artliberated.org.
392.  Jerzy Urban znieważył Papieża [ Jerzy Urban Defamed the Pope], Gazeta 
Wyborcza, 09.03.2006.
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Reporters without Borders, who supported Urban, stated: ‘We are perfectly 
aware that criticising John Paul II is an absolute taboo in Poland’. The reason 
why the prosecution was not possible on the offence of blasphemy was that 
it would have been improper to consider the Pope as ‘an object of worship’. 
Thus, another archaic offence was used as legal grounds in the case.
The year 2005 brought another relevant case in a different part of 
Europe, also known for its conservatism in religious matters. The case of 
Gerhard Haderer’s comic book The Life of Jesus occurred in Greece393. 
“He meant it as a piece of religious satire, a playful look at the life 
of Jesus. But Gerhard Haderer’s depiction of Christ as a binge-drinking 
friend of Jimi Hendrix and naked surfer high on cannabis has caused a 
furore that could potentially land the cartoonist in jail. Haderer did not 
even know that his book, The Life of Jesus, had been published in Greece 
until he received a summons to appear in court in Athens in January 
charged with blasphemy” summarised the Guardian.
The book was banned in Greece and Haderer received a suspended 
six-month jail sentence. Like in the Nieznalska case, artistic and writers’ 
associations collected supportive signatures on petitions for the effective 
exercise of the freedom of expression. Ultimately, the ban and sentence 
were reversed on appeal.
However, none of these events received any special attention besides 
artistic and local circles. Those events continued to be considered rather local 
curiosities than serious legal problems of common European importance.
5.5. The groundbreaking case – the Mohammad  
caricatures and endangered identity of ‘Europe’
The approach towards the archaic offence of blasphemy was change 
suddenly by another case from the year 2005. The case did not deal with 
offending Christianity, but the European religious “other”. When the 
Danish newspaper Jyllands Posten a comic strip featuring the prophet 
Mohammad, the Islamic community raised a protest, having argued that 
their religious feelings were offended. Islam does not allow for portraying 
393.  Cartoonist faces Greek jail for blasphemy, The Guardian, 23.03.2005.
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the Prophet and even less ridiculing him. The caricatures brought a wave of 
protest and became a topic of discussion all around the world. Facing the 
events following the publication of the cartoons, European countries began 
to defend almost unconditionally freedom of speech. Freedom of speech 
suddenly became a symbol of Europe and European democracy. It was 
because of the impact the cartoons caused. Around 100 people were shot in 
the resulting protests, European flags were burnt in front of embassies and 
death threats towards publishers394 eventually opened Europe’s eyes to the 
paradox of sustaining the ‘wide margin of appreciation’ of states in matters 
of morality and professing values of tolerance, pluralism, free speech and 
broadmindedness at the same time. This uniform European effort for 
the revision of archaic blasphemy laws and expressing a uniform opinion 
would likely never been possible without intense feelings connected with 
the event: Islamophobia versus growing Islamic fundamentalism on the 
one hand and national religious identities versus a sudden re-affirmation of 
secularism as a European value on the other hand. 
The difference between the former cases and the Mohammad caricature 
seems obvious. As far as the former cases were concerned, they dealt with 
offending traditional attitudes and the values professed in the countries 
concerned and were not perceived as forms of religious oppression but 
rather mild weaknesses justified by tradition and the ‘protection’ of religious 
sensitivities often associated with national identities. Thus, nobody felt in a 
position to speak against them openly and in a European-wide forum. In 
the Mohammad caricature crisis, Europe had to face its ‘foreign’ element 
— a religion, which was not essentially ‘European’, with which Europeans 
did not identify themselves and on which they never built their values. 
And it was that religion, Islam, that dared to speak its name and appeal 
for protection equal to other religions that received protection from 
blasphemy in some European countries. European identity was challenged 
by the Islamic protest. And as an opposition to it, Europe no longer could 
appeal to its Christian roots, in times of religious pluralism and professed 
freedom of religion. It was left with no choice but to embrace pluralism 
and secularism as a boundary of democracy. It was one of the few instances 
in which Europe ever expressed as a whole a strong opinion in controversial 
394.  See e.g.: Storm grows over Mohammad cartoons, CNN, 03.02.2006.
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religious matters. Inspired by the Mohammad caricature crisis, The Venice 
Commission started its work on issues of blasphemy in 2006. As a result 
of this work, a new report on blasphemy was issued by the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe in 2007 and a new recommendation 
was adopted by the Parliament in the same year. In October 2008 the 
Venice Commission adopted its own report.
5.6. The new approach and its principles
New documents representing a new European approach towards 
blasphemy issues were created in the aftermath of the Mohammad events. 
They were the work of the Venice Commission for Democracy and the 
COE’s Parliamentary Assembly.
The new approach is visible in all of the adopted documents, both 
in the Commission’s report as well as in the Parliamentary Assembly’s 
report and recommendation. The new approach acknowledged the 
previously mentioned theoretical concerns. The change in the approach 
to blasphemy is substantial and decisive. All the documents agree on 
the fundamental questions. They underline that a common European 
approach is necessary with regard to freedom of expression as a value of 
vital importance for democracy. They advocate revising and abolishing 
blasphemy laws as reflecting the historically dominant position of certain 
religions in certain member states. They insist that the public debate must 
be open for expressions which may offend, shock and disturb and only 
expressions that incite to hatred and discrimination against a person or 
a certain group of persons should be penalised. Moreover, they call for 
greater understanding between members of different religious groups and 
greater tolerance towards activities which are critical and even offensive. 
Critical dispute, satire, humour and artistic expression should not be 
seen as provocation. They uniformly reaffirm and reemphasise the rule 
established by the ECTHR, which was not sufficiently put into practice: 
“freedom of expression is not only applicable to expressions that are 
favourably received or regarded as inoffensive, but also to those that 
may shock, offend or disturb the state or any sector of the population 
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within the limits of article 10 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights”395. 
The Assembly also drew a line between hate speech and blasphemy and 
a borderline between what is permissible and what is non-permissible in 
modern democracies. This approach agrees with critics like Oliva396. The 
protection of the believer on the non-believer, analogical to protection 
from discrimination, instead of the protection of belief, should be 
favoured. To distinguish between blasphemies and hate speech, the report 
elaborates:
“Hate speech is always directed against persons or a group of persons, 
but not against a religion or ideas, philosophies, a political party, state 
organs, a state or nation or mankind as such”.
The new approach underlines the importance of introducing such changes 
in order to bring to life the ideal of a religiously plural Europe.
5.. Current blasphemy regulations  
in some European countries 
Regardless of the new recommendations, the offence of blasphemy as 
such or in similar forms still exists in a few European Union countries. 
The Venice Commission’s report lists Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, 
Italy, Lichtenstein and the Netherlands as those countries where the 
blasphemy offence exists. In addition, also Ireland maintains blasphemy 
bans. Also until recently, the United Kingdom had recognised the offence 
of blasphemy. However, in 2008 Section 79 of the Criminal Justice 
and Immigration Act 2008 abolished the offences of blasphemy and 
blasphemous libel. The Act was adopted by the House of Lords on the 
395.  Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Blasphemy, religious insults 
and hate speech against persons on grounds of their religion, Report, p 1 and e.g. 
Handyside vs. United Kingdom, Application no. 5493/72.
396.  Garcia O. J., 2007.
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8th of May 2008 and entered to force on the 8th of June 2008. In 2006 the 
Racial and Religious Hatred Act entered into force, banning hate speech 
on the grounds of religion or/and ethnic origin. 
According to the Commission’s report, in Cyprus, the Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Spain, Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, 
the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, and the Slovak Republic, laws 
forbidding religious insults or offending religious sentiments exists.397 I 
have also observed that a similar provision exists in Malta.
Since an exhaustive legal comparison of each European country’s 
legislation is not the focus of this research, below I briefly analyse some 
examples of contemporary blasphemy laws. I include European Union 
member countries with legislation that strictly bans blasphemy, those that 
recognise it in law but not in practice, those with legislation that protects 
a particular faith and those whose penal provisions have been recently 
used in front of national courts either as blasphemy laws or religious 
insult laws. Additional comparative information on the legislation 
of other European countries is available in the reports of the Venice 
Commission. The Commission’s analysis refers to those countries of the 
COE where the offence exists; the analysis was created on the basis of a 
questionnaire delivered by the member states to the Commission.
Due to its placement in the Constitution, Ireland seemingly maintains 
one of the strongest blasphemy bans. Article 40.6.1.i of the Irish 
Constitution declares that: “The publication or utterance of blasphemous, 
seditious, or indecent matter is an offence which shall be punishable in 
accordance with law”. Section 13.1 of the 1961 Defamation Act provides 
that every person who composes, prints or publishes any blasphemous 
libel shall be liable to a fine not exceeding five hundred pounds or to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years. In addition, section 
13(2) allows the court to order the seizure and detention of all copies of 
the libellous material and members of the Garda Siochana398 may enter 
if necessary by force and search buildings for copies of the material. In 
1991, however, the Irish Law Reform Commission issued a Consultation 
397.  Venice Commission’s Report, par. 27-30.
398.  Irish equivalent of police force.
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Paper on the Crime of Libel399. The conclusions of the Commission in 
regard to blasphemy stated the following:
“In Ireland, the abolition without replacement of the offence of 
blasphemy and blasphemous libel is impossible under the existing 
constitutional provision. A referendum which had as its sole object 
the removal without replacement of that provision would rightly 
be seen as a time wasting and expensive exercise. Our provisional 
conclusion, however, is that in any more extensive revision that may 
be undertaken of provisions of the Constitution which, for one reason 
or another, are generally considered to be anachronistic or anomalous, 
the opportunity should be taken to delete the provision relating to 
blasphemy.” 
Such a removal of the offence of blasphemy from the Constitution has 
not yet happened. The last prosecution, which took place in 1999400, 
however, established a precedent of non-prosecution. In Corway, after 
having analysed the successful blasphemy prosecutions from the 19th 
century, the Court arrived at the conclusion that the law lacks a legislative 
definition of blasphemy. The judges also added that the task of defining 
a crime is that of a Legislature, not the Court. Thus, in the absence of 
legislation defining the crime, the provisions of the Constitution remain 
void. As a result of Corway, legal practices in Ireland do no longer 
recognise the crime of blasphemy. 
Malta is one of the countries where the state religion receives higher 
protection of the law than other religions. Article 163 of the Maltese 
Criminal Code provides that anyone who publicly vilifies the Roman 
Catholic Religion, as the religion of Malta, shall be on conviction liable to 
imprisonment from one to six months. Such a vilification may be done by 
any means including in print, speech or even gestures. Also vilifying those 
professing Roman Catholicism is punishable in the same way. Article 
164 extends this protection to “any cults tolerated by law”. The term of 
imprisonment however, is shorter in the case of “cults” and amounts to 
399.  The Law Reform Commission, Ireland, 1991.
400.  Corway vs. Independent Newspapers (Ireland) Limited.
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one to three months. The Catholic Religion receives stronger protection 
on the basis of its status as a state religion.
Also Greece, previously mentioned in the context of Haderer’s case, 
maintains a blasphemy ban. The Greek Penal Code includes a section 
entitled “Plots Against Religious Peace”. The section, in addition to two 
other offences, contains offences of malicious blasphemy and blasphemy 
concerning religions. Malicious blasphemy forbidden by Article 198 
provides a punishment of imprisonment up to two years for anyone 
who publicly and maliciously blasphemes God. Showing a public lack 
of respect towards God is punishable by imprisonment up to three 
months. Blasphemy concerning religions includes blaspheming the 
Greek Orthodox Church or any other religion tolerable in Greece. Upon 
conviction, article 199 provides a punishment of imprisonment of up to 
two years for blaspheming a religion. As the Venice Commission’s report 
underlines, the object of penal protection in the Greek case is the sole 
existence of God, regardless of beliefs of any individual. The victim of the 
crime is not a religion or a believer but the divine. Such a protection is 
an expression of the dominant position of the Greek Orthodox Church 
as a state religion and its influence on the state apparatus. Moreover, the 
report underlines that trials related to blasphemy are rather frequent in 
Greece.401
In Poland, where previously mentioned cases occurred, the Criminal 
Code provides for the protection of the believers and the objects of 
worship. Article 196 of the Polish Criminal Code provides a punishment 
of limitation of personal freedom or imprisonment of up to 2 years upon 
conviction for those who publicly offend others’ religious sentiments 
by ridiculing an object or place of worship. In the year 2007 a few new 
convictions on the grounds of Article 196 occurred. They included a 
conviction of the metal band Gorgoroth’s producer for organizing a 
‘blasphemous’ concert in Krakow402 and a conviction of the creator of a 
401.  European Commission for Democracy through Law, Annex II: Study no 
406/2006.
402.  Grzywna za satanistyczny koncert [Fined for a satanistic koncert], Gazeta 
Wyborcza, 26.06.2007 
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programme with an Internet version of the Catholic confession.403 The 
concert was a typical black metal concert and symbolism typical for 
the black metal scene was used on the stage. The concert was recorded 
for television and one of the local television directors informed the 
Prosecutor’s Office about a blasphemy case. The Internet programme, on 
the other hand, imitated the Catholic confession by asking to write down 
sins and offering absolution. The proceeding was initiated by a private 
person, who informed the Prosecutor’s Office. Another proceeding 
before a local court in Torun took place when another two private 
persons informed the Public Prosecutor’s office about a photographic 
manipulation offending their religious sentiments. The manipulated 
photograph showed the face of Joseph Stalin on a well-known painting 
of Jesus. Initially the accused accepted the sentence of 6 months of 
imprisonment, but finally he was acquitted by the Court, having 
apologised for insulting religious sentiments.404
Also Finland maintains blasphemy laws that have been recently in use. 
Chapter17, Paragraph 10 of the Finnish Penal Code405 sets out a crime of 
breaking religious peace. Paragraph 10 declares that anyone who publicly 
blasphemes God, offends or ridicules what a religious community, 
including both the Church and other registered religious communities, 
consider as holy is liable to a fine or imprisonment of up to six months. 
The same punishment is provided for disturbing religious ceremonies. 
Preventing religious ceremonies by violence or threats is regulated in 
paragraph 11 and punishable by imprisonment of up to 2 years.
Although Denmark after the Mohammed caricature crisis took 
a stance unconditionally protecting freedom of expression, Finnish 
jurisprudence took a contrary turn. In 2008 two persons in Tampere were 
convicted of agitating against an ethnic group and defamation as well as 
disturbing the religious peace in the meaning of Chapter 17, Paragraph 
403.  Grzywna za parodię spowiedzi w sieci, [Fined for a parody of confession], 
Rzeczpospolita,Issue 136, 13.06.2007.
404.  Przeprosil za fotomontaz Jezusa I Stalina [(The accused) apologised for the 
photo-manipulation of Jesus and Stalin], Gazeta Wyborcza, 10.02.2007.
405.  Rikoslaki , 17 luku, 563/1998.
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10.406 The crime they committed in 2005 included publishing offensive 
comments on Internet blogs. They included, in addition to offending 
particular individuals, hate speech against people of African and Russian 
origin as well as offensive words against the Prophet Muhammad 
and “what the Islamic community regards as holy”.407 The offensive 
material included also offensive caricatures of the Prophet. The Court 
acknowledged that freedom of expression is not limitless and the aim of 
the blasphemy law is to protect the religious sensitivities of people and 
maintain religious peace. And religious peace was in the consideration of 
the Court a higher common good providing safety and order. For that 
reason, it required protection and limitation of speech.408
Also as recently as in the beginning of the year 2009, the Public 
Prosecutor’s Office in Helsinki issued official charges against another 
person suspected of hate speech and breaking religious peace.409 The 
charges concerning blasphemy and breaking religious peace regard 
offensive words against the Prophet Mohammed and Islam. The words 
used by the accused suggested that Islam and the Prophet himself 
encourage paedophilia. The case was decided in the local court in Helsinki 
in September 2009 and the defendant was found guilty of violating 
religious peace410.
The Danish Public Prosecutor, on the other hand, took exactly the 
opposite position. The Criminal Code in section 140 prohibits the 
mocking or ridiculing of public religious doctrines or acts of worship of 
any lawfully existing religion. The punishment upon conviction amounts 
to imprisonment up to four months. Since the 1970s the discussion 
on the abolition of the offence has been ongoing. In 2004, the Danish 
People’s Party proposed a Bill of Abolition of section 140. The proposal, 
however, was not adopted. 
When Mohammad caricatures were published in 2005, the Muslim 
406.  Tampereen käräjäoikeus 30.05.2008.
407.  Ibid., par. 6.
408.  Ibid., Syytekohta 6.
409.  Dnro R 09/8, Syytemääräys, 27.03.2009.
410.  Paakkanen M., Halla-aho tuomittiin sakkoihin uskonrauhan rikkomisesta 
[Halla-aho found guilty of breaking religious peace], Helsingin Sanomat, 10.09.2009.
12
community informed the police about the crime of blasphemy. After 
an investigation in March 2006, the Danish Director of the Public 
Prosecution announced that there was no basis for criminal proceedings 
in response to the publication. Since the offence of blasphemy is subject 
to public prosecution only, the decision was final. Even though the 
Prosecutor observed that freedom of expression is not unlimited, the 
publication was not found to be sufficiently scornful to fall under the 
criminal provisions.411 Danish Public Prosecutor, in contrast to the 
Finnish, did not consider that religious peace is a value of its own that 
should be protected at the expense of freedom of expression. 
5.8. The importance of blasphemy  
abolition for religious pluralism 
As the position of this volume is based on the notion of facilitating 
religious pluralism and greater religious freedom for everyone, I must 
agree with the position of the new documents in regard to blasphemy. 
Freedom of speech is essential for the expression of both religious and 
non-religious opinions. The protection of certain beliefs, regardless of the 
broadness of the definition of such beliefs, in every case excludes non-
believers in the traditional meaning of atheists and agnostics. First of all, 
it may be a point of personal belief, that God or any other divinity is the 
essence of what an atheist or another non-believer considers essentially 
non-compliant with his or her values. The protection of divinity excludes 
critique and at the same time excludes the expression of atheistic belief. 
Even if the blasphemy law were to be stretched to protect typical non-
believers, the protection of an atheistic type of belief is impossible due 
to the lack of the sacred object or symbol that could be ridiculed. Like 
Smith, I would like to quote Feinberg’s thought presented in The Moral 
Limits of Criminal Law: 
[…] a sense of fairness has never impelled a legislature to penalize 
clergymen and their congregations for savage denunciations in their 
411.  For more details on the decision see: Lagoutte S., 2008.
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churches of law abiding atheists […] the resentment of the atheists 
at the mockery of their beliefs does not constitute a profound offence 
since nothing they hold sacred is impugned by it.412
Even though the hate speech as shown below has changed these limits 
slightly in some of the countries, the essence remains the same. There is a 
fundamental inequality between a belief and a non-belief created by the 
offence of blasphemy. Whether it is blasphemy against religion or divinity 
as such, a non-believer cannot be offended in his or her belief and thus 
remains the religious “other” when the offence of blasphemy is entrenched 
in national legislation. Similarly to the ban on religious symbols, which 
creates the “otherness” of religious believers and protects the non-existent 
“freedom of not being affected by a religion”, the blasphemy ban protects 
a non-existent “freedom from being offended”. However, if we attempt to 
justify such bans, from the perspective of religious pluralism, they carry 
a message of what is “accepted as a religious/non-religious norm” and 
what “the other” is and condemned as improper. From the point of view 
of the equality of all faiths and beliefs, such bans create an imbalance 
based on the core of the person’s convictions and in a democratic society, 
where religious pluralism and equality are key principles, these bans are 
nowadays hard to justify.
The protection of the divinity goes even further and undermines the 
essence of a non-belief as such. Atheism per se, by denying the existence 
of God, offends the divinity and ridicules it. Thus protection of the 
divinity violates the freedom of non-belief in its essence and compels 
non-believers to restrain from expressing their sincere convictions in 
public. 
In regard to religious adherents’ arguments that a lack of protection 
shows the domination of secular beliefs in the society, I must disagree. The 
neutrality of the state allowing for open debate among all actors on the 
religious scene allows for the open critique of any kind of faith or view. 
The state does not choose to favour any worldview, while by choosing to 
maintain a blasphemy law, a religious option is favoured. 
412.  See Smith S..D., 1999.
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5.. Hate speech bans and religion
A religious or a broader social peace is a value that is considered to be 
important enough to require special protection from the State in a 
majority of European countries. Thus the majority of the countries of 
the European Union and COE include provisions banning hate speech 
towards different social groups. According to the Venice Commission’s 
report, however, the scope of the offence varies greatly in each of the 
countries. Whereas in some, incitement to hatred is a necessary element 
of the offence413, in others both incitement and hatred are punishable414. 
Moreover, the “incitement” as such is not clearly defined or uniformly 
understood in Europe. Also the punishable grounds of discrimination and 
hatred differ. In some countries coverage is wide and includes incitement 
to religious, racial, ethnic or national hatred as well as hatred based on 
language, political convictions, disability or social status. Among the 
European Union countries, only Malta and Slovakia do not include bans 
on religious hatred415. In some others, like in the Netherlands, Sweden 
or Denmark416, also sexual orientation is one of the forbidden grounds 
for discrimination and hatred. Denying the Holocaust and glorifying 
terrorism as forbidden contents of speech belong to a similar category of 
limitations of speech. 
From the point of view of religion, two of these grounds are especially 
important. The first one is obviously religion and the second, sexual 
orientation. In regard to religion, it is important to emphasise the legal 
difference in the protection scope between blasphemy and hate speech on 
the grounds of religion. Whereas the notion of blasphemy regards religion 
and religious symbols and their core, the notion of hate speech protects 
the believer from being ridiculed and offended. As the recommendation 
on blasphemy and hate speech emphasised, religion or religious symbols 
cannot be protected as such. But a believer, like other groups in the 
society, should be protected from discrimination or hatred he or she 
413.  Austria Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Portugal, source: Venice Commission’s Report, par. 33.
414.  Lithuania, source: Venice Commission’s Report, par. 33.
415.  Venice Commission’s Report, par. 34.
416.  Venice Commission’s Report, Annex II, 2008.
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could face because of being a believer. Such a distinction is formally 
clear and constitutes an approach more compatible with the principles 
of democratic pluralism. In practice, however, it may cause substantial 
difficulties, which I will analyse below.
In those democracies that forbid hate speech on the grounds of sexual 
orientation, a few cases including religious individuals speaking against 
homosexuality have occurred. 
In the Netherlands, the Penal Code in Article 137c bans insults or 
incitement to discrimination or hatred on grounds of sexual orientation. 
The Dutch Courts dealt with charges based on this article in two well-
known cases. The first one from the year 1996 concerned a Dutch 
politician. Mr Van Dijke expressed publicly, in a weekly magazine, an 
opinion that homosexuals are no better than thieves in breaking God’s 
commandments. Upon prosecution, Van Dijke was in the first instance 
convicted. But the Court of Appeal acquitted him and the ruling was 
upheld by the Supreme Court.417 Similarly, in the case of Imam El 
Moumni, who declared in a television broadcast that homosexuality was 
harmful to the Dutch society, the court of the first instance convicted the 
accused. Later, however, upon appeal, the Imam was acquitted and the 
sentence was upheld by the Supreme Court. In both of those cases, the 
charges concerned speeches made in public and to a wider audience than 
just a religious congregation.418
Lately, however, a more interesting case, of Pastor Åke Green, 
occurred in Sweden. The case considered expressions that the Pastor 
directed to his own congregation during one of his sermons. It concerned 
expressions that were supposed to support the religious arguments of the 
pastor and his teaching on homosexuality to his religious congregation. 
Chapter 16, Section 8 of the Swedish Criminal Code criminalises 
agitation against a group by making a statement or otherwise spreading 
messages that threaten or express contempt for an ethnic group or any 
other group of people with reference to their race, nationality, ethnic 
origin, religious belief or sexual orientation. The amendment protecting 
from hatred on the grounds of sexual orientation entered into force in 
417.  Loof J.P, pp. 267-278.
418.  Ibid.
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January 2003. In the legislative process, the Swedish Council of Free 
Churches demanded the exclusion of sermons and similar situations from 
the scope of the amended provision. In response, the government replied, 
that the purpose of the law was not to restrict free speech in churches or 
anywhere else any more than in regard to incitement to hatred against an 
ethnic group, for instance.419
In July 2003, Åke Green held a sermon titled: “Is homosexuality 
congenital or the powers of evil meddling with people?” The sermon 
included statements such as:
“Legalizing partnerships between two men or two women will 
clearly create unparalleled catastrophes. Already, we are seeing 
the consequences through the spread of AIDS. Although not all 
HIV infected people are homosexuals, AIDS once stemmed from 
homosexuality.” 
Or:
“The Bible discusses and teaches us about these abnormalities. And 
sexual abnormalities are a serious cancerous growth on the body of a 
society”.420
In addition, Pastor Green compared homosexuality with paedophilia and 
bestiality and expressed the opinion that all sexual perversions stem from 
sinful changes in normal sexual behaviours. In his sermon he widely used 
references to verses in the Bible.
The Court of the first instance convicted Åke Green of violating 
Chapter 16, Section 8 by agitating against a group on the basis of their 
sexual orientation. The Court of Appeal acquitted the defendant and 
the ruling was sustained by the Supreme Court in November 2005. The 
Supreme Court in its judgement referred to the case law of the ECTHR 
and expressed an opinion that limiting Åke Green’s freedom of expression 
419.  Govt. Bill 2001/02:59, p 35, quoted in: The Supreme Court of Sweden, case B 
1050-05.
420.  Green Å, 2003.
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and freedom of religion would be disproportionate. The Court quoted 
the famous ECTHR declaration repeated in many judgements, that 
freedom of expression is applicable not only to ideas favourably received 
but also to those that offend, shock or disturb421. The Court considered 
that even though the Swedish law’s intent was to protect from statements 
such as those expressed in the sermon, the European Convention should 
be applicable directly and thus it must be possible to depart from the 
national law in order to secure conformity with the Convention. The 
Court believed that the ECTHR might find the limitation of Åke 
Green’s speech disproportionate, since the sermon should not be analysed 
on the basis of exact wording but in a wider context. Even though the 
words Green used might be considered more derogatory than the verses 
in the Bible, the preaching was done to his congregation and regarded a 
theme found in the Bible. And the belief as such should not be analysed 
in the terms of legal legitimacy or the lack of thereof. Limiting the core of 
a belief might be considered as a disproportionate limitation on freedom 
of religion and in connection to it, freedom of expression.422
5.10. Hate speech – necessity or another  
form of limiting speech?
From the point of view of religious pluralism, hate speech bans 
constitute a curious example. They are advocated for by the COE in their 
recommendation and are believed to facilitate religious as well as other 
forms of pluralism in a democratic society. Looking at the principle itself, 
that indeed appears to be true at a first glance. Hate speech bans do not 
differentiate between believers and non-believers and do not resort to the 
legal “othering” of anyone on religious grounds. Both believers and non-
believers are theoretically protected from possible hateful attacks based 
on their beliefs. Moreover, religion is just one of many grounds of possible 
discrimination. For that reason, hate speech bans appear more democratic, 
since they do not favour religious or non-religious aspects in any way. 
421.  Handyside vs. UK, Application no. 5493/72.
422.  The Supreme Court of Sweden, Case B 1050-05, 29.11.2005.
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From this theoretical and seemingly democratic perspective, we 
should, however, see the possible practical implications. First of all, as the 
examples of Malta and Slovakia show, it should not be taken for granted 
that a believer (or a non-believer) is protected from discrimination. For 
that reason, it might be argued that the hate-speech ban itself is shaped 
in a discriminatory way. The grounds of possible hate speech may be 
shaped freely and in fact express an ideological or even religious approach 
of a state. The lack of protection from hate speech on the grounds of 
religion and sexual orientation may ideologically mean nothing, but taken 
in context, may express conservative religious values. A society which will 
protect against racial or ethnic hatred but will not protect against hatred 
towards homosexual atheists, for example or any other non-traditional 
faith adherents, ceases to remain ideologically neutral. In that way, 
the mere shape of a hate-speech ban may cause the “othering” of non-
protected groups.
Secondly, like the cases of Åke Green or Van Dijke and Imam El 
Moumni showed, either of the social groups will be dissatisfied as a 
result of the application of the bans. Social equality and protection from 
discrimination will be always compromised for either side of a conflicting 
discourse. In the above-mentioned cases, the homosexual minority may 
argue that their rights have been compromised and a religious outlook on 
life was favoured. If the outcome had been different, religious individuals 
could have argued that secular values were given preference. As Leigh 
put it: 
“If non-discrimination law requires the silencing of any views other 
than those positively approving of homosexual lifestyles, equality has 
become dominant over freedom of religion and freedom of expression 
to a remarkable degree.”423
Either of the arguments puts the state and its neutrality towards religious 
views into an impossible and inconvenient position. The state is bound to 
be labelled as either a religious or secular values supporter.
But even if we dismiss this argument, remembering that legal conflicts 
423.  Leigh I., 2007, p 263.
1
always favour either of the sides, we should consider other practical 
issues as well. Can religious freedom grant a leeway to utter any kind 
of discriminatory speech then? Loof argues that differentiating between 
religious motives and other motives for speech would be a regrettable 
development as it would force the courts to decide whether certain 
opinions could be seen as religious.424 Remembering the difficulty of 
defining “a religion” and “a belief ”, which I discussed in the first chapter 
of this volume, I believe such a development could lead to an impossible 
unpredictability of the law. It may cause an absolutely free interpretation 
of each case unbound by any common standard of rights. In each case 
the arbitrariness of deciding would be left to the courts. The law and the 
boundaries of rights would remain absolutely unpredictable. 
Another method of balancing conflicting rights might be an approach 
where religiously motivated discriminatory speech is directed to a 
religious congregation and not to the general public. Loof, however, again 
points out the possible difficulties of such an approach. He argues that 
such an approach negates freedom of religion as such and denies religious 
speech’s place in public debate.425 I disagree with Loof. Religious speech 
is directed primarily to religious adherents and the mere existence of 
religious communities, places of worship and confessional schools marks 
the existence in a public sphere. I find such a solution to be one of the 
possible ones in which freedom of religion and religious expression does 
not limit the freedom of others, but still serves its purpose of providing 
moral standards to those interested. I will also return to the public versus 
private dichotomy in regard to the place of religion in a society in the 
theoretical discussion in later chapters.
Some absolutist critics, like Heinze, reject hate-speech bans due 
to their sole nature as completely unnecessary for a democratic society. 
Heinze ascertains that hate-speech bans are incompatible with democratic 
citizenship for two reasons. First of all, they ban speech solely because 
of the speaker’s opinions and secondly, because they produce uncertainty 
in judicial weighing and balancing. All viewpoints should be allowed to 
be expressed in a democratic society and a majority of whatever kind 
424.  Loof J.P., 2007, pp. 276-277.
425.  Loof J.P., 2007, p 277.
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cannot silence minorities. 426 Moreover, Heinze believes that democracy 
today is able to defend itself, due to substantial changes in education and 
preparation for democratic citizenship. He believes that there can be no 
comparison between the seemingly democratic overthrow of democracy 
in the Weimar Republic and dangers that European democracy meets 
today.427 At this point, I am bound to disagree with Heinze. I am 
convinced that while speaking of laws and legal principles, we should 
refrain from speculations concerning the possible self-destructive force of 
democracy. It can be argued and speculated, on the contrary, that hate-
speech bans are necessary right now, when Europe as a whole is facing 
the challenge of multiculturalism. When different fundamentalisms 
collide, prejudices and discriminatory policies are likely to increase 
intolerance and social conflict and with time grow into a destructive force. 
It is impossible to estimate whether hate-speech bans facilitate or hinder 
democracy. Such speculations remain fruitless for the legal argument.
Nevertheless, taking into consideration previous concerns, I must 
express the opinion that whereas hate-speech bans might improve 
tolerance and the peaceful coexistence of various social groups in a 
society, they might as well bring an unnecessary uncertainty to the 
law. Occasionally, if not shaped with careful enough consideration, or 
applied without careful balancing, they may act against the principle of 
democratic pluralism as such and increase religious “othering”. Although 
I am reluctant to accept complete absolutism as a principle, I do agree 
with Brandt’s conclusions, expressed in regard to the ban on glorifying 
 terrorism:
“The measure of tolerant society is not how well we co-exist when we 
all agree, but how we remain inclusive when we don’t. In a democracy, 
especially one divided along ethnic or religious lines, tolerance of free 
speech is paramount, for only in ‘relevant discussions about social 
order’ can divisions become tolerable. Of course there are those who 
will be insulted, afraid, deeply offended by what may be said on both 
sides. (…) We must hold on to the idea that both sides are capable of 
426.  Heinze E., 2007, p 301.
427.  Ibid., pp. 306-307.
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and have the duty to give a rational, if rigorous response to the other’s 
critique within public debate, without interference by a government 
telling them what not to say.”428
In Europe, scarred by the history of ethnic and religious conflict, hate-
speech bans, Holocaust denial bans and similar, appear plausible for 
the time of growing multiculturalism and pluralism. Their purpose is to 
increase tolerance, facilitate pluralism and mutual peaceful coexistence 
and prevent the possible self-destruction of democracy. However, even 
though the very purpose of maintaining hate-speech bans is increasing 
pluralism in a multicultural society, the legislators and the courts must 
remain careful. Hate-speech bans, similar to blasphemy bans or any 
other bans on speech, may instead of facilitating greater tolerance, bring 
an effect that is exactly opposite. They may discriminate and chill public 
debate. A liberal democrat is bound to agree with Mill’s claim, that 
a mature democracy defends itself best when the open market of ideas 
remains unrestricted.429
5.11. Conclusions
The Venice Commission’s report and recommendation and the COE’s 
Parliamentary Assembly report and recommendation are an important 
step towards the European common commitment to basic values. In 
a multicultural era, revoking national sentiments to defend laws and 
policies incompatible with the ideals of democratic religious pluralism 
and equality of religions (or non-religions) is no longer plausible. 
Whereas each country has its own religious traditions, those traditions 
cannot hinder the facilitation of rights of non-believers. However, a 
certain cultural relativism of this common European effort cannot go 
unaddressed. It seems that without the Mohammad caricature crisis, the 
Venice Commission’s work and the Parliamentary Assembly’s report and 
recommendation could have never been possible. As long as blasphemy 
428.  Brandts Ch., 2007, p 294.
429.  Mill J.S., 1869.
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was ‘our’ problem, connected with ‘our religious tradition’ it was tolerable. 
As soon as it became ‘their’ problem, connected with the cultural ‘other’, 
it had to be immediately examined through the lens of democracy. ‘Our’ 
fundamentalism was tolerable, ‘theirs’ was not430. The inspiration for 
the reports and recommendation brought about by the Mohammad 
caricatures is visible also in the text of the COE’s recommendation, in 
the deep condemnation of life threats against artists and journalists 
issued by Muslim leaders. Only such drastic threats could make Europe 
speak in one voice. This tendency toward democratic “othering”, as will be 
summarised further in part III of this volume, has been visible in almost 
each of the example areas chosen in this volume. Only a challenge by a 
foreign religious identity made Europe notice possible problems and 
clashes between archaic laws concerning religion and democracy.
In regard to blasphemy and hate-speech bans, the questions for the 
future are: can the new approach of European institutions influence 
people and lessen their sensitivities? Can Europeans distance themselves 
from the offensive works and accept them as representing the freedom 
of those who do not share their world and religious views? Can the ideal 
of free speech ever be reached in both theory and practice? Will the 
offence of hate speech simply replace blasphemy? And will the EU also 
strengthen its commitment to democratic values, following Danish Prime 
Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s call to defend freedom of speech431?
430.  See: European elite scrambles to defuse furore over caricatures of Mohammad, 
The Guardian, 03.02.2006.
431.  See: Denmark calls for fight for freedoms after cartoons row, EU Business, 
07.10.2008.
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6. Religion and education  
– between equality and indoctrination
6.1. The school as an institution  
of unavoidable tensions between doctrines
School environments are special and bring multiple difficulties connected 
with drawing boundaries between the religious and the secular. School, in 
this chapter primarily meaning institutions of basic education, are places 
attended by persons usually below the age of 18, who are considered 
to be children in the meaning of the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child. School is an institution which cannot be avoided and the purpose 
of the schooling system is to provide adequate education, which can 
prepare children to function as fully capable members of society. The 
places of education are usually chosen by parents in accordance with 
their best knowledge and convictions concerning what type of education 
should be provided for their children. The majority of European schools 
providing basic education are public schools with curricula approved by 
the educational authorities of a state. Children cannot of their own will 
change or resign from education and schooling. The school obligation is 
recognised by all countries of the European Union.
It is essential to recognise the essential problem regarding the influence 
of religious or secular ideologies in education. The education of the young 
determines the future of the entire society. Thus whatever types of ideology 
are passed along within the school programmes, they might become with 
time the living ideologies of the society. Therefore, issues connected with 
education and religion are of even greater sensitivity than those that touch 
upon the rights of adult members of the society. For these reasons, both 
advocates of secular doctrines as well as religiously inspired ones struggle 
to ensure what is to be considered by them as “adequate education”. 
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6.2. The complexity of rights involved
In addition to the socially sensitive role of the school, the educational area 
is challenging from the legal point of view. The rights that are involved in 
the process of education involve a complicated puzzle of different types 
of rights held by different categories of persons. They involve the political 
and social rights of children, their parents and their teachers.
These rights stem from various national and international regulations. 
The rights of children, in addition to other constitutional and 
international sources of rights, are entrenched in the Convention of the 
Right of the Child from the year 1989, which explicitly includes the right 
to receive education, as well as the right to possess own religious beliefs. 
The interpretative body of the convention, the CRC Committee, has also 
developed a right to receive information on sexual health on the basis of 
the right to education, information and the highest attainable standard of 
health432. 
Parents’ and teachers’ rights stem from the national constitutions, 
international and European human rights conventions, EU law and other 
international agreements include, in addition to the freedom of religion, 
the right to decide the religious education of their children. 
This tangled web of mutual rights and obligations is certainly difficult 
to unfold in regard to the leading themes of this work, which include the 
principles of equality and religious pluralism. I identify several areas that are 
particularly sensitive from the point of view of the possible philosophical or 
religious coercion of believers by non-believers and vice versa. 
6.3. The right to education in European  
and international law
The cornerstone of the rights regarding the relationship between 
education and religion is the right to education itself. It is guaranteed by 
international and European legal obligations and provided in accordance 
with national laws of European countries. 
432.  General Comment, CRC/GC/2003/3.
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The right to education is recognised as a social right under the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and 
the European Social Charter. The previously mentioned Convention on 
the Rights of the Child was, on the other hand, the first legally binding 
international instrument to incorporate the full range of human rights, 
including civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights. The right to 
education is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Convention. 
In Europe the possibility of access to legal redress in regard to the 
right to education was strengthened by the addition of Protocol 11 to 
the European Convention on Human Rights. The protocol established 
the right to education and in addition determined its connection with 
parents’ freedom of religion:
“No person shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise 
of any functions which it assumes in relation to education and to 
teaching, the State shall respect the right of parents to ensure such 
education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and 
philosophical convictions.”
The right to education, as understood in the Protocol, may be grounds for 
an individual complaint to the ECTHR.
The European Union has also recognised the importance of education 
although not immediately. The Maastricht Treaty however, recognised 
the legal status of education and made the European Council and the 
European Parliament responsible for cooperation in matters of education. 
Article 126 states:
“The Community shall contribute to the development of quality 
education by encouraging cooperation between Member States and, 
if necessary, by supporting and supplementing their action, while fully 
respecting the responsibility of the Member States for the content of 
teaching and the organization of education systems and their cultural 
and linguistic diversity.”
Educational programmes, like the Erasmus, Socrates or Leonardo da 
Vinci programmes, have intensified cooperation in matters of education. 
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Growing amount of common strategies and processes, like the Lisbon 
strategy 2010 in regard to education or the Bologna process, underline 
the fundamental importance of education in the European Union. The 
Lisbon Treaty currently undergoing ratification imposes an obligation on 
the Union to contribute to the development of quality of education in a 
similar manner as the Maastricht Treaty in regard to the Community. 
Moreover, the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, which 
in accordance with the Lisbon Treaty shall become the part of the EU 
Treaties, guarantees in regard to education and religious or philosophical 
convictions that: 
1. Everyone has the right to education and to have access to 
vocational and continuing training.
2. This right includes the possibility to receive free compulsory 
education.
3. The freedom to found educational establishments with due respect 
for democratic principles and the right of parents to ensure the 
education and teaching of their children in conformity with 
their religious, philosophical and pedagogical convictions shall 
be respected, in accordance with the national laws governing the 
exercise of such freedom and right.
6.4. European strategies for education  
and religion and equity in education
As demonstrated above, education belongs to the realm of competence of 
the states but is crucial for Europe and European integration. Therefore 
developing the best possible strategies and coordinating those strategies 
is essential for achieving of quality education.
Although religion at first glance may not be at the heart of educational 
integration strategies, it is one of the cultural factors which influences 
the quality and accessibility of education. Therefore, recently there has 
been increased activity of European institutions in interpreting certain 
principles regarding education and equity and the relationship between 
the state and religion in education. 
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The European Union’s strategies refer to migrant children433 and the 
importance of intercultural dialogue. Therefore, the European Union’s 
strategies concentrate on the concept of equity in education. European 
cooperation for schools should: “enhance the essential role which schools 
play in promoting inclusive societies […] in accordance with the principle 
of equity”434. The Strategy paper on equity in education underlines that 
equity is viewed as the extent to which individuals can take advantage of 
education in terms of treatment, opportunities and access435. Moreover, 
the strategic framework for European cooperation in education and 
training sets at the centre of the strategy promoting equity and active 
citizenship. Education, according to the strategy, should promote 
intercultural skills, democratic values, respect for the fundamental rights 
and the fight against discrimination. 
A stronger emphasis on the importance of the relationship between 
religion and education has been expressed by the Council of Europe. The 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has adopted a specific 
recommendation on education and religion436, which reaffirms that issues 
of religion belong to strictly private matters and that the family has a 
paramount role in the upbringing of children, including the choice of a 
religious upbringing. Nevertheless, due to the growing misunderstanding 
between religious and non-religious communities, education should, 
according to the recommendation, combat ignorance, stereotypes and 
misunderstanding of religion. This could be done only through teaching 
comprehensive knowledge of all religions. However, the recommendation 
also underlines that even in countries where one religion prevails, the 
teaching should comprise knowledge of all religions, not only the 
dominant one. 
433.  Migration & mobility, COM(2008) 423.
434.  Conclusions of the Council, (2008/C 319/08), p 2.
435.  Communication from the Commission, COM(2006) 481.
436.  Recommendation 1720 (2005).
208
6.5. Types of religious instruction
Types of religious instruction can be classified in various ways. Skeie437, 
for instance, distinguishes between strong and weak solutions in regard 
to models of religious education. Strong models include systems of 
confessional religious education, where religion is a part of school 
curricula. The previous Spanish model and the current Maltese or Greek 
one are included in this category. On the other side of the strong models 
is the French model, where religious education is not at all included in the 
school curriculum. The model is also strong as it takes a decisive secular 
stance. Weak models include solutions which balance a secular approach 
with a religious approach. Among others, the British multicultural religious 
education system (RE) was included by Skeie in this classification. Skeie’s 
classification is far more complex and touches upon more complicated 
administrative questions such as who the provider of the curriculum is, 
who employs the teachers, etc. However, for the problems considered in 
this volume, these three most important features of Skeie’s classification 
correspond with the topics that I discuss in this volume: how doctrines 
influence the non-religious, or, on the other hand, religious individuals and 
what the role of the state is in the process. For that purpose, I distinguish 
between confessional models of religious education, non-confessional 
models as well as models with no religious education at all. 
Some, like Diez de Velasco, question classifications based on the 
confessional versus non-confessional dichotomy, arguing that they 
lead to a dead end and serve no purpose in attempts to suggest a model 
of education for peace.438 However, education for peace is similar to 
education for citizenship and therefore not applicable to the problems 
of religious education per se. The problems of education for peace (or 
citizenship as I call it in this volume) will be mentioned in one of the 
following paragraphs. For the purpose of discussion on religious education 
sensu stricto, I sustain the basic classification based on a confessional/
non-confessional dichotomy in order to illustrate the problems that such 
models pose for the development of religious pluralism and equality. This 
437.  Skeie G., 2001.
438.  Diez de Velasco F., 2007, p 80.
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classification also vaguely corresponds to a classification made previously 
in this volume in regard to types of state and church relationships. States 
where the influence of religion on public life and the constitution is high 
usually opt for confessional models. Those states, where the influence of 
religion is rather symbolic or which adhere to multiculturalism, most often 
offer the non-confessional multi-religious model. In addition, France, 
which adheres strongly to the separation principle, offers no religious 
instruction in schools. This model is treated here as a separate model.
In order to identify central issues concerning the influence of religious 
education or the lack of it on religious equality and pluralism, I compare 
the essential qualities of these three types on the examples of Spain, the 
United Kingdom and France.
6.5.1. Confessional instruction and principles of pluralism
In order to illustrate problems concerning the confessional model of 
religious education, I use an example of the Spanish system. The Spanish 
model has undergone recent rapid evolution from a typical confessional 
model to an increasingly multicultural model. Therefore it is useful in 
showing tendencies and the direction of the development of the models 
of religious education in Europe. 
The Spanish religious education system was for a long time 
confessional and based on the agreement between Spain and the Holy 
See on education and cultural matters.439 This agreement was signed as 
a result of obligations stemming from the Concordat of 1978 and the 
constitutional obligation of the state to take into account the religious 
views of the society and maintain cooperation with the Catholic 
Church.440 The agreement on cultural matters obliged the Spanish state 
to include the Catholic Religion teaching in all Educational Centres 
under conditions comparable to other subjects. The agreement stipulated 
that, due to respect for freedom of conscience, such education was not 
to be considered mandatory for those who wished to be exempted, but 
all public schools were obliged to offer it to students as an option. Thus 
439.  Agreement, 1979, BOE N1 300.
440.  Spanish Constitution, 1978, art. 16.3.
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the obligation was laid on the state to provide the classes. The obligation 
to participate was not laid on the students when they applied and 
qualified for exemption. Initially the educational privilege of providing 
religious education was reserved only for the Catholic Church. In 1990 
a new law441 allowed other confessions than Catholic to sign cooperation 
agreements with the state. This amendment allowed for optional teaching 
of other confessional religious classes than Catholic.442 
Gomez-Quintero notes that in its case law regarding religious 
education in Spain, the Supreme Court on numerous occasions dealt with 
the proper balancing of constitutional principles. The Court emphasised 
also other constitutional requirements than cooperation with the Catholic 
Church, like the obligations of assuring pluralism, neutrality and religious 
freedom. For that reason, the Court ruled that under such a regime, where 
a religious confession enjoys the privilege of teaching in a public school, 
requiring students who are exempted from religious classes to take other 
compensating subjects instead was a disproportionate burden for them 
and posed unreasonable inequality based on their lack of a religious 
confession.443 In striving to assure the most reasonable model of religious 
education that would secure equality and equal burdens on the students, 
a new law was adopted in 2002.444 The law introduced a major change in 
the previous system. It put an obligation on every student to participate 
in religious education classes. The classes were, however, differentiated 
and the schools had an obligation to organise both confessional religious 
education as well as a non-confessional equivalent. In this new setting, the 
legal difference was the obligation imposed on the students. Participation 
in non-confessional education was no longer an additional burden imposed 
on non-religious students due to the fact that their religious peers chose at 
the same time to receive education in their religion. The law introduced 
rather an obligation of all students to participate in education concerning 
religion and left it up to the students and parents whether they preferred 
to receive confessional instruction or religiously neutral instruction about 
441.  Organic Law of General Order of the Educational System, 1990.
442.  Maritnez-Torron J., 2005, p 145.
443.  Gomez-Quintero A.S., 2004, pp. 563-566.
444.  Organic Law on the Quality of Education, 2002.
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society, religion and culture. This trend approximated the Spanish approach 
to the non-confessional, multicultural model described below. 
In addition, a new law concerning education for citizenship was 
introduced in 2006 to strengthen multiculturalism and pluralism, but it 
did not replace religious education. This law will be discussed in detail 
in the following sections of this chapter, while discussing other areas in 
education where religious rights might be involved.
Providing compulsory confessional religious education from which 
one may be excluded by the expressed objection of the parents, does 
not prima facie discriminate against any religion. In largely religiously 
homogeneous societies, it might be argued that the state mainly facilitates 
the freedom of religion of the majority of students. Yet such education 
should be provided carefully and with regard to certain conditions 
guaranteeing freedom of religion and preventing the religious coercion 
of non-religious and differently religious individuals. The principles of 
careful balancing have been drawn up in the case law of the ECTHR 
concerning religious education and the rights of parents to decide the 
education of their children in conformity with their own convictions.
In Angeleni vs. Sweden (1041/83) the ECTHR (the Commission) 
acknowledged that the Convention protects against religious 
indoctrination by the state. In this case, however, EComHR decided 
that religious instruction concerning a particular religion does not 
automatically amount to indoctrination nor infringe the Convention. 
The teaching of Christianity was not found disproportionate, due to the 
historical role of Christianity in Europe.
In a more recent judgement, however, Folgerǿ vs. Norway445, the Court 
took a more decisive stance. The judgement confirmed the approach 
expressed in Angeleni that teaching about Christianity cannot be as 
such seen as indoctrination and is justified due to history and national 
traditions. A further part of the sentence, though, took a more decisive 
approach as to the acceptable limits of such teaching. The Court found a 
violation of the freedom of religion by the former Norwegian model of 
religious education. The model included partial exemption from religious 
classes but since religious education elements were deeply integrated 
445.  Case of Folgero and Others vs. Norway.
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in the entire educational system, it did not allow for exemption from all 
activities potentially indoctrinating into Christianity. The Court explicitly 
emphasised that a democratic state is forbidden to pursue the aim of 
indoctrination and that such a limit must never be exceeded. Teaching 
does not amount to indoctrination when it is knowledge-based but exceeds 
those limits when it amounts to preaching and religious upbringing. 
The ECTHR in Folgerǿ underlined that the state must make sure 
that information or knowledge included in the curriculum is conveyed 
in an objective, critical and pluralistic manner. Moreover, in another case 
concerning problems of religious education, Hasan and Eylem Zengin vs. 
Turkey vs. Turkey, the Court emphasised that a course on specific religion, 
which is designed to preach that religion, cannot be compulsory.446 
The exemption must be granted in order to comply with principles of 
democracy and pluralism.
There are, however, certain other factors which should be taken into 
consideration while discussing the equality between denominations in 
systems of confessional religious education. First of all, students who do not 
follow compulsory religious teaching often must follow substitute courses 
instead, or at least apply through their parents for a formal exemption from 
religious instruction classes. An individual who does not participate in the 
compulsory course in confessional religious instruction is burdened with 
extracurricular requirements in the form of substitute courses and parents 
are burdened with the extra requirement of applying for exemption. These 
extra requirements are imposed due to the fact of not being religious in the 
same way as the majority of pupils. This differentiation is not of course per 
se disproportional. However, in cases when it imposes a heavy burden and 
a risk of exposure of convictions, it might exceed what is legally considered 
proportional. In Folgerǿ the ECTHR established that the partial exception 
system violated the Convention by imposing a heavy burden on the parents, 
including the necessity of disclosing their own philosophical/religious 
convictions to the school in the process of applying for particular exemptions.
Following the Court’s reasoning in regard to exception, it is impossible 
not to observe that the element of disclosure applies to any kind of exemption 
system, whether partial or complete. The child or his or her parents not 
446.  Hasan and Eylem Zengin vs. Turkey, Application no. 1448/04.
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belonging to the religion allowed to provide teaching in school must in any 
case disclose their belief. This disclosure includes at least admitting that they 
do not belong to the religion that enjoys the privilege of teaching, in order 
to be granted the exception. Following the Court’s reasoning, this aspect 
would in principle be the first and the leading argument speaking against 
the maintenance of confessional religious instruction. Such instruction 
differentiates unnecessarily among pupils and their parents on the basis 
of their belonging or not belonging to a religious group allowed to provide 
confessional teaching in public schools. Achieving equality may be done by 
adopting a system closer to the Spanish system from the year 2002. When 
the obligation to study about religion applies to all students, then it is an 
option of choice to participate in confessional religious instruction if such is 
offered in one’s own religion. The burden of disclosing one’s own convictions 
to the school is theoretically minimised as no explanation why a non-
confessional option was chosen is needed. Yet, the practical implications of 
such a system may vary depending on the religious profile of the population. 
In a religiously homogeneous population, applying for non-confessional 
education may have effects that are the same for the equality of the students 
as applying for an exemption. It may contain an element of “disclosure” of 
one’s own convictions if they are different than those of the majority’s.
Taking into consideration the goal of achieving religious pluralism, 
we must consider the social, not purely legal aspect. Education is a special 
social sphere. Differentiation between pupils participating and exempted, 
does not apply to matured and developed individuals, like university 
students, who are prepared to approach differences. It instead affects pupils 
in the process of learning tolerance and non-discrimination. Pushing non-
religious and differently religious individuals into the margin of religious 
“otherness” certainly does not improve the facilitation of religious pluralism 
and equality. Otherness, offered at an early age, influences segregation more 
than the pluralist coexistence of categorisation into “insiders” and “outsiders” 
and at the same time advocates for a “middle way approach” in the context 
of Europe. Jackson observes that in modern pluralistic societies an individual 
might identify with aspects of a cultural tradition, argue with other aspects 
and creatively reshape his/her cultural (and religious) identities.447 Therefore, 
447.  Jackson R., 2001, pp.35-36.
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law creating a possibility of “otherness” does not facilitate an achievement of 
religious equality and pluralism. 
In principle, all these arguments can be dismissed by appealing to the 
aspect of facilitation rather than coercion. Yet, from the overall perspective 
of facilitating religious pluralism, another aspect is the symbolic support 
given by the state to a particular confession. Such symbolic support is 
often an expression of identification of national interest with an interest of 
a particular religion, rather than the equality of all religions. In a similar 
manner, as an embracement of a state religion, support for confessional 
religious education for the majority, affects the perception of various 
religions, beliefs and values. And such a perception cannot be based on 
equality, if only one religion receives factual support of the state and the law. 
This leads back to the discussion of “otherness”, “insiders” and outsiders”. 
6.5.2. Multicultural compulsory education  
and the principle of equality and pluralism
British and recently changing Scandinavian approaches constitute a 
relatively new, but increasingly popular, approach towards religious 
education. They have evolved into multicultural and multi-religious 
models offering comprehensive education on various religions448. I take 
the British example here as the one enjoying the longest tradition.
The British system of religious education owes its origins to a 
philosopher of religion, Ninian Smart. His Secular education and the Logic 
of Reason published in 1968 laid the foundations for today’s approach to 
religious education in Britain. Smart argued against confessional religious 
education and instead advocated for a non-confessional approach, which 
would help to promote religious tolerance. As Barnes notes, Smart:
“[…] appeals to the increasingly pluralist and secular character of society 
and for the need for the state to be neutral with regard to religious 
matters. Finally he proposes that close attention to the nature of religion 
[…] establishes the case for a non-dogmatic, multi faith approach.”449
448.  See e.g. Slotte P, 2008.
449.  Barnes F.L., 2001, p 1.
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The influence of Smart’s approach is visible still today in the British religious 
education model. The National Framework for Religious Education from 
the year 2004 sets out a multicultural approach for the curricula of religious 
education.450 The aim of religious education is, according to the Framework, 
to include enquiries into the nature of religions and beliefs, investigation into 
teachings and ways of life. The goal expressed in the Framework is to develop 
pupils’ skills in interpretation and communication in relation to questions of 
identity and belonging. A broad and balanced curriculum should include 
teachings on Christianity, Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam, Judaism, Sikhism as 
well as other religious traditions, including pupils’ own. The curricula should 
encourage interfaith dialogue and reflect the important contribution of 
religion to community cohesion. The Framework establishes both goals and 
methods of reaching those goals in religious education. Currently all publicly 
maintained schools provide religious education in a manner that should be 
consistent with the Framework’s fundamental suppositions.
Such a model conforms to standards recommended by the Council of 
Europe in regard to religious education. The religious education, although 
compulsory, is a course about religions and their doctrines and it does not 
give preferential treatment to or marginalise any confession. This assertion 
may be questioned by the disproportionally large proportion of time 
given to instruction on Christianity. Given, however, that the teaching 
of Christianity is provided in the same manner as teaching on other 
confessions, this disproportion may be justified by the historical influence 
of Christianity on European culture. In order to answer the question, 
whether such a disproportion is similar to that present in confessional 
religious education, it should be approached individually case by case. 
If disproportions can be balanced and teaching is provided without 
preaching and without discrimination between religions, such a form of 
religious instruction helps to improve the standard of equality and non-
discrimination. From an early age, pupils are faced with the fact that 
differences exist and people may profess various beliefs, which should not 
be ridiculed. Religious children of various confessions learn about other 
confessions or the lack thereof. Atheistic or agnostic children, on the 
450.  Qualifications and Curriculum Authority, Religious education – the non-
statutory national framework, 2004.
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other hand, learn to understand their schoolmates’ religious perspectives 
on life. Even if particular religious principles are not taught, children, 
as is underlined in the above-mentioned European recommendations, 
recognise the diversity of the religious landscape. They advocate for 
changes in religious education that will recognise this diversity rather 
than propagate confessional religious instruction. 
Compulsory multicultural religious education in public schools helps 
prepare students for life in a religiously plural society. Schreiner reminds 
that multiculturalism influences the understanding of religious education 
and points out the elements that should be included:
“Violent conflicts and wars in Europe with religious implications, 
anti-Semitism, nationalism, racism and sexism are challenges and 
phenomena which are not limited to national contexts. These areas 
should be parts of RE [religious education] teaching”451
If a national context is insufficient in the new multi-religious era, so is often 
confessional instruction in comparison to multicultural non-confessional 
religious instruction. Confessional instruction is usually offered on a 
traditional national religion. Multicultural religious education extends the 
perspective beyond the national interest and helps prevent associating the 
national interest with the interest of any particular religion. Subsequently, 
such form of religious education is better able to deal with the difficult 
challenge of growing European multiculturalism and religious pluralism. In 
order to assure balanced and adequate multicultural religious education, the 
content and form must also be carefully thought through. Jackson reminds 
that critical multicultural religious education must offer more sophisticated 
analyses of culture and religion than simple descriptive reifications.452 
6.5.3. Should religious education be compulsory?
As it has been discussed above while analysing the ECTHR case law 
dealing with religious education, confessional religious education should 
451.  Schreiner P, 2001, p 265.
452.  Jackson R., 2004a, p 7.
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never be compulsory, without the possibility of exemption. However, in 
regard to multicultural religious education, the same question may be 
posed. Why should there be compulsory religious education at all? Some, 
like White, claim that in a secular era, teaching of religious education is a 
relic of the past, when moral choices were unimaginable without backing 
them with a religious background.453 White argues that morality does 
not have to be based on religion and that the ‘deep-rooted practice of 
using religious material for moral lessons is now way out of touch with 
twenty-first century life’.454 White firmly argues that religious education, 
no matter whether confessional or non-confessional, should be excluded 
from obligatory school curricula and, if not, at least the education on 
negative features of religions should be included.
The majority of scholars, however, argue the contrary. Non-
confessional and multicultural religious education should be provided by 
public schools. Schreiner, as previously mentioned, argues that religious 
education is a necessity in today’s world torn apart by religious disputes 
and plays the role of preparing students to deal with these arguments.455 
Also Cush argues that teaching on religion via other curricular subjects 
does not play a role and religion is not possible to be taught via other 
secular subjects, without diminishing the importance of religions for 
human life. Religions are inseparable from the rest of human life, 
claims Cush and therefore multicultural education on religious values is 
important. It gives children from varied backgrounds the opportunity of 
having a dialogue on issues that are important for them.456
Similarly Skeie underlines that knowledge that supports different 
kinds of believing and non-believing and gives opportunities to exchange 
values and opinions without being threatened or ridiculed helps children 
become better equipped to engage in struggles in society.457
Wright, in response to White’s opposition to religious education, 
points out that teaching morality is not the purpose of multicultural 
453.  White J., 2004, pp. 151-164.
454.  Ibid., p 161.
455.  Schreiner P, 2001.
456.  Cush D., 2007, pp. 217-227.
457.  Skeie G., 2006, p 30.
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non-confessional religious education. Instead, critical religious education 
prepares children to function in a society where different kinds of beliefs 
have relevance. It prepares them to engage in a meaningful discussion on 
fundamental questions essential for different persons.458
Thorson Plesner, while analysing different approaches to religious 
education, observes that “successful religious education” contributes 
effectively to fostering tolerance and freedom of religion.459 
From the point of view of an individual’s freedom of religion, general 
compulsory religious education can be justified under certain conditions. The 
teaching must be under no circumstances aiming or be likely to influence 
pupils in the direction of embracing a particular belief.460 When this 
condition is met, the rights to individual freedom of religion are not in danger 
of being violated. Teaching about different religions and moral views provides 
knowledge that is necessary for the development of religious pluralism, 
democracy and tolerance. As the COE recommendation on education and 
religion underlines: “each person’s religion, including the option of having no 
religion, is a strictly personal matter. However, this is not inconsistent with 
the view that a good general knowledge of religions and the resulting sense 
of tolerance are essential to the exercise of democratic citizenship.”461 Each 
example of possible conflict, though, must be carefully examined, like in the 
case of education for citizenship or sexual education. Whenever a threshold 
of indoctrination, instead of an impartial transfer of knowledge is crossed, the 
boundaries of justification are no longer maintained.
6.5.4. Secularism and lack of religious instruction  
and its influence on the principle of equality and religious pluralism
In France, on the other hand, no religious instruction in public schools is 
offered, except for Alsace-Lorraine. France adheres particularly strongly 
to the principle of full separation between church and state. The principle 
of laïcité applies also to the public education system, which discourages 
458.  Wright A., 2004, pp.165-174.
459.  Thorson Plesner I., 2004, pp. 791-812.
460.  Ibid., p 808.
461.  Recommendation 1720 (2005).
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the development of any religious identity. Legislation from the year 2004 
banned wearing religious symbols in public schools. 
Despite the strong separation tendencies, a debate began in 1980 
whether some elements of education on religion should be included in 
school curricula. In 1989 some elements containing information on 
religion were added to history and geography courses462.
The French model of state and church relations has been mentioned 
previously in this volume, and an example of education was brought to the 
discussion. I do want to emphasise here, again, the same position. The absolute 
separation of religion from the public sphere of education and discouraging 
from developing any religious identity does not in my opinion enhance 
the equality of either religions or religious pluralism. It pushes religion into 
the margin, in the same way in which confessional religious instruction 
marginalises non-religion. It creates an image of “otherness”: a religious 
individual versus a secular standard. And otherness, like mentioned before, 
does not influence diversity positively, especially when it is communicated 
already at an early age. Skeie reminds that the French “blindness” to religion 
might have been a virtue for a long time, but it is difficult to maintain as a 
position in multicultural and multi-religious Europe.463
6.6. Other areas where education and religion collide
6.6.1. Sexual education
One of the controversial areas where a potential conflict between religious 
and moral values and a secular system of education may appear is the area 
of sexual education. Like mentioned previously, in the chapter regarding 
women’s reproductive rights, the area of sexuality is traditionally strongly 
connected with religious morality. Thus possible moral objections may arise 
in regard to sexual education and providing religious education compliant 
with parents’ convictions. Education on reproductive health was confirmed 
to be essential for the realisation of children’s rights, especially the right 
462.  Jackson R., 2004, p 174.
463.  Skeie G., 2001, p 240.
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to health. The CRC Committee in, for instance, General Comment no. 3 
concerning HIV and children’s rights underlined the importance of such 
education. Many European countries provide such education as a part of 
school curricula. While religious parents might have objections to sending 
their children to sexual education classes, the European position on the 
matter rejects religious objections in these matters. This position was 
created by the ECTHR in the case Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen vs. 
Denmark.464 In this case practising Christian parents protested against their 
children’s participation in sexual education classes in Denmark. The ECTHR 
disagreed with the applicants and found no violation of the Convention. The 
Court admitted that the right of parents to have their children educated with 
respect to their convictions applies to the entire State education programme 
and not only religious instruction. The sentence underlined, however, that 
allowing for extensive exemption systems from integrated school curriculum 
is not covered by Protocol 1, Article 2. The Court expressed an opinion that 
such an exemption system would make the institutionalised teaching run the 
risk of proving impracticable. The Court admitted that various instructions 
might encroach on the religious-philosophical sphere. However, the 
availability of private confessional schools, where children can learn about 
these topics in a manner compliant with their creed, was in the opinion of 
the Court a sufficient method of balancing religious and secular interests. 
The part of the judgement advocating for private schooling in case of 
contentious objection of parents can be seen a most practical solution. It 
must be observed, however, that the argumentation of the Court in regard 
to exemptions is strikingly different than in the above-mentioned case of 
Folgerǿ. Exemption from integrated religious teaching is not that strikingly 
different from exemption from integrated sexual education teaching. The 
burden placed on the school system to organise the exemption is comparable.
However, participation in classes of sexual education can be seen not 
only from the perspective of the right of the parents to decide their children’s 
education in accordance with their convictions. It can also be seen as the 
right of a child to the highest attainable standard of health. Although the 
religious convictions of the parents are extremely important and are to be 
464.  Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen vs. Denmark, Application no. 5095/71, 
5920/72, 5926/72.
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taken into consideration, so are the rights of the children. Even though these 
two rights do not arise from the same legal plane, they can be both invoked 
by the state in the planning of educational curricula. All EU countries have 
ratified the CRC, which in accordance with the CRC Committee gives the 
grounds for the right to sexual education. The question whether parents can 
deprive their children of that right is far more complex. It can be argued 
that sexual education does not automatically infringe anyone’s freedom of 
religion, if it is taught in a neutral manner and does not advocate for any 
specific sexual behaviour but instead presents available knowledge. Similarly, 
like the Education for Citizenship discussed below, sexual education 
facilitates deeper social goals and helps protect the right to health. From the 
point of view of a religiously plural society, the provision or non-provision 
of such education remains, in my opinion, neutral. The students are merely 
faced with objective knowledge, not with indoctrination. 
Even though religious communities may object, the issue does not 
touch the community as such but individuals and their rights, on the one 
hand religious adult individuals and on the other sensitive members of 
the society such as children. In a democratic pluralist society religious 
communities still have all their rights to preach on what sexual choices 
their adherents should or should not do. The problem for the facilitation 
of a religiously plural society would arise if the state imposed similar 
burdens of teaching sexual education on confessional schools. Such a 
requirement might be seen as “secular indoctrination”. Confessional 
schools should be allowed a maximum margin for the interpretation of 
controversial social areas in accordance with their doctrines. 
From the point of view of a religiously plural society, also an opposite 
situation might pose a difficulty. When a state chooses not to provide 
sexual education, because of its affiliation with any specific religious 
doctrine, it could infringe the rights of non-religious individuals. Whilst 
neutral information does not indoctrinate, a conscious refusal supported 
by a religious choice may. Such a conscious choice made by a democratic 
state in order to protect a religious doctrine is not defendable and links 
us back to the argumentation invoked in this volume in the chapter 
concerning women’s reproductive rights. 
The best model, which takes into consideration the concerns of all parts 
of such a discussion, should integrate the maximum of knowledge and 
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perspectives on moral choices in regard to such controversial areas. Although 
extremely difficult to realise in practice, a democratic state should strive to 
facilitate both the teaching of impartial sexual education, as a measure to 
secure the right to health and information, as well as multicultural religious 
education, which can give pupils and students a deeper understanding of 
various available moral choices, whether religious, philosophical or secular. In 
addition, in order to secure the rights of those citizens who are particularly 
sensitive in regard to their beliefs, confessional schools should enjoy a 
maximum freedom to provide teaching compliant with their religious dogma.
6.6.2. Headscarves in educational establishments
One of the areas of intersection between education and religion is the 
headscarf ban in educational institutions. In the chapter concerning 
church-state relationships in Europe, the French example of headscarf ban 
was used. The headscarf has, however, been an issue in other European 
countries as well and the problems regarding headscarves affect both 
students and teachers. The national legislation of European countries differs 
considerably concerning this matter. Skjeie compares European approaches 
and distinguishes between models that allow for a headscarf with different 
modifications and those that do not. Permissive models are divided by Skjeie 
according to the classification made in the VEIL project465. They include 
systems of ‘soft selective regulation’ and systems with ‘no selective regulation’. 
Strict regulation systems are classified as systems with ‘established selective 
bans’. In addition, there are also those countries where no regulation exists. 
Established selective bans exist in France and in Turkey. Systems 
with no selective regulation can be found, for instance, in Austria, the 
Netherlands and Spain. Soft selective regulation exists, according to 
Skjeie, in Sweden and Finland. Soft selective systems permit headscarves 
but demarcate between headscarves and those body covering garments 
which cover parts of the face or the whole face. Some systems, like those 
in Hungary, Poland or the Czech Republic, include no regulation, as the 
465.  The VEIL Project on Values, Equality and Differences in Liberal Democracies. 
The project addresses the questions of equality and is sponsored by the European 
Commission: http://www.veil-project.eu.
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headscarf issue has not yet become a problem calling for legal regulation. 
Even though the majority of European countries permit headscarves, 
whether all or just certain types, the ECTHR found that introducing a 
ban on headscarves was compliant with democratic principles and met 
requirements of proportionality and necessity. In Dahlab vs. Switzerland and 
Sahin vs. Turkey, the ECTHR expressed its view on the relationship between 
a headscarf and other principles of European democracy, like gender equality.
The case of Dahlab and Sahin concerned different categories of 
individuals involved in the educational process. Ms Dahlab was a teacher 
whereas Ms Sahin a student. Ms Dahlab was forbidden to wear a 
headscarf while performing her duties as a teacher in a primary school, 
while Ms Sahin was not allowed to wear a headscarf while studying in 
a university. The argumentation of the Court in both cases concentrated 
on the headscarf ’s impact on women’s equality and the influence of 
a headscarf as a religious symbol with the potential for being used in 
proselytizing. The Court constructed a negative image of the veil as a 
symbol that is non-compliant with the values of European democracy:
“The applicant’s pupils were aged between four and eight, an age at 
which children wonder about many things and are also more easily 
influenced than older pupils. In those circumstances, it cannot be 
denied outright that the wearing of a headscarf might have some kind 
of proselytizing effect, seeing that it appears to be imposed on women 
by a precept which is laid down in the Koran and which, as the 
Federal Court noted, is hard to square with the principle of gender 
equality. It therefore appears difficult to reconcile the wearing of an 
Islamic headscarf with the message of tolerance, respect for others 
and, above all, equality and non-discrimination that all teachers in a 
democratic society must convey to their pupils.”466
Moreover, the Court saw the bans in both cases as necessary for 
protecting the rights of others. In this case, the Court constructed a “right 
not to be affected by a religion”, which in every way resembles “a right not 
to be offended”, discussed previously in regard to blasphemy cases. 
466.  Dahlab vs. Switzerland, Application no. 42393/98, p 10.
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Although this discussion was briefly touched upon in the chapter 
concerning the French ban, let us return to the discussion taking into 
consideration the wider European impact of the cases of Dahlab and 
Sahin. Constructing the perception of the veil as a non-democratic symbol 
contradictory with principles of tolerance and respect for others pushes 
Islam as such to be seen as necessarily undemocratic and intolerant. Such a 
construction has effects exactly opposite to those promoting understanding 
between religions and the growth of religious pluralism. This problem 
was also observed by Evans467. The Courts reasoning, underlines Evans, 
is based on stereotypes of Muslim women. First is that of a victim and 
the second that of an aggressor468. Such stereotypes promote a vision of 
religion as “foreign” and as a negative social phenomenon. Propagating 
stereotypes of this kind, directed to a vulnerable group of students, about 
whose indoctrination the Court expressed such concern, nourishes rather 
religious intolerance more than multiculturalism and religious pluralism. It 
strongly concentrates on “otherness” and chooses to classify this otherness 
as undemocratic, without paying attention to differences between Muslims 
themselves and the actual possibility of choice for the women involved. 
The concerns of the Court about securing gender equality are 
understandable. Gender equality is one of the foundations of Europe 
and it is an undeniable fact that many Muslim women/girls do not wear 
the veil voluntarily. Looking at cultural traditions of various branches of 
Islam, even the existence of the religious obligation to wear the veil is 
questionable.469 However, the veil is often not only a question of religious 
choice, but also a question of identity choice. As Weldmölder observes, 
the wearing of the veil is often the free choice of a woman to underline 
her ethnic background and occasionally might be even perceived as a 
modern symbol of Muslim femininity.470 Pushing all Muslim women into 
the position of victims of gender equality violation is at least an abuse of 
facts. And since the approach to women’s rights clashing with traditionally 
467.  Evans C., 2006.
468.  Ibid., pp. 71-73.
469.  Weldmölder H., 2007, pp. 155-165.
470.  Ibid., p 159.
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Christian religious perceptions, is not even close to being so strict471, 
“othering” Muslims carries a message of Europe’s relativism in its approach 
to Islam and Christianity. It also carries a danger of perceiving a state and, 
more widely, Europe as an enemy of religious freedom, which can have 
no other consequences than the intensification of fundamentalism. This 
way, these judgements’ effect may be exactly the opposite to prevention of 
fundamentalism, what seems to have been the key concern of the judges.
Finally, from a strictly legal point of view, protecting the rights of 
others in this context lacks actual legal foundation. Similarly, like in the 
case of older blasphemy cases, it constructs “a right” that does not exist in 
the convention nor in any of the legal systems, “the right not to be affected 
by a religion”. Such artificial legal constructions impose disproportional 
exclusions of either side of the participants in the religious versus secular 
values argument. Whereas “the right not to be offended in religious 
feelings” excludes atheists or agnostics, “the right not to be offended by a 
religion” discriminates against religious individuals. I firmly disagree with 
Weldmölder, who sees the introduction of a headscarf ban as necessary for 
protecting the freedom of others and as fulfilling a democratic state’s duty of 
neutrality. As argued above, such a ban hardly carries a message of neutrality. 
Moreover, the freedom of others is constructed by Weldmölder as a kind 
of collective secular morality demanding protection from religious symbols. 
As Rawls emphasises, a liberal democratic state does not rely on a collective 
understanding of morality.472 Regardless of what kind of collective morality 
it is, secular or religious, it is not shared by all members of a democratic 
society. Moreover, basing legal argumentation on rights that do not exist 
and pose a danger of undermining legal principles such as tolerance and the 
achievement of religious pluralism is dubious. If limitations are based on 
non-existent rights, the margin of appreciation in limiting freedoms due to 
protecting the rights of others becomes unpredictable. 
To finish this brief discussion, I want to remind of a quotation from 
the latest COE approach to blasphemy and religious and non-religious 
coexistence in a religiously pluralist society: 
471.  See the previous discussion on reproductive rights.
472.  Rawls J., 2005, e.g., pp. 40-43 or 174-176 .
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“(…) in a democratic society, religious groups must tolerate, as must 
other groups, critical public statements and debate about their 
activities, teachings and beliefs(…)”.473 
A democratic society cannot construct a right to be offended by either 
religion or non-religion, but must facilitate the coexistence of both.
6.6.3. Education for peace/education for citizenship
In 2002 the Council of Europe adopted another resolution regarding 
education, a recommendation on education for democratic citizenship.474 
The recommendation advocated the adoption of education for citizenship, 
which was seen to be “a factor for social cohesion, mutual understanding, 
intercultural and inter-religious dialogue, and solidarity”. The 
recommendation and its appendix focused on both objectives of introducing 
such as subject as well as methods of its teaching. The objectives of such 
education included promoting a free, tolerant and just society and defending 
the values and principles of freedom, pluralism, human rights and the rule of 
law as foundations of democracy. In accordance with this recommendation, 
many countries have introduced subjects such as education for citizenship or 
education for democracy. At first glance, these new subjects do not have a lot 
in common with religious education and potentially should not be an area 
of conflict between a state and religious communities. On the contrary, the 
purpose of these subjects is to build religious and multi-cultural dialogue. 
The Spanish example, however, illustrates that a seemingly neutral subject 
like Education for Citizenship may be grounds for a legal dispute involving 
the right of parents to determine about the education of their children in 
conformity with their own beliefs and conscience.
Spanish Education for Citizenship was introduced by an amendment 
of the Organic Law on Education475. The amendment introduced a new 
compulsory subject for all students and imposed an obligation on private 
473.  Blasphemy, religious insults and hate speech against persons on grounds of their 
religion, Report, par. 13.
474.  Recommendation (2002) 12.
475.  Decree 1513/2006 and Decree 1631/2006.
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schools, including Catholic ones, to provide the subject in the school 
curricula. The purpose of the new subject was to teach, among other things, 
about human rights and constitutional rights as well as about principles of 
pluralism and democracy. The introduction of the law was inspired by the 
above-mentioned recommendation of the COE. Soon, however, the issue 
raised an objection by the Catholic Bishops of Spain and the Episcopal 
Conference of the Spanish Bishops issued a special Instruction476 and a 
press release477. The instruction commented on the negative influence 
of secular ideology on the Catholic population and the press release 
concentrated solely on the new subject and its moral influence on Catholic 
pupils and students. The Bishops argued that the state had no right to 
impose any particular set of morals on the students, whether secular 
or religious, and that Education for Citizenship did morally influence 
students both through its form and content. They also argued that the 
state had no right to control private schools, primarily Catholic ones, by 
imposing on them the obligation of teaching Education for Citizenship.
Ultimately, Catholic parents in a few Spanish provinces requested the 
right to exempt their children from attending the classes. The exemption 
was not granted and the case culminated in the recent judgement of the 
Spanish Supreme Court.478 In January 2009 the Court sustained the 
obligatory nature of the course without exemption. The Court declared 
that the exemption and the right to determine the moral education of 
children apply to matters of religion and morals and that Education for 
Citizenship was different in nature from religious education. The Court 
stated that, indeed, the state must remain ideologically neutral, but 
Education for Citizenship as such was not meant to teach any particular 
moral views but instead introduce a variety of views present in a pluralistic 
society and teach respect for basic rights. As long as the subject was 
taught in a morally neutral manner, without imposing any moral stance 
on the students, it was found to be in conformity with the Constitution 
476.  Plenary Assembly of the Episcopal Conference of Bishops, Pastoral Instruction, 
Madrid, 23.11.2006, Article 18.
477.  Press Release of the Episcopal Conference of Bishops, 01.03.2007.
478.  Supreme Court, Sentence on Education for Citizenship and the existence of the 
right to conscientious objection, no. 905/2008, 29.01.2009.
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and the European obligations of Spain. The Court also confirmed that 
law places an obligation on the state to control education, including 
control over the obligatory nature of education and assuring that curricula 
comply with democratic principles both in private and public education. 
Although no case on the European level has yet emerged, it is 
reasonable to expect that the ECTHR would agree with the line of 
reasoning of the Spanish Supreme Court. After all, the introduction of 
such a subject was done in accordance with the COE recommendation, 
which encouraged the promotion of democratic values through such types 
of education. The issue arising from the perspective of equality and religious 
pluralism is whether the promotion of democratic values can conflict with 
sincere religious views. As we saw, for instance, in the example of the Åke 
Green case, in regard to hate speech, it can. However, the difference lies in 
the element of coercion. While the state in the Green case attempted to 
force a person to silence or perhaps even change his beliefs, the panoramic 
education for citizenship does not attempt to force anyone into any 
thinking, but to present the variety of views of the modern society. 
The issue of balancing rights and ideological influences will be 
discussed in detail in the further theoretical chapters in part III of this 
volume dealing with understandings of European democracy. But as 
mentioned before, democracy is not an ideologically neutral conception 
and resignation from the promotion of democratic values leads to 
further political discussion on just governance models. To sum up briefly, 
the key issue in cases of conflict of democratic values and the “secular 
indoctrination” of religious citizens is a broader question. European 
democracy is nowadays not only an electoral system of governance but 
also additional principles promoting a just and pluralist society. Moreover, 
democracy is an agreed common European value, confirmed in the 
law, both on the EU and COE levels. Thus “democratic indoctrination” 
can hardly be seen as equivalent to religious indoctrination as they are 
essentially different by nature. Whereas religious indoctrination limits 
moral choices, “democratic indoctrination” promotes respect for different 
choices. And although some democratic values might not be consistent 
with some religious doctrines, it is important for both religious and non-
religious citizens to understand and accept the moral choices of others, so 
that a democratic society can function.
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Another issue is the “democratic indoctrination” imposed on 
confessional schools. Although it is always controversial to say that some 
religious principles do not comply with requirements of democracy, 
such a fact cannot be seriously denied. Religion and modern democratic 
principles do not always go hand in hand and religious teaching on, for 
example, sexual minorities can clash with modern European approaches, 
expressed, for instance, in the European Charter. Can a state require 
religious schools to teach on rights that religious communities do not 
recognise? On the one hand, a state should ensure the realization of 
democratic principles and the promotion of rights and democratic values. 
On the other hand, the right to practice and preach religion should 
also be recognised. Drawing a line here cannot be simple and depends 
on the conceptual stance on democracy. Although the promotion of 
democracy is essential for maintaining pluralism and the facilitation 
of moral choices, I believe the state should refrain from influencing 
religious organizations as such. First of all, such influence, as the Spanish 
example has shown, creates resistance and objections. Such objections 
lead to juxtaposing democracy and religion. Even though, as explained 
later in this volume, a certain degree of secularism and neutralism is 
unavoidable for the maintenance of a democratic society, multiculturalism 
should leave a certain margin of interpretation of democratic principles 
to religious communities and individuals choosing to belong to them. 
Education on rights and democratic principles is essential, but in the 
case of confessional schools, the state should allow them to interpret such 
education in line with their own moral choices and principles. 
A certain objection may arise. It may be argued that such leeway will 
increase the danger of creating religious extremism. I would, however, 
argue the contrary. In the case of confessional schools, some doctrines 
non-compliant with secular standard will be passed in any case. If the 
state takes a very strong secular stance on the issue and forces confessional 
schools to teach according to a secular standard, extreme religious 
doctrines will receive additional reinforcement. They will be taught as a 
clear opposition to the obligatory secular subject and treated as a defence 
against secularism. In this way, the purpose of introducing the secular 
subject will be brought to naught. Allowing religious communities to 
interpret these principles in according to their doctrine allows students 
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to learn in ways consistent with their consciences. After all, confessional 
schools are not the same as public secular schools. Allowing for the 
existence of confessional schools includes a certain pre-agreement of the 
state, for communicating ideologically influenced knowledge. Imposing 
an obligation to teach about secular principles, without the possibility of 
their re-interpretation, may indeed seem to be “secular indoctrination”. 
This argument could be developed further and deal with the existence 
of confessional schools as such. But I believe hardly anyone would argue 
against the establishment of such schools. Banning such schools could 
hardly be defended as democratic or supportive of religious pluralism. 
6.. Securing religious pluralism and equality in education 
– convergent standard under European law?
Although there is no strictly binding legal common standard in regard 
to religious education in Europe and models differ considerably, certain 
criteria for the convergence of the models are visible. Due to the 
complicated matrix of the rights of children, their parents and teachers, 
the issue of religious education is not purely a question of law but also 
of pedagogy and politics. Even if areas of education belong to the sole 
competence of the nation states of Europe, legal issues arising in his 
area on the European level have shaped certain standards that cannot be 
exceeded. Christoffersen sees the source of these converging standards 
primarily in the ECHR but also in other European developments.479 In 
addition to legal sources, I see the convergence criteria in recommendation 
documents and European policies that have at their core the promotion 
and facilitation of greater religious and cultural pluralism and equality. 
These documents have shaped a new multicultural and religiously plural 
standard, which is not yet legally binding, but strongly recommended. 
Some of the agreed European standards, like those concerning the veil, 
are questionable from the perspective of increased religious pluralism and 
respect for freedom of religion and freedom of expression in religious 
matters. The majority of developing approaches and convergence criteria, 
479.  Christoffersen L., 2006, pp. 21-58.
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however, lead to the facilitation of greater choice and greater respect for 
individual questions of conscience. The limits in regard to education, 
which cannot be exceeded, are those of attempting religious or ideological 
indoctrination or not securing an efficient system of exemption. Strategies 
that are advocated by the COE and in the judgments of the ECTHR 
include offering a comprehensive course on religions taught in a non-
preaching manner. 
Although no common standard exists, guidelines as to the 
recommended standards are clearer than ever before. These standards 
include the obligation of states to avoid as far as possible any form 
of ideological coercion in the field of education. Even though the 
facilitation of everyone’s choice is impossible, if the functionality of 
educational systems is to be sustained, I am convinced that the systems 
should avoid implementing measures that would amount to “othering” 
of pupils on the basis of their religious or non-religious convictions. In 
cases of unavoidable conflict of religious values with democratic rights 
and values, confessional schools should be allowed the maximum choice 
of interpretation of such a conflict in accordance with their doctrines in 
order to allow alternatives to strictly secular approaches. Although the 
promotion of democratisation is at the heart of ensuring religious and 
cultural pluralism, the democratic state cannot benefit from “secular 
indoctrination” imposed on confessional educational centres. Such an 
attempt inevitably puts religion and the state as well as democracy at 
opposite ends of the spectrum. Such a contrast is extremely dangerous for 
the development of tolerance and unnecessarily leads to the perception of 
European democracy as hostile to sincere religious beliefs. 

Part III:  
Theoretical Considerations  




7. Religion and democracy  
– a constructivist approach
.1. From problems of law and religion  
in Europe to problems of European democracy
As illustrated so far, despite the fact of sharing the same principles 
concerning religion and equality, law on the surface level differs 
significantly in European countries. Even the interpretation of what 
is and what is not considered a religion or belief480can lead to the 
marginalisation or otherisation of some individuals. Law on the surface 
level in European countries does not necessarily correspond with the 
underlying common democratic European principles. These principles 
often tend to be treated superficially or even ignored in the process of 
building democratic consensus in particular European societies481. Public 
reason is still often understood as comprising common principles of 
a culturally homogenous population. Meanwhile, as Young observes, 
differences may be as strong a deliberative resource as similarity482:
“If citizens participate in public discussion that includes all social 
perspectives in their partiality and gives them a hearing, they are most 
likely to arrive at just and wise solutions to their shared problems. 
Group difference is a necessary resource for making more just and 
480.  See the discussion in part 2.4 and 2.5.
481.  See an earlier discussion on Greek and Polish constructions of national identity 
as religious identity in the respective chapters of Part II.
482.  Young I. M., pp. 398-404.
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wise decisions by means of democratic discussion (…)”483
In order to: increase the recognition and inclusion of religious “others”; 
increase the coherence of the legal system; and minimise the disparity 
between legal principles and the application of the law on its surface 
level, democracy must be approached in a deep and substantial way. It 
cannot be understood only as a way of reaching political decisions and 
the cultivation of national traditions. In this part, I present a deliberative 
approach to democracy. I deal first with the set of principles that are 
considered democratic and analyse their importance for religious 
equality and pluralism. Finally, basing my conceptions on the classical 
liberal democratic and deliberative approach presented in Rawls’ Political 
Liberalism and A Theory of Justice, I attempt to construct a theoretical 
model of principles of justice that ought to be taken into consideration 
in a multicultural society. The aim of the model is to combine liberal and 
communitarian concerns so as to avoid the otherisation and exclusion of 
differently religious individuals and communities. It puts emphasis on 
common European principles and understands law in the European polity 
as a unity, which despite its various sources and levels ought to strive for 
coherence. The source of this coherence is sought in common democratic 
principles, which are understood as the deep structure of the law. 
.2. Democracy - secular versus post-secular approaches
In previous chapters, I have in certain parts of the discussion referred to the 
fact that democracy is not a value-free concept. As previously underlined, I 
am convinced that democracy is, on the contrary, a concept with a fixed and 
firm set of values that constantly develop and expand. Modern democratic 
requirements influence religions and religious communities and their 
position in a democratic society. In this chapter I analyse what the modern 
requirements of democracy are and how they influence religious coexistence. 
I argue that the Rawlsian model of “reasonable consensus”, with certain 
adjustments to the demands of religious communities in the post-secular 
multi-religious era, constitutes the most sustainable model of a democracy.
483.  Ibid., p 402.
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In a post-secular society, as Habermas reminds, in contrast to the 
prediction of modernism, religion and communities of faith still demand 
public influence and relevance.484 This demand clashes with the current 
vision of democracy, which is inherently a humanist secular construct. 
The demand of religious communities to exist actively in a public sphere 
meets varied responses. On the one hand, traditional religions still enjoy 
substantial freedom to exist in a public sphere in certain countries. 
The examples used in this volume as well as many others illustrate this 
tendency. Greek blasphemy laws, limitations on women’s reproductive 
rights or the endorsement of natural law in the Maltese constitution can 
be highlighted here. Other religions, on the other hand, meet difficulties 
in gaining social and legal acceptance. Islam is defended against by 
invoking secular arguments. New religious movements, on the other hand, 
meet difficulties in seeking registration and recognition as religions. 
But not only approaches to various religious traditions differ. Also the 
religious communities themselves differ in their demand to be present 
in the public sphere. Some of them demand a large influence in public 
matters. The Catholic Church, for instance, sees its role as a moral 
guide for society. Islam consists of both moral and legal systems that are 
intertwined and difficult to divide. Some others, like various new religious 
movements, see religion and its practice as an individual issue.485 
Religious groups that demand a large influence in the public sphere 
often accuse democracy of imposing a secular set of values and ignoring 
religious values in public life. The Spanish veto of the Catholic Church 
against the introduction of Education for Citizenship serves as a good 
example. In a democracy, religious groups see their set of morals as one 
of many competing moral models, which could be equally useful for the 
existence of a democratic state. In this chapter I will argue why not all the 
moral models are equally helpful and why neutralism and a certain margin 
of secularism are necessary for the existence of a democracy. At the same 
time, I will argue why a strict separation between religion and public life, 
which pushes religion completely out of common social life, is no longer 
sustainable as a democratic model in a multicultural society. I will analyse 
484.  Habermas, J., 2008, pp. 17-29.
485.  Ibid.
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if the democratic model based on Rawlsian postulates could be readjusted 
to the demands of religious communities and what benefits and dangers 
such a readjustment may bring. I will use primarily references to the 
theorists of modern liberal democracy – Rawls, Dworkin and Habermas.
.3. Democracy as a moral conception and a set of values
In this volume I argue that democracy is not value-free but in fact is a 
fixed conception based on certain assumptions, which are necessary for its 
existence.
Dworkin bases the ideal of democracy on the possibility to vote and 
have an equal share in the choice of political representation. He traces 
all other features of democracy to the equality of the vote. Free speech 
or basic liberties are all a result of the equal opportunity to vote. And 
that equality of vote rights is according to Dworkin a sufficient reason 
to demand equality for various conceptions of life. Dworkin argues that 
the majority who believe in a single best way of life do not have the right 
to impose these conceptions on others because of the equality of their 
vote.486 Like Dworkin, I argue that the moral majority is not in a position 
to impose their preferred way of life on others. But, unlike Dworkin, I 
see the justification of this assumption not only in the equality of the 
political vote itself. I am deeply convinced that the “democracy” born in 
ancient Greece, would not be considered a democracy today. It would be 
rather seen as an oligarchy of men, who if they were born in a particular 
privileged class called “citizens” could decide by voting on the matters of 
the entire Athenian society. The possibility of voting and participation in 
the political decision-making is undoubtedly still today an essential and 
underpinning feature of a democracy. But the possibility of voting in itself 
no longer guarantees the democratic nature of a state. A state in which 
the election procedure functions but some citizens are deprived of rights 
would not be considered a democracy today. Rawls calls this distinction 
a procedural versus constitutional democracy.487 I believe that in light of 
486.  See e.g.: Dworkin R., 2002, pp. 184-210 .
487.  Rawls J., 2001, pp. 145-148.
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international and constitutional obligations, any other “democracy” than a 
constitutional one would be deemed undemocratic today.
I argue that there are three essential conditions, in addition to the 
functioning of an impartial electoral procedure, which are necessary 
for the existence of a democratic state. First of all, a democratic state is 
nowadays based on certain fundamental principles or, if preferred, values, 
which I briefly analyse below. Secondly, a democratic state today has an 
obligation to secure the rights of its citizens. And thirdly, a democratic 
state is bound by its international obligations, which it should respect. 
The lack of any of these three conditions or the lack of the possibility 
of voting negates the democratic nature of a state in its modern 
understanding. These three conditions are intertwined and reciprocally 
influence each other. International agreements play an extensive role in 
the understanding and development of human rights. Human rights 
influence our understanding of democratic principles. Democratic 
principles, in turn, influence both the development of international law 
and our understanding of particular rights. This reciprocal influence of 
democratic conditions is illustrated in a figure below.












These underlying democratic foundations are not value-free. For 
instance, the principles of equality, pluralism and non-discrimination 
in fact constitute a certain set of moral values. They include a particular 
vision of the society which could be seen as a particular moral vision. But 
in contrast to other moral visions, these principles allow various moral 
systems to coexist within this system to the greatest extent in a modern 
pluralistic and multicultural society. The principles on which a democracy 
is based are not merely secular moral concepts, as religious communities 
may choose to see them. They are the essential requirements; it could be 
said practical requirements, that allow for a plurality of moral concepts 
within. They allow for a plurality, without which a democracy cannot 
function these days. And if a state chooses to be based on different 
moral foundations, based on any particular religious view of life, it may 
be difficult or impossible to secure the equal respect of every citizen’s 
way of life. Other moral worldviews than those which are based on 
the presumption of equality of all moral conceptions could and in all 
likelihood would influence the core of the beliefs of citizens in a way 
impossible to accept in a religiously plural society.
.4. Legal principles as fundamentals of liberal democracy
I approach democracy as a political and legal construct. As mentioned 
above, I argue that a democratic state nowadays is based on a set of 
principles. The set of principles may vary and be broader or narrower. In 
a welfare state, social welfare and equality of the distribution of goods 
is a leading principle to achieve, but in another democratic state, social 
welfare may not be of equal importance. International law, as mentioned 
above, has influenced understandings of common democratic values and 
principles. These principles include primarily equality, non-discrimination 
and the rule-of law.488 Smaller regional international law systems, like 
those specific to Europe, have developed a more complex common set of 
democratic principles. These principles have evolved over time and some 
of them that were not considered necessary for a democratic state until 
488.  See discussion below.
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recently are considered to be such nowadays. Some principles have been 
derived from others. Just like the pre-conditions of democracy influence 
one another, so do the principles as show in the figure below.
For the purpose of this dissertation, I deal in this chapter with the 
values that are considered to form a democratic credo in Europe. In 
addition to the previously mentioned equality, non-discrimination and 
rule-of law, the European democratic core includes pluralism, tolerance, 
broadmindedness and solidarity. These principles are either explicitly 
included in European-wide legal obligations, including human 
rights and EU treaties, or then have been developed in the process of 
interpretation carried out either by courts on the European level or by 
other European institutions. The Treaty on the European Union in its 
current shape provides that the Union is based on liberty, democracy, 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of 
Equality
Rule of LawFreedom
Other principles: e.g. tolerance, broad mindedness.
Figure 4: Correlation of democratic principles.
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law.489 The Lisbon Treaty extends these principles and in addition to 
the currently included fundamental principles, declares that the Union 
is based on principles of equality. In addition, the Treaty assumes that 
pluralism, non-discrimination, justice, solidarity and the equality of 
men and women are common principles for European democracies.490 
The Statutes of the Council of Europe provides that the founding 
principles of the Council are the rule of law and the enjoyment by 
all persons of human rights and fundamental freedoms.491 These 
European principles are comparable to what Dworkin includes in 
the catalogue of liberal principles.492 European democracy can thus 
be characterised as a liberal democracy. Below I analyse briefly each 
of the principles and explain their importance and origin. I start with 
analysing the equality principle as the most important and explain its 
relevance for every subsequently analysed principle.
.4.1. The principle of equality as the fundamental democratic  
principle and the source of other principles
Let us first deal with the principle of equality of individual members of 
democratic societies. I believe this principle is the fundamental principle 
in a liberal democracy. Liberal democracy focuses on an individual 
and his or her rights. Such a focus leads to the principle of equality. If 
all individuals are in focus as individuals it is impossible to treat them 
differently due to their characteristics. If the political goal is to assure the 
rights of everyone, liberal democracy must approach all individuals as 
equals. Dworkin traces the principle of equality back to the equal right to 
vote and explains the whole functioning of democracy as the consequence 
of the equality of voting rights. Certainly, the origin of the principle 
of equality can be traced back to the equality of the vote. Nowadays, 
however, the principle of equality is not only a simple corollary of the 
489.  Treaty on the European Union, Article 2.
490.  Treaty of Lisbon, Article 2.
491.  Statutes of the Council of Europe, ETS no. 001, London, 05.05.1949, article 3.
492.  Dworkin R, 2002, pp. 181-204.
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right to vote. Its understanding has evolved and broadened. In Europe 
the understanding of the principle of equality has attained characteristic 
qualities that have been systematically expanded in the process of 
European integration and judicial proceedings before European courts.
According to Dworkin, the principle of equality is more important 
than the absolute right to liberty.493 Liberties are a consequence of 
equality. Indeed, without the principle of the equality of each member of 
a democratic society, the realization of other principles or rights would 
not be possible. If members of a society were not assumed to be equal, 
it would change the scope of rights including the basic democratic right 
to vote. The legal and political construction of a state would be based 
on premises other than democratic. The classic example of Athenian 
democracy shows how a lack of equality affected the right to vote. Only 
those who enjoyed the status of citizens were included in the decision-
making processes. But we need not go as far back as ancient Greece. Still 
a hundred years ago women were not allowed to vote in the majority of 
European countries, with the notable exception of Finland494. When the 
principle of equality is removed or circumscribed, even the democracy’s 
leading feature, political participation, is affected.
The assumption of equality is necessary for the existence of a 
democratic state. The understanding of equality may, however, differ. 
We can distinguish many kinds of equality. Dworkin, for instance, in 
Sovereign virtue: the theory and practice of equality distinguishes equality of 
resources, equality of welfare and political equality.495 Habermas, on the 
other hand, explains equality from the perspective of distributive justice 
and equal inclusion. He argues that the principle of equal treatment 
from the perspective of distributive justice requires that all citizens have 
equal opportunities to make use of formally equal rights and liberties in 
realising their individual life plans. From the perspective of inclusion, the 
principle of equality requires the promotion of sensitivity to the claims of 
groups suffering discrimination.496
493.  Dworkin R, 1978, pp. 240-258 .
494.  See: Markkola P, Nevala-Nurmi S-L., Sulkunen I., 2009.
495.  Dworkin R., 2002, pp. 11-211.
496.  Habermas J., 2008a, p 266-267.
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Rawls defines equality by using a negative definition, which explains 
what inequality means. In Rawls’ A Theory of Justice, inequality is a state 
of affairs in which one class of persons has greater liberty than another 
or liberty is less extensive than it should be.497 Equality is thus not simply 
an equal distribution of power over political decisions. Equality means 
equal respect for fundamental differences, such as race, sex, religion or 
ethnic background. Nowadays in Europe, this also means equal respect 
for a person’s sexual orientation.498 Equality means that these differences 
cannot justify different discriminatory treatment and different access to 
rights.
Absolute equality is utopian. For the purpose of the achievement 
of other principles, however, the principle of equality has the greatest 
importance. Equality, meaning more than just simple equality of political 
participation, is essential for the achievement of other democratic 
principles. This volume to a large extent approaches equality from 
the Habermasian perspective of inclusion and draws on the Rawlsian 
explanation of inequality as best corresponding to “otherisation”.
.4.2. The principle of freedom
The principle of individual freedom is another fundamental principle on 
which the modern understanding of democracy is built. It can be also 
named liberty. Liberal democracy recognises the personal liberty of each 
person, which the state as far as possible should respect. The rights of an 
individual embody the principle of liberty. Liberal democracy guarantees 
its citizens certain uninfringeable area of personal freedom, which can be 
limited only for a just purpose of protecting the liberty of others. 
The relation of the principle of equality and the principle of freedom 
determines the nature of democracy. Dworkin in Taking Rights Seriously 
analysed the relation between these two principles. In Dworkin’s analysis 
the principle of equality appears to be superior to the principle of liberty 
as he calls it. He ascertains that a government that respects the principle 
of equality can restrain liberty only with very limited types of justification. 
497.  Rawls J., 1971, pp. 203-204.
498.  See: European Charter, Employment Equality Directive.
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These types of justification can be mainly based on the protection of the 
liberty of others.499 This view expresses the idea of balancing different 
rights. In Europe and the ECHR system, the idea of balancing different 
rights is essential. No freedom is absolute. The principle of equality may 
require limiting a person’s freedom in order to protect the freedom of 
another. Therefore, I agree with Dworkin, that the principle of freedom 
(or liberty) is not absolute. “There is no such thing as any general right 
to liberty” reminds Dworkin.500 There are only particular liberties and the 
principle of maximal respect for these liberties. In a liberal democratic 
society, the principle of equality ultimately shapes the extent of personal 
freedom.
Habermas approached freedom as a natural condition manifesting 
in free will and accessible by self-experience. One’s inner nature enables 
the conditions of freedom through somatic impulses, strivings, moods 
and free will.501 Rawls, in his conception of justice, sees citizens as free 
primarily in the aspect of moral choices. This conception is important 
for this volume as it touches directly on the topic of religious freedom. 
The Rawlsian conception of free citizens implies that citizens are free 
if they conceive of themselves and of others as having the moral power 
to have their own conception of the good and the ability to pursue this 
conception or change it.502 
The principle of freedom requires that each individual’s freedom of 
fundamental life choices be guaranteed. In the situation of conflicting 
freedoms, the principle of equality is ultimately the decisive factor 
defining the borderlines of particular freedoms. 
.4.3. The principle of the rule of law as the guarantee of stable democracy
The principle of the rule of law is strictly linked with the idea of securing 
equality and rights. It protects individuals from the arbitrariness of the 
authorities and secures the proper and balanced functioning of the entire 
499.  Dworkin R., 1978.
500.  Dworkin R., 1978, p 277.
501.  Habermas J., 2008a, pp. 191-200.
502.  Rawls J., 2001, pp. 21-23.
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legal system. It ensures that the will of majority will not be introduced 
into the system outside of legal procedures.
As Rawls reminds, a tyrant may change laws without notice, but they 
would not be laws, since they would not provide the basis for legitimate 
expectations. The rule of law allows citizens to expect how law is created 
and what law is.503 Rawls in A Theory of Justice504 observes that the rule of 
law implies a few precepts. First of all, he argues that the system of rules 
organises the conduct of members of the society and that such rules must 
not impose a duty to do what cannot be done. In other words, it includes 
limits to arbitrariness. Secondly, it includes a duty to enact and execute 
laws in good faith. Authorities chosen by a majority cannot enact laws 
with the intention of securing solely their own interest. Rawls argues that 
laws and commands are accepted as laws and commands only if they are 
believed to be possible to be obeyed and executed. The rule of law thus 
affects the social acceptability of the law. 
Habermas argues that modern coercive law must be generated in 
accordance with legitimacy guaranteeing procedure. The procedure of 
law-making must be legally institutionalised and take into consideration 
the principle of equal inclusion of all members of the political community. 
At the same time, Habermas reminds that only a rule of law without 
other conditions of democracy is not sufficient.505 
All in all, the rule of law serves the purpose of securing the social 
coexistence of the members of the society. In a modern democracy, the 
expectation of respecting the rule of law is not only a construct of legal 
theory or interpretation. It is also legally sanctioned in various documents 
of a constitutional nature. It implies respect for fundamental democratic 
principles. In a liberal constitutional democracy it is a safeguard 
guaranteeing that fundamental principles including equality and the 
freedom of an individual cannot be replaced by other principles by the 
sole will of the majority.
503.  Rawls J., 1971, pp. 235-243.
504.  Ibid.
505.  Habermas J., 2001, pp. 766-81.
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.4.4. Other principles as the necessary corollary of equality,  
freedom and the rule of law
Equality, freedom and the rule of law are the foundations on which other 
democratic principles have been developed. I concentrate here on those 
principles which the Lisbon Treaty lists as common European principles: 
non-discrimination, pluralism, toleration, broadmindedness and solidarity. 
The principle of non-discrimination is a safeguard of the principle 
of equality. Differences in treatment do occur and absolute equality is 
utopian. The fact is that human beings are not born equal with natural 
capacities nor do they enter society with equal economic resources. 
The principle of non-discrimination helps to prevent marginalisation 
and further disadvantaging in the enjoyment of freedom of individuals 
burdened by unprivileged social conditions. The principle of non-
discrimination establishes whether differences in treatment are 
proportional and necessary in a democratic society. In the ECHR system 
the non-discrimination principle is assessed by examining whether 
the limitations of equality are well-balanced, based on just purpose 
and proportional to the aim. And even then, the principle of equality 
will ultimately require evaluation whether the difference in treatment 
is necessary in a democratic society. Discrimination is a state of affairs 
where a group of persons does not receive the same treatment as other 
groups due to some inherent characteristics they possess. The ECTHR 
has summarised in its case law that:
“For the purposes of Article 14 of the Convention, a difference of 
treatment is discriminatory if it “has no objective and reasonable 
justification”, that is, if it does not pursue a “legitimate aim” or if there 
is not a “reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means 
employed and the aim sought to be realised”.506
The principles of tolerance and broadmindedness are also based on 
both the principle of equality and the principle of freedom. Tolerance, 
in a Habermasian understanding, is an agreement of citizens to draw 
506.  See e.g. Mazurek vs. France, Application no. 34406/97, par. 48.
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boundaries that compel the parties involved to adopt each other’s 
perspectives and give them equal consideration.507 In this understanding 
tolerance is similar to what Rawls calls “the duty of civility”. The duty 
of civility is a form of strengthening the agreed political construction of 
justice, liberal democracy. It implies the acknowledgment by citizens that 
they do not expect others to share their own religious or moral doctrines. 
Instead the citizens in their “duty of civility” should attempt to seek 
how to endorse the political conception of justice from the perspective 
of an individual’s doctrines.508 The Rawlsian “duty of civility” appears 
to be highly idealistic especially in regard to religious doctrines. The 
Habermasian assumption that we should respect fellow citizens even if we 
regard their beliefs as false or their way of life as bad is similarly idealistic. 
It is in practice nearly impossible to expect that every citizen be tolerant 
and broadminded. Especially when religious and moral conceptions are 
at stake, citizens often have difficulties with acknowledging other ways 
of life as equally worth protection. It is, however, the task of the state 
to discourage intolerance and prejudice. The state also has a duty to be 
tolerant and broadminded in framing its policies and laws and in the 
judicial procedures of applying these laws. This duty includes prevention 
of prejudice and intolerance. 
In European conditions, principles of toleration and broadmindedness 
have been derived from other principles primarily in the jurisprudence of 
the ECTHR. The ECTHR has on many occasions repeated, especially in 
regard to freedom of expression, that it 
“is applicable not only to “information” or “ideas” that are favourably 
received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but 
also to those that offend, shock or disturb the State or any section of 
the population. Such are the demands of that pluralism, tolerance and 
broadmindedness without which there is no “democratic society”.509 
507.  Habermas J., 2008a, p 254.
508.  Rawls J., 2005, p 465.
509.  Vereinigung Bildender Künstler vs. Austria, Application no. 68354/01, par. 26.
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The same principles have been reaffirmed in recommendations issued by 
the COE that have been analysed in this volume, for instance regarding 
blasphemy laws. These principles strengthen the principle of equality and 
non-discrimination. Equal respect for other ways of life, other religious 
views and any otherness requires broadmindedness and tolerance. 
Although these principles might be interpreted differently by different 
people, their importance in the interpretation of rights and democratic 
boundaries in Europe has increased, as can be seen in the COE 
recommendation. 
The principle of pluralism has only recently acquired increased 
importance in Europe. From the principles of equality, non-
discrimination, tolerance and broadmindedness, it is only natural to 
deduce the principle of pluralism. If all people are equal and tolerant it 
is natural to assume that the society will differ in its choices, including 
religious choices. The principle of equality allows the differences to be 
equally appreciated and accepted. In regard to religion, the principle of 
pluralism has not been obvious in Europe until lately. Historically, the 
countries of Europe have been based on particular religious traditions. The 
populations have been religiously homogeneous or at best have tolerated 
a few religions different than the dominant ones. Although freedom of 
conscience was professed as a principle, religious pluralism was not until 
recently an obvious fact in every country. In some countries like Greece, 
Malta, Poland or the Scandinavian countries, the population is still 
relatively homogenous. Like shown on the analysed examples in part II 
of this dissertation such a situation leads to various problems concerning 
the application of the principle of pluralism. Migration and the 
exchange of cultures, however, started to affect even those comparatively 
homogenous societies. Multiculturalism drew attention to the necessity 
of strengthening commitment to pluralism as a principle. This tendency 
is visible in the analysed recommendations and other interpretative 
documents. Pluralism, both religious and other, must be respected if the 
democratic model is based on the principle of equality.
Finally, the Lisbon Treaty mentions the principle of solidarity. The 
principle of solidarity may be, in addition to tolerance, understood as a 
dimension of the Rawlsian “duty of civility”. In this case, solidarity would 
mean support for the common principles of justice regardless of one’s 
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own doctrinal and moral conceptions. For the purpose of maintaining 
democracy as a political and legal construct, solidarity as “the duty of 
civility” is particularly important. Solidarity, like tolerance, strengthens 
the democratic foundations of the society. Citizens’ commitment to 
fundamental principles is as important as the commitment of the state as 
an institution. 
But solidarity may also include a collective aspect. Solidarity as a 
principle can refer to the maintenance and empowerment of cultural 
groups. It may mean solidarity in preserving the group identity of a 
particular social group. In this understanding, solidarity would be a 
corollary of cultural rights.510 From the perspective of an individual, 
group solidarity is a more natural form of solidarity than the general 
solidarity of the whole society for the purpose of advancing political 
goals. Individuals having different conceptions of life will more naturally 
solidarise with other individuals sharing similar moral conceptions, 
rather than with those whose ways of life differ considerably. Similar to 
tolerance, the assumption of all citizens’ readiness to support the chosen 
political construction is very idealistic. For this reason, the principle 
of solidarity opens the door to varied interpretations. In conjunction 
with the principle of equality, it may give rise to increased demand for 
acceptance of and respect for cultural and religious group rights.
.5. The role of rights in democracy
Rights are a concretisation of the principle of freedom. The principle of 
freedom is moulded into various rights and freedoms of an individual. 
A modern constitutional democracy does not exist without the concept 
of rights. The rights stem from equality and vice versa. The principle of 
equality and the ideal of rights are indivisible. In Europe, human rights 
stem from the national constitutions and the European Convention on 
Human Rights. Moreover, if the process of ratification of the Lisbon 
Treaty succeeds, the European Charter of Rights will become a part of 
the Treaties and the EU will become a party to the Convention. The 
510.  Habermas J., 2008a, p 297.
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human rights documents have undoubtedly shaped both the ideal of 
rights and the understanding of the democratic principles that were 
described above. The states can include a broader scope of rights than 
those secured by the international agreements. The scope of secured rights 
must not be, though, narrower than the catalogue of rights guaranteed in 
the international obligations ratified by states.
The process of understanding these boundaries of rights in Europe is 
nowadays influenced by the process of integration and the development 
of understanding of democratic principles. The principles play a greater 
and greater role in judicial procedures concerning rights, their conflicts 
and their boundaries. The role of rights is to protect the individual from 
the state’s arbitrariness as well as the majority’s arbitrariness. In Rawlsian 
theory, the rights, or as he calls them ‘basic liberties’ are the first and 
primary condition of justice:
“Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic 
liberty comparable with similar liberties for others.”511
For Rawls, a just and democratic society does not exist without citizens 
having basic equal rights. Those rights, according to him, should include 
at least: the right to vote, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, liberty 
of conscience and thought, freedom from arbitrary arrest and the right to 
hold personal property.512
For Dworkin, on the other hand, the rights are a consequence of a 
chosen political theory and are necessary for advancing the goals of 
that theory. The goals might be different, like the achievement of social 
welfare, for instance. Failure to protect the rights is unjustified within the 
selected political and legal theory. The goals and their importance may 
be gradual. Thus some rights may serve the purpose of achieving a goal 
that serves a more fundamental goal.513 In the context of democracy, 
chosen as a political model, the achievement of democratic principles can 
be seen as the goal for which the existence of rights is necessary. And 
511.  Rawls J., 1971, pp. 60-65.
512.  Ibid., p 61.
513.  Dworkin R., 1978, pp. 169-171.
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in the hierarchy of democratic principles, as argued above, the principle 
of equality appears to be the most fundamental. In European democracy, 
as analysed above, also other principles, such as pluralism, tolerance 
and broadmindedness, could be treated as goals. In this dissertation the 
leading goal that was used as the prism for the analysis was achieving 
religious pluralism. I agree with Dworkin, that rights are a consequence 
of a chosen political theory. In Europe this theory is liberal democratic 
theory. And thus the rights and their boundaries should be shaped and 
interpreted in accordance with the underlying principles of the theory. 
The question of the post-secular and multicultural era, however, is how 
far the exception from the universality of rights may be granted? Can 
a religious community appeal to the principle of equality in selecting 
the catalogue of rights important for it? Or can members of a religious 
community give up their rights in the process of pursuing their religious 
goals? I return to this problem at the end of this chapter.
The borderlines of rights end where the rights of others begin. It is 
often impossible to foresee how a particular collision of rights will be 
solved. In the case of rights connected with religion, multiple conflicts 
may occur. They may be conflicts between freedom of religion and 
freedom of expression, or between the right to privacy and the freedom 
to convert as an aspect of religious worship. Therefore, I underline again 
that the principles as forming the primary foundation of democracy 
must be treated as guidelines in every singular case of the rights clash. If 
rights are separated from principles, their boundaries become impossible 
to determine and might bring contradicting solutions in similar cases. 
Therefore, throughout this volume I have repeatedly referred 
to democratic principles. I ascertain that invoking solely rights in a 
discussion on religious issues is fruitless. The boundaries of rights can 
be shaped freely if they are not interpreted according to a currently 
recognised set of principles. The principle of equality, and in the case of
Europe, the principle of religious pluralism growing in importance 
should be taken into consideration both in the creation and in the 
application of law. 
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.6. The role of international obligations in a democracy
International obligations are in large degree a leading force shaping 
the understanding of the principles considered nowadays as universally 
democratic. The UN Charter of Human Rights has in particular 
developed and strengthened the idea of protecting of an individual from 
the state’s arbitrariness and “promoting and encouraging respect for 
human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction 
as to race, sex, language, or religion”.514 The Charter has entrenched the 
principles of equality and non-discrimination. Habermas refers to this 
role of international law as constitutionalisation515. Due to the growing 
role of international law, Habermas observes that the understanding of 
the role of a nation state must be adjusted and the concept of national 
sovereignty must be adapted to governance beyond the nation state.516 
In Europe, the European Union and the Council of Europe as the 
centres of European integration are based on international treaties. Even 
though the European Union is these days to a large degree a legal system 
of its own in certain respects similar to national legal systems, the origins 
of this legal system lie in international obligations. Although Europe 
is currently going through the processes of new adjustment of the role 
of a nation state the processes of integration were initiated through 
international law. 
Being bound by international obligations, expressed in the maxim pacta 
sund servanda, is a part of the rule of law in a broader international context. 
A democratic state cannot choose to quit being bound by its international 
obligations and then choose freely to be bound again at any convenient 
point in time. A breach of obligations is sanctioned by various procedures 
before international courts. Leaving international organizations where 
the treaties are drafted and ratified, solely to avoid being bound by certain 
obligations, will affect the international position of the state. In Europe 
such a case occurred in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Greece, after 
the military junta’s takeover, was accused by the European Commission 
514.  Charter of the United Nations, Article 1.3.
515.  Habermas J., 2008a, p 318.
516.  Ibid., p 319.
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of Human Rights of breaking most of the obligations stemming from 
the Convention on Human Rights. Disrespect for these international 
obligations was sanctioned with a suspension of the rights of Greece as a 
member of the Council of Europe. In order to avoid suspension, Greece 
left the organization in 1969. That move was not considered democratic 
and Greece under the Regime of the Colonels, due to rights violations 
and international law violations, was not considered a democracy.517 The 
readmission of Greece into the Council was considered in 1974.518 The key 
consideration confirming the democratic nature of the Greek state and its 
readiness for readmission was compliance with Article 3 of the Statutes of 
the Council of Europe. Article 3, in addition to the obligation to secure 
the rights of citizens, requires acceptance of the principle of the rule of 
law and the obligation to cooperate sincerely for the realisation of the aims 
of the organization. International cooperation and respecting international 
obligations are among the foundations of democracy. Habermas sees 
this obligation of a liberal democratic state as a part of fulfilling a “social 
contract” lying at the foundations of a democratic polity.519
.6.1. Rawlsian reasonable consensus as a model for religious peace
As explained above, I assume that democracy is a political construct 
based on democratic principles, the idea of rights and compliance with 
international law. This understanding resembles and in large degree 
is based on John Rawls’ idea of justice as a political construct. Due to 
this similarity, I naturally agree with the Rawlsian model of religious 
coexistence based on the idea of reasonable consensus. However, I believe 
that in a multicultural and religiously plural democracy, a certain margin 
of exception should be considered in regard to religious communities. 
In his A Theory of Justice, Political Liberalism and The Idea of Public 
Reason Revisited, John Rawls deals primarily with the problem how a 
democratic conception of a state can be reconciled with what he calls 
“comprehensive religious, political and philosophical doctrines”. He 
517.  Hammarberg Th, Viewpoint, 2007.
518.  The Council of Europe, Memorandum Strasbourg 1974.
519.  Habermas J., 2008a, p 320.
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attempts to establish how it is possible that citizens who share different 
sincere beliefs based on their religious, political or philosophical doctrines 
can create a society which can agree to be bound by common rules of 
political life. He touches upon problems that have been present for a 
long time in American jurisprudence and which have been troubling the 
European scene for a relatively recent period of time in comparison to its 
trans-Atlantic democratic counterpart.
This difference is a result of the historical dissimilarity in the 
development of religious regimes on these two continents. While 
America developed a concept of separation of church and state, 
which Rawls refers to as a conception essential for the development of 
democracy520, Europe still today is divided by different religious traditions 
linked to the national and historical sentiments of particular European 
countries. While America has attempted to cultivate and adjust to the 
practical requirements of the separation, Europe still today has countries 
the constitutions of which recognise a moral power of a particular church 
to give binding guidelines on moral rights and wrongs521.
I believe that John Rawls’ conception of political liberalism 
characterised by the central role of justice as fairness and citizens as free 
and equal is the only model offering a workable solution for the current 
understanding of European democracy. It offers a practical approach to 
religious problems of the new Europe in the era of integration, increased 
migration and growing multiculturalism. I also argue, however, that this 
model requires a certain careful readjustment to the demands of religious 
communities in the religiously plural era. Although Rawls himself did 
not mean his conception to be an actual response to real constitutional 
problems, but rather a guiding framework for reflection for jurists and 
citizens, I nevertheless attempt to show why this conception is in fact 
a conception that can be workable in practice and should be taken into 
consideration in the process of solving the difficult questions stemming 
from religious problems of Europe.
520.  Rawls refers to A. de Tocqueville’s ideas concerning the role of this separation. 
See more: The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, Rawls J., 2001.
521.  See further details concerning the Maltese constitutional position of Catholicism 
in the remainder of this volume.
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I do not attempt to propose a legal clone of the American system. 
Rawls’ conception of liberalism, although referring to the American 
system, was not meant to be an illustration of that particular democracy, 
but a conception of a democracy. Rawls’ democracy is an ideal construct 
not referring to any system in particular. In the parts where it refers to 
the American system, it does so solely to illustrate the role of particular 
democratic institutions used in building the ideal democratic conception.
.6.2. The concept of citizens as free and equal
Rawls takes as the underpinning for his theory a model of a society which 
is characterised by diversity and pluralism. He calls such diversity “a 
permanent feature of the public culture of democracy”522. This pluralism 
and diversity apply to what he calls comprehensive religious doctrines 
and, in connection to them, to individuals’ conceptions of the good. Rawls 
ascertains that all citizens, or let us call them members of a society, can 
be characterised by certain common features. These features include, first 
of all, regarding themselves as self-authenticated sources of valid claims 
concerning life. Secondly, and connected with those claims, is that they 
have their own conception of the good. And, finally, the last feature is 
the capability of taking responsibility for their life goals that might be 
and often are connected with these conceptions and claims. As a natural 
consequence of this diversity and everybody’s conviction of the validity of 
their own claims, the society members’ conceptions collide and clash with 
one another.
Rawls’ model treats all the members of the society and all their 
conceptions of the good, comprehensive doctrines and other features as 
equal. In all the above-mentioned features, citizens must be treated as 
equals and the development of the entire theory of political liberalism 
is meant to sustain this conception of equality as the ideal to achieve 
and maintain. Concepts such as liberty or equality are, in A Theory of 
Justice and Political Liberalism, considered as inherent to the conception 
of a democracy and inseparable from it. Citizens cannot be treated as 
unequal due to their particular reasonable comprehensive doctrine. 
522.  Rawls J., 2005, p 36.
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The equality of all members of society is the underpinning of all 
democratic liberal ideas and the foundation of the systems of rights. 
This conception of equality was taken as the underpinning for the 
analysis conducted in this volume. Also as argued above, the principle 
of equality is treated as the fundamental principle of democracy and 
the source of other principles in the democratic model presented here. 
The principle of equality is also the leading principle of European 
documents concentrating on the meaning of democracy. For that 
reason, Rawlsian assumptions are essential for the solution of European 
problems connected with religions. 
However, as illustrated in previous chapters, European states and 
societies often offer preferential treatment to traditional or well-
recognised religions. In Rawlsian theory, if a political society is 
understood as a community united in affirming one and the same 
comprehensive doctrine, then such a regime ceases to be democratic. 
In order to sustain such a regime, a state must use oppressive power 
to sustain the political community. Criminal law provisions banning 
offending God, like those in Greece, or the criminal ban on abortion, like 
in Malta or Ireland, can be pointed out as examples of such oppressive 
power. Finally, there are states, like Austria, that have very strict laws on 
the registration of religious communities. Such laws differentiate between 
legitimate religions and religious “others”. Can a state recognising only 
certain comprehensive doctrines as legitimate be considered democratic 
or not? Rawls ascertains that the government cannot act to maximise the 
fulfilment of citizens’ religion or religious doctrines, since none such view 
is affirmed by citizens generally. Such a pursuit gives a society a sectarian, 
not democratic character. The recognition of all religious conceptions as 
equal is essential for a democratic state in an era of multiculturalism and 
growing religious pluralism.
.6.3. The citizens and doctrines as reasonable and rational
Other requirements necessary for maintaining the liberal democratic 
model concern doctrines and the citizens themselves. In Rawsian 
theory, these necessary characteristics are reasonableness and rationality. 
Reasonableness and rationality are understood differently in the Rawlsian 
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model and these features apply both to citizens as well as religious, 
political and philosophical doctrines. 
Reasonable persons are those who are ready to propose principles 
and standards as fair terms of cooperation and abide by them willingly if 
others do the same. Thus the reasonable is a social element which requires 
reciprocity. Unreasonableness, on the other hand, is characterised by an 
unwillingness to honour or propose any general terms of cooperation. 
Meanwhile, the rational applies to an individual’s choices in achieving 
his/her own aims and the ability to rationalise, balance and prioritise 
those choices into a coherent scheme. However, the rational should 
not be only self-centred but should also include the goals and aims of 
an individual, which are meant to improve and change the individual’s 
community, environment etc. In justice as fairness, the reasonable and the 
rational are seen as complementary. The reasonable refers to the public, 
while the rational rather to the private. 
In Rawls’ theory the reasonable and the rational refer not only to 
persons but to the doctrines themselves, too. In defining what reasonable 
doctrines are, Rawls remains cautious in order to avoid arbitrariness. He 
points to certain essential features of doctrines in general. They cover 
major religious, philosophical, and moral aspects of human life in a more 
or less consistent manner and they organise and characterise recognised 
values so that they can be compatible with one another and express an 
intelligible view of the world. Finally, what is essential for doctrines is 
that they do not remain unchanged over time but evolve slowly in light 
of what, according to the doctrine, can be seen as good and sufficient 
reasons. These criteria are comparable with criteria presented in various 
general definitions of religions and beliefs, for example those provided in 
the studies conducted by Tillich523 or Smart524.
The essence of a doctrine’s reasonableness is connected with certain 
democratic characteristics of the entire society. Reasonable doctrines, in 
Rawlsian theory, recognise that they are one of many reasonable doctrines 
that reasonable citizens might affirm. Reasonable doctrines recognise that 
their claims may be of no meaning or value to other reasonable citizens 
523.  Tillich P, 1973.
524.  Smart N., 1979.
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adhering to other reasonable doctrines. Thus what determines a doctrine’s 
reasonableness is the recognition that even in a situation of having 
political power, the persons adhering to the doctrine will not attempt 
to prevent the rest of the citizens from affirming their own reasonable 
views. If a doctrine attempts to do that, it is understood by Rawls as 
unreasonable:
“When there is a plurality of reasonable doctrines it is unreasonable 
or worse to want to use the sanctions of state power to correct, or to 
punish those who disagree with us.”525
Such self-limitation of the doctrines makes room for reasonable pluralism. 
Reasonable pluralism, according to Rawls, differs from ordinary pluralism 
in such a way that in ordinary pluralism comprehensive doctrines would 
suppress, if they could, the liberty of thought of others. In reasonable 
pluralism they understand other views even if they do not believe in 
them.
This aspect of the Rawlsian model puts the burden of sustaining 
pluralism on citizens and doctrines themselves. In this respect, the theory 
is very idealistic and corresponds to the principle of tolerance. Adherents 
of the doctrine very often are unwilling to compromise and do not see 
other world views as equally worthy. The confirmation by Pope Benedict 
of the theory of the primacy of the Roman Catholic Church over other 
Christian denominations may serve as one example of unwillingness to 
engage in dialogue.526
The European democratic model, however, in theory agrees 
with the Rawlisian assumption that only reasonable and rational 
citizens and doctrines can build a democracy. COE’s interpretative 
recommendations deeply discourage and condemn fundamentalisms that 
are seen as unreasonable.527 Such fundamentalisms are excluded from 
the public discussion due to the very fact of their unreasonableness. The 
525.  Rawls J., 2005, p 138.
526.  Pope highlights primacy of Church of Rome, asks for prayers, Catholic News 
Agency, Vatican City, 22.02.2009.
527.  E.g. Recommendation 1396 (1999), par. 3, Recommendation 1804 (2007), par. 16.
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unreasonableness of a doctrine justifies refusal of its equal treatment in 
comparison to other doctrines. For the maintenance of the political 
conception of democracy, such an approach appears to be necessary. It is 
impossible to achieve democratic goals and sustain democratic principles 
if we guarantee the equality of non-democratic or anti-democratic 
conceptions with democracy supporting conceptions. The concept of 
reasonable doctrines, however, is essentially based on the understanding 
of Western and primarily Christian religions. And as such it may not be 
sensitive enough to cultural differences. On the contrary, applying the 
analogy to Christianity may lead to an automatic labelling of different 
conceptions as “unreasonable” or in other words, “fundamentalist”. Such 
labelling was used in the Dahlab and Sahin cases, where the wearing of a 
headscarf was considered to be an expression of fundamentalism and as 
such found incompatible with democracy528. In such contexts, culture is 
understood as Western culture. Nuotio observes that modern law fails to 
recognise the importance of culture. From the cultural and communitarian 
approach, such a failure may seem wrong and lead to misjudgement and 
the rejection of unfamiliar or untypical beliefs:
“A person whose beliefs are strange to us might be measured with 
false yardstick if we do not take this fact into account. A person with 
irrational beliefs might even be regarded as insane and lacking the 
capacity to be a reasonable person.” 529
.6.4. The overlapping consensus as the essence  
of the constructivist model of democracy
The features mentioned above do not solve the problem of how citizens 
with different comprehensive doctrines, which are often incompatible 
with each other, can coexist together in a just, democratic society. Rawls 
admits, after all, that religious conceptions contain the idea of the right 
and the good and they include the conception of justice themselves. 
The majority of them assume that by following these conceptions, the 
528.  See: the discussion on education in this volume.
529.  Nuotio K., 2008, pp. 18-44, 24 and 33.
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common good of all the society can be achieved and think that they are 
correct in those views: “(…) we always think our own view is not only 
reasonable but also morally speaking true, or reasonable” reminds the 
author530.
Thus for achieving the goal of political liberalism, a certain political 
construction is necessary. This construction must be based on political 
values and not on the understanding of truth based on comprehensive 
doctrines. And those doctrines which assume no authority beyond the 
church, and do not accept state authority or political values beyond the 
church, are deemed to be unreasonable531. The political construction of 
justice must be based on what Rawls calls “an overlapping consensus”. 
This consensus is an agreement between reasonable citizens to create, 
follow and accept agreed principles of political justice and settle for 
themselves how these principles relate to their comprehensive doctrines. 
This consensus is not entirely separate from citizens’ conceptions of the 
good, but neither does it aim to advance either of those conceptions. 
Instead, it creates a certain common core, where the political agreement 
overlaps with citizens’ conceptions. If we could graphically draw 
this model it would look like a flower, where the petals are various 
comprehensive doctrines of citizens and the core holding these petals 
together is the overlapping consensus concerning the political conception 
of justice.
This overlapping consensus is the foundation of public reason. It 
includes the agreement on the conception of the society and citizens, 
principles of justice and basic rights. And it is based on the idea of 
reciprocity, which means that all citizens agree to follow this political 
agreement in order to create a society based on equality and liberty and 
they expect others to be bound by the same rules. It does not attempt to 
answer the moral and philosophical questions concerning the truth and 
the ultimate conception of the good, but instead puts emphasis on the 
idea of social coherence and peaceful coexistence as a political value as 
such. A society that reaches such a consensus and lives by its rules is in 
Rawlsian meaning a “well-ordered” society. 
530.  Ibid., p 128.
531.  Ibid., p 138.
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Th e well-ordered society’s overlapping consensus must be as deep as 
to reach a common core of ideas on society, a fair system of cooperation 
and of citizens as reasonable, rational, free and equal. It must be also as 
broad as to cover the principles and values of a political conception of 
justice as fairness. It all is possible due to what Rawls calls slippage in the 
citizens’ comprehensive doctrines. Th ey rarely are entirely comprehensive 
in regard to all aspects of life and thus leave room for adjustment. 
To the objection that an overlapping consensus is indiff erent or 
sceptical to comprehensive doctrines, Rawls answered in the following way. 
Although an overlapping consensus indeed avoids the general conceptions 
contained in comprehensive doctrines, it does not attempt to deny any 
of the comprehensive religious, philosophical or political views. Instead 
it attempts to make it possible for all to affi  rm their views and the only 
measure to do that is to work out a common political conception of justice. 
Figure 5: The idea of overlapping consensus.







The political conception of justice must distinguish between those questions 
which can and cannot be removed from the political agenda in order to 
achieve an agreement. Avoidance of referring to comprehensive doctrines 
in those controversial questions allows reaching a stable consensus. 
In the case of Europe, the political conception of justice equals the 
liberal democratic conception of justice. In advancing this conception, 
the Rawlsian idea of “reasonable consensus” can serve as a beneficial tool. 
Without the idea of democratic consensus and the reasonable approach 
of various doctrines to the common model, democracy is torn apart in 
doctrinal conflicts. The Rawslian conception of reasonable consensus 
resonates in the ideas expressed in the documents issued by the COE 
and in the European Parliament’s report on the EU’s commitment to 
fundamental rights.532 Recommendation 1804 (2007), State, religion, 
secularity and human rights can be used as an example illustrating this 
tendency. The key findings presented in the recommendation conform to 
Rawlsian ideas. The COE confirmed its commitment to the plurality of 
ethical, moral and ideological conceptions of individual European citizens 
and the necessity of state neutrality in approaches to these conceptions. 
It also advocated that governance and religion should not mix and 
that states should exclude from consultations any religious groups not 
supporting fundamental values of democracy.533
.6.5. Why the political must be separated from the doctrinal
Rawls, in his A Theory of Justice, Political Liberalism and The Idea of 
Public Reason, attempted to justify why political and doctrinal issues 
must be separated from one another. This necessity is supported by the 
requirement of equality. Comprehensive doctrines that cannot support 
democratic society are not reasonable:
“Their principles and ideals do not satisfy the criterion of reciprocity, 
and in various ways they fail to establish the basic equal liberties. As 
examples, consider the many fundamentalist religious doctrines, the 
532.  See the next chapter for details.
533.  Recommendation 1804 (2007), par. 3, 4, 10 and 23.
264
doctrine of the divine right of monarchs and the various forms of 
aristocracy, and, not to be overlooked, the many instances of autocracy 
and dictatorship.”
As Rawls further explained, the focus points of the religious and the 
political spheres are different. Whereas the religious values represent 
concern over supreme values, the political values of a constitutional 
democracy concentrate on the conception of a just society of equal 
citizens, which allows different conceptions to flourish in the society. 
Without citizens’ support for public reason and without them honouring 
the political conception of justice and reciprocity, divisions and hostilities 
between doctrines are bound to exist. Harmony and concord depend on 
citizens’ willingness and devotion to realise the ideal of public justice. Only 
a common idea of justice and social rules distinguished from controversial 
doctrinal arguments can be the foundation of a just and well-ordered 
society. Without state and citizen support for the model, the core of the 
principles remains empty and the will of the majority ultimately determines 
who enjoys what rights and whether the principle of equality applies at all.
.. The critique of the Rawlsian conception
The Rawlsian constructivist approach has been a subject of critique for a 
variety of reasons. In a multicultural and religiously plural society, the core 
of the critique concentrates on the premise of equality and neutrality. 
Wenar criticises the Rawlsian construction, claiming that it is not 
neutral but instead is in fact a comprehensive doctrine of its own.534 
He argues that the reasonable consensus is too expansive to be neutral 
and that reasonable persons who are sincere religious believers would 
have problems in supporting such a construction. He argues that many 
doctrines and beliefs could be listed as incompatible with becoming a part 
of the consensus due to their core. He argues also that many philosophical 
approaches could be excluded. Wenar reminds that the majority of 
doctrines include a political element and the requirement to support a 
534.  Wenar L., 1995.
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political conception contradictory with the doctrine’s political elements 
would mean requiring citizens to be politically “schizophrenic”.535 
Habermas in his Between Naturalism and Religion: Philosophical Essays 
engages in a polemic with Menke’s critique of Rawls. Menke’s critique 
follows the line of Wenar. According to Menke, the Rawlsian conception 
is faulty, because the complete neutrality of aim is not true.536
The neutrality of the aim should be measured by the complete inclusion 
of all citizens. However, the idea of a reasonable consensus excludes many 
incompatible doctrines, causing the neutrality of the aim to be unattainable. 
Moreover, the idea of equal liberties can never be “specified” in a neutral 
way. Habermas defends the notion of liberal democratic equality, arguing 
that the asymmetric restrictions of personal ethical judgements are an 
expression of civic equality: “The norm must be legitimated by democratic 
means in an awareness and assessment of non-neutral effects by all 
those who must live with the consequences.” I agree with Rawlsian and 
Habermasian arguments supporting the idea of reasonable consensus. 
Neutrality of aim is not assumed in a liberal democracy. Like I argued 
above, similarly to Wenar, I do believe that liberal democracy is indeed a 
certain moral conception comparable to a “comprehensive doctrine”. In 
order to achieve the goals of this conception, a common core of values must 
be created and aimed for. And only a reasonable consensus of citizens is a 
solution that can realistically advance the achievement of this goal.
I see similar problems as those observed by Wenar or Mencke. 
However, since I agree with Habermas, that the individual should 
remain the focus in a liberal democracy, I approach the problem from 
the perspective of an individual member of a community. The idea of a 
reasonable consensus and common core of political values burdens a 
citizen with the requirement of tolerance, the acknowledgment of other 
doctrines and the adjustment of his/her own conceptions to the core of 
the political model of democratic justice. In case of many religions and 
many citizens, imposing such a burden is possible due to what Rawls calls 
“slippage” in the doctrines themselves. Moreover, thanks to education and 
535.  Ibid., p 53.
536.  Menke, Können und Glauben, Philosophie der Dekonstruktion, quoted in 
Habermas J., 2008a.
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the strengthening of democratic values, a gradual increase of commitment 
to these values is possible. However, it is impossible, or at least highly 
idealistic, to expect all doctrines or all citizens to have such a slippage 
and agree to compromise their own moral conceptions. Whereas it 
is possible to burden the state to remain as neutral as possible to shape 
laws and policies in a way which does not discriminate against religious 
or non-religious adherents, the same is hard to expect from all citizens. 
Even for modern democratic states, due to their national traditions, the 
state’s neutrality is still, even in seemingly secular Europe, a challenge or 
a quest, as Thorson Plesner terms it.537 Requiring neutrality and tolerance 
from all citizens of various cultures is a burden of considerable weight. In 
a multicultural society it is natural to have more and less flexible doctrines. 
The automatic labelling of proponents of all doctrines who are unwilling 
to adhere to the idea of a reasonable consensus as “unreasonable”, might 
unjustifiably marginalise considerable groups of the population. Such 
marginalisation may as a result affect the idea of a reasonable consensus 
negatively. The result may bring a growing fundamentalisation of the 
marginalised groups. The reasonable consensus and democratic values may 
easily become the target of such groups. If compliance with democratic 
values is forced, growing resistance is natural. The challenge for a 
multicultural democracy is how broad a margin of toleration could be 
given to those who are considered intolerant? And how far is it possible 
to accommodate those who are unwilling to resolve the conflicts between 
democratic values and their own values in a manner of conscientious 
compromise? Can cultural or religious identity serve as a legal excuse 
allowing for different cultures not compatible with democratic rights and 
principles to be governed by their own normative systems?
.8. The necessary margin of secularity in a democratic state
The principles of democracy and the idea of rights are certainly secular 
concepts. This volume does not argue that they are not. However, their 
social and legal function extends beyond their role as secular moral 
537.  Thorson Plesner I., 2008.
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conceptions. Safeguarding the equality of various religious and non-
religious groups requires employing these secular concepts in practice. 
Employing any religious values would discriminate against the non-
religious and differently religious individuals. Secular principles such 
as equality and non-discrimination allow both secular and religious 
individuals and groups to exist in a democratic society.
The endorsement of any religious doctrine in public life limits the 
principle of equality. In terms of a Rawlsian reasonable consensus, it 
imposes a certain conception of the good, which may be inconsistent with 
the particular religious conception of an individual.
A religious individual may argue that a secular conception is 
inconsistent with his or her religious conception of the good. And that 
may be true. However, a religious individual is still in large degree free to 
choose a religious way of life even in a liberal democratic system based 
on secular democratic principles. A religiously neutral system ought 
to allow for a variety of religious choices. A system based on religious 
values, on the other hand, nullifies the possibility of such choices for all 
the religious “others”. A system of religiously neutral political and legal 
principles is, if nothing else, a practical necessity. It makes it possible 
for all the citizens professing different religious or non-religious beliefs 
to coexist. If democracy is the selected construction and conception of 
justice, neutralism is important for maintaining it. Any departure of the 
state from this practical necessity of neutrality will necessarily produce 
inequality and undermine the democratic commitment of the state. 
And then it is a question of the degree of this departure that ultimately 
determines whether a system is still democratic or should be considered 
as a different conception and construction of justice. The secular system 
burdens primarily the state, even though, as I argue below, it also has 
consequences for religious individuals. And such consequences should 
be examined in order to determine how far a democratic state is obliged 
to intervene into a sincere religious belief in the pursuit of democratic 
goals and how far, on the other hand, religious individuals could be 
allowed to give up their rights and duties in the pursuit of religious 
goals. 
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.. Religion and collective rights – the role of cultures  
and the addendum to the Rawlsian conception
..1. The role of culture
Liberal democracy, as illustrated, concentrates on an individual and 
his or her rights. This individualistic approach towards society has 
been criticised as discriminative towards cultures and non-European 
religions.538 The communitarian approach towards rights has been 
proposed as an approach that guarantees equality of not only individuals 
but of various conceptions of life. However, how far can a culture or a 
community as a continuation of tradition rather than as an expression of 
the will of individuals be appreciated in a liberal democracy? 
Culture is important for this volume’s discussion primarily because 
modern cultures are in large degree based on religions. Cultural diversities 
concentrate on religious aspects.539 Religion is understood as the core of 
the cultural identity of an individual and of a cultural community. The 
demand of cultural rights is dictated by the demand of equal freedom of 
moral choices for everyone. It is based on the principle of equality for 
different conceptions of rights themselves. In Habermas’ words: 
“Collective rights empower cultural groups to preserve and make 
available the resources on which their members draw in forming and 
stabilizing their personal identities.” 540
While strong multiculturalism argues that liberal democracy is 
discriminative and based solely on Western conceptions541, liberal 
democrats defend the internal coherence of the system and its ability to 
deal with internal conflicts. 
Habermas in his latest book Between Naturalism and Religion: 
538.  See the chapter on critique of Rawls above. See also: Parekh and Taylor as quoted 
in Nuotio K., 2008.
539.  E.g. Huntington S. P., 1996.
540.  Habermas J., 2008a, p 297.
541.  Shah P., 2005.
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Philosophical Essays to a large extent deals with the topic of culture.542 
Presenting a wide variety of arguments appearing in a multicultural 
discussion, he ultimately defends the liberal democratic model and 
argues that the system of rights is sufficient for protecting cultures. 
Habermas argues that although culture and cultural rights are important, 
a dogmatically protected culture will not be able to reproduce itself. 
Collective rights can strengthen culture only when individual members 
are given the ability of critical choice in the appropriation, revision or 
rejection of the culture.543 In a liberal system, group rights are legitimate 
only when they are derived from the rights of individual members.544 He 
underlines the role of individual rights and the necessity of their sensitivity 
to individual differences:
“Only the egalitarian universalism of equal rights that is sensitive 
to difference can satisfy the individualistic requirement that the 
fragile integrity of unique irreplaceable individuals should be granted 
equally.”545
Moreover, although the expectation of tolerance does not have a neutral 
effect on believers and non-believers it would be, according to Habermas, 
disproportionate of believers to reject the demand for tolerance because 
its burdens are not shared equally.546 He concludes this argument by 
asserting that the challenge for cultures perceived as less democratic is 
to find functional equivalents for the separation of church and state. He 
argues that such adaptation is today no more of a submission to alien 
cultural norms than it was for religious communities in the West when 
they had to adjust to the change in mentality.547
I agree with the Habermasian assertion that in a liberal democracy, 
collective rights should be derived from individual rights. Collective rights 
542.  Habermas J., 2008a, ch. Equal Treatment of Cultures.
543.  Ibid., pp. 302-303.
544.  Ibid., p 300.
545.  Ibid., p 290.
546.  Ibid., p 310.
547.  Ibid., p 311.
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not based on the rights of individuals do not guarantee a choice between 
personal adjustments, revisions or even the rejection of the doctrine or 
culture in question. Liberal democracy’s focus is based on the individual. 
However, the focus on the individual should allow for the maximal range 
of choices in matters of personal conviction. In such a case, a believer may 
choose to give up partially his or her rights in the pursuit of the religious 
goals of his or her religious community. In fact, such situations do exist. I 
choose to illustrate this with an example of a culturally traditional European 
religion, in order to show that such an abdication of one’s own rights is 
not only a domain of non-tolerant and culturally alien non-European 
religious traditions. Catholic women are expected to accept the fact that 
the Church does not apply the principle of equality of men and women 
in employment and does not employ women priests. Such a principle is 
in clear contradiction to European principles of equality in employment. 
However, an individual adhering to the Catholic tradition is expected to 
accept giving up her rights in the pursuit of her religious goals. The religious 
community is in this case allowed to regulate its internal functioning and 
limit the rights of individuals in employment in accordance with its own 
doctrine. As this example illustrates, giving up universally recognised rights 
and relying on a religious community’s normative system is not only the 
domain of immigrant and primarily Islamic religions demanding equal 
recognition for their culture. For that reason, I believe, the principle of 
equality can and ought to offer a certain margin of adjustment of the liberal 
democratic model to requirements of religious communities. 
..2. Private versus public presence as an inadequate  
measure in discussion on religious communities
The leading problem of a religiously plural society lies in the fact 
that the paradigm of gradual secularization as a necessity proved to 
be in some degree wrong.548 In Europe, just as elsewhere, religious 
communities started demanding more space in public life. This space is 
impossible to offer in political life to any great extent as a consequence of 
safeguarding equality in a democratic society. Therefore it is assumed that 
548.  Katzenstein P J., 2006.
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democratisation pushed religion to the domain of private life and banned 
it from the domain of the public.549 
I argue, however, that the dichotomy private-public is inadequate in 
a discussion of religion. First of all, if we approach religion as a matter of 
private choice, it naturally belongs to the domain of the private. The COE 
approaches matters of religion in this way: “The Parliamentary Assembly 
forcefully reaffirms that each person’s religion, including the option of having 
no religion, is a strictly personal matter.”550 Such an approach leads to the 
assumption that even if religion is a part of an individual’s communal life 
from his or her childhood, it is a matter of private choice of conscience to 
change the religion, quit the religious community or continue to be a believer. 
The same applies to a person who was raised in a secular manner. He or 
she can choose to become a believer, if his or her private conscience dictates 
such a necessity. If some communities enforce the norms more strongly 
than others, any religious community forbidding changing one’s religion, 
in an individualistic approach does not carry democratic qualities since 
it limits the aspect of freedom. Even if a community forbade conversion, 
the honesty of a belief is ultimately a question of individual conscience. 
An individual whose conscience has changed will in all likelihood profess 
his or her values in private. And even if he or she ultimately returns to the 
values and conceptions professed in the community, such a choice is still a 
private choice of conscience. For that reason, if individualistic approach is 
adopted the private aspect is an inherent quality of a religion. Individualistic 
approach would correspond to two aspects of understanding religion 
proposed previously in Part I. It would correspond to religion understood as 
a belief and as that what would in a life of a believer account for a religion
However, if we approach religion from two other aspects: as identity 
and a way of life, the private-public dichotomy is still of little use. I 
believe that the assumption that the political arena is the only area of 
public life is not entirely true. Public life happens not only via politics. 
Public life happens via publications, assemblies and social dialogue and all 
other dimensions of a civil society. Religious communities in a democratic 
country should be allowed to have wide access to these dimensions of 
549.  Among others: Habermas J., 2008.
550.  E.g. Recommendation 1720 (2005).
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public life. Encouraging other people to consider the community’s values 
and moral foundations is an expression of public life. Identifying oneself 
with one’s community and its way of life is thus inherently a public 
aspect. A community that issues a newspaper or organises public events 
where other people can learn about its moral conceptions is a successfully 
existing public entity, just like any other public entities based on common 
interests in any other area of life. The public life area does not exclusively 
consist of the domain of law and politics. 
While discussing the problem of religiously motivated discriminatory 
speech, I referred to Loof ’s arguments that allowing religious adherents 
the freedom to engage in discriminatory speech exclusively to the forum 
of his or her religious community would push religion out of public life.551 
Although I agreed that limiting speech for any reason is always problematic, 
I disagreed with Loof ’s assumption that freedom only within a religious 
community pushes religion to the realm of the private. As mentioned above, 
I do believe that the existence of religious communities capable of forming 
an association, founding schools, and participating in public discourse 
is an essential expression of public life. Therefore I consider a religious 
community to be a public forum of expression. It is a forum in which the 
widest extent of religious freedom is exercised. And as such a special forum, 
a religious community should enjoy the widest possible freedom in its 
internal activity. It offers a religious individual the opportunity to express 
his or her convictions in public and exercise the dimension of religion 
understood as identity and the way of life. Religious communities should 
not be treated as potential criminal organizations, as is often the case in the 
process of registering new religious movements552. Although it is arguable 
what private and public are, even those who propose that private sphere is 
broad, like Taylor, agree that the understanding of the public may differ: 
“There seem to be two main semantic axes along which the term public 
is used. The first connects public to what affects the whole community 
(“public affairs”) or the management of these affairs (“public authority”). 
The second makes publicity a matter of access (“This park is open to the 
551.  Loof J. P, 2007.
552.  See the discussion in this volume concerning the Church of Scientology’s 
problems with registration in Germany..
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public”) or appearance (“The news has been made public”).”553 I argue that 
the public aspect of access and appearance is no less important than the 
aspect affecting the whole community. If these aspects are enjoyed, it can be 
no longer argued, that religion is pushed solely to the sphere of the private.
The dichotomy private-public remains is of little use if we take into 
consideration these different dimensions of understanding religion. 
Individualistic understanding of some religions will place them 
automatically in the realm of private, while identity aspect of other 
religions will place them in the realm of public. Differences between 
religions and beliefs make such a dichotomy unsustainable if public 
sphere is not exclusively understood as political sphere. 
..3. Legal pluralism or one neutral system applying to all? To what extent can a 
liberal democracy allow for different cultural approaches to fundamental values?
The Rawlsian conception of reasonable consensus supports in the best 
practical way the conception of democracy based on principles and rights. 
It applies mainly to the political aspect of life that creates consequences 
for all individuals professing various conceptions of life. This Rawlsian 
conception does not, however, deal in detail with the aspect of public life 
which is expressed through the inner activity of a religious community. 
In the multicultural critique, the liberal democratic model is accused of 
being discriminatory towards religious communities and cultural rights.554 
In this volume, I have defended the position that in political and legal life, 
which affects all citizens equally, a certain margin of secularity is necessary 
as a corollary of neutrality. However, I also argue that in order to secure 
in the best way the possibility of life dictated by one’s own convictions, 
religious communities, as a forum for the broadest extent of religious 
freedom, should be guaranteed a maximally broad margin of freedom in 
their activities. Legal pluralism has been a disputed topic in connection 
with religious pluralism and I want to analyse briefly the possibilities and 
difficulties of legal pluralism based on religious conceptions.555
553.  Taylor C., 2004, p 104.
554.  E.g., Parekh B., 2000.
555.  E.g., Tamanaha B., 2000.
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First of all, it is worth pointing out that, contrary to what is believed, 
legal pluralism connected with religion is not a new phenomenon in Europe. 
It is not exclusively a phenomenon brought by the demand for establishing 
Sharia law. In fact, as the analysis of the concordat systems illustrated, certain 
aspects of family law are regulated by both state and religious systems. I refer 
here to marriages and annulments granted according to the canon law of the 
Roman Catholic Church. According to the majority of concordat treaties, the 
states bound by those treaties accept marriages and annulments of marriages 
done in accordance with canon law provisions. Such an acknowledgement of 
a religious institution’s normative decisions and giving them the state validity 
equivalent to civil law decisions is an acknowledgment of the possibility of 
legal pluralism based on religious tradition. 
In September 2008, Sahria courts were given the power to decide 
Muslim cases in the United Kingdom.556 The rulings of 5 Sharia courts 
can now be officially enforced through the county courts or High Court. 
Sharia courts have received increased attention primarily due to their 
possible impact on women’s rights. Can a European democracy accept 
Sharia courts, the judgments of which may likely affect women’s rights? In 
the year 2007 a court in Bologna accepted the arguments of defendants, a 
father and a brother, who severely beat up the daughter of the family, for 
living contrary to Muslim tradition by dating a non-Muslim. The court 
acknowledged that the girl was beaten up for her own good. 557 Also 
in Germany, a battered woman who applied for a fast divorce had her 
application rejected after the judge argued that the Koran allows a man 
to beat his wife.558 These judgments pose interesting questions concerning 
the relation between religiously motivated conduct and fundamental rights 
and principles. How far can religion justify exceptions in the application 
of the rights system? Can religion or culture justify the limitation of the 
rights of an individual? Should legal pluralism apply to such situations or 
should it apply solely to situations where religious adherence guarantees 
extra privileges, such as the recognition of marriages and divorces by one’s 
556.  Revealed: UK’s first official Sharia courts, The Sunday Times, 14.09.2008.
557.  Guitta O., Sharia’s Inroads Around the World, Middle East Times, 02.03.2009.
558.  A German Judge Cites Koran in Divorce Case, Der Spiegel International, 
21.03.2007.
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own religious community? Or perhaps it should not apply at all so that the 
coherence of the democratic system can be sustained?
From the point of view of liberal democracy and its foundations, the 
problem should be approached from the perspective of the individual. 
A potentially oppressive religious normative system cannot be imposed 
on anyone against their will. If a liberal democracy allowed for such an 
imposition solely on the grounds of cultural or religious identity, it would 
equal the state’s failure in safeguarding the principle of freedom (of 
choice) and basic rights. Principles of democracy put an obligation on the 
state to protect an individual from rights violations. 
However, can a secular democracy impose rights on those who do not 
wish to enjoy them? And how far could individuals give up their rights in 
pursuance of their religious goals? Let us assume that as a result of freedom 
and equality of choices of the available ways of life an individual willingly 
agrees to be under the jurisdiction of a religious system that consists of its 
own religious, moral and legal norms. And if those religious and moral 
norms do not comply with the requirements of a secular system of rights, 
the individual in question is willing to give up his or her other rights in 
pursuance of the right to freedom of religion. Can a democratic state allow 
for such a voluntary resignation of rights? Are there rights that should be 
considered of such a fundamental nature that they could not be given up? 
Giving up of certain rights under informed consent is an imaginable 
solution, which in a certain way resembles contract law. The parties to 
a possible conflict or any other legal situation that arises agree to apply 
a different set of rules than those universally applied. If we look at such 
exceptions from this perspective, they do not present themselves as a 
revolutionary novelty. Under the principle of equality of choice and equality 
of all religious and moral conceptions, such a solution is, I believe, possible. 
However, I am convinced that in a democratic system certain limits must 
be introduced in addition to the requirement of full and informed consent. 
Some rights are of such fundamental value that voluntary abdication 
from their protection could introduce chaos and the decomposition of the 
legal system. If one could agree to give up the right to life, ritual murder 
would become possible under a cultural excuse. Similarly, other forms of 
violence should not be allowed under cultural excuse. If a liberal democracy 
extends its toleration to cultural, moral and religious choices incompliant 
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with standards securing basic social coherence, there is a danger of falling 
back into anarchy and chaos. If we admit the possibility of abdicating some 
rights, the challenge is how to draw the line between rights that can and 
cannot be given up by one’s own consent. 
The theory of rights assumes their indivisibility. However, as some 
ascertain, there is in fact a hierarchy of rights, and non-derogable rights 
enjoy a higher position than others.559 Those non-derogable rights, which 
must be guaranteed by a state at any time, could be a useful category for 
establishing the core of rights that an individual cannot give up. Those 
rights under the ECHR would include the right to life, the prohibition 
of slavery and the prohibition of torture and degrading treatment. 
Abdicating those rights would introduce anarchy to the legal system and 
make it impossible to successfully balance between the obligations of the 
state to secure democracy and legal order and the will of individuals. 
Similar approach to conflict between collective and individual rights 
was proposed by Scheinin560. In his article concerning possible conflict of 
individual rights and rights stemming from collective identity, he insisted 
that solutions of conflict between individual and collective rights should 
be based on the concept of non-derogable rights. In the case of a conflict 
the priority cannot be simply given to individual rights but the solution 
must be sought on the basis of non-derogable rights, untouchable core of 
particular rights and difference between forbidden violations and allowed 
limitations of rights561.
Legal pluralism could possibly to some limited extent apply to 
exemptions from punishment in the realm of penal law. The British 
exemption for the Sikhs who are allowed to use turbans instead of 
motorcycle helmets is frequently raised as an example. Shah in his 
discussion of pluralism approaches the issue of homicide as a cultural issue 
of legal pluralism. He ascertains that when South Asians kill they make 
choices under legal pluralism rather than simply break the law.562 However, 
the pursuit of equality is different than allowing for the destabilisation of a 
559.  Teraya K., 2001.
560.  Schenin M., 2005.
561.  Ibid., p 190.
562.  Shah P, 2005, p 20.
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democratic legal system. Nuotio reminds that in Western liberal societies, 
the law has developed into a sphere separate from tradition. As such it 
imposes on everyone the obligation to comply regardless of their culture, 
religion or tradition. If culture were to be regarded as a force that could 
diminish criminal responsibility, then we would be forced to abandon many 
of the underlying presuppositions of modern law.563 Including culture in 
the catalogue of legal exemptions limiting criminal responsibility could 
pose serious problems for maintaining the coherence of the legal system. 
Questions that would need re-considering would be, for instance: what 
kinds of offences should be excluded from penalisation — only minor 
offences or serious crimes as well? How to ensure the equality of those who 
are not excused from criminal liability due to not having any “privileged” 
sincere belief guaranteeing a legal exception? Drawing any clear theoretical 
lines here is not easy and requires further research in penal law. Allowing 
for exceptions from criminal liability of religious adherents for hate speech, 
for instance, may raise an argument concerning the privileged nature of 
religious adherents. Finally, the question of what should be punishable and 
what should not be in light of respect for sincere beliefs calls for in-depth 
criminal law research. Currently religious communities are criminally liable 
just like any other communities. But as we have observed in the examples 
of discriminatory speech or Sikhs’ exemption from security obligations, 
religious adherents enjoy a certain wider margin of freedom in certain 
respects. The problem is how to balance equality between religious and non-
religious individuals, if religion could be used as a legal excuse exempting 
someone from receiving criminal punishment.
Another area where legal pluralism could apply is the realm of 
family life and contract law. As mentioned above, in the states bound by 
concordat treaties, such jurisdiction of Church institutions in matters of 
marriage and annulment is generally accepted. Such jurisdiction is an 
extra privilege granted to a religious community. If such privileges are 
granted to one community, the principle of equality would require that 
other communities have equal possibilities if they so request. The problem 
arising is: How to secure the equality of those who do not belong to any 
community granted such privileges? Moreover, the questions concerning 
563.  Nuotio K., 2008, pp. 23-31.
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what areas of competency could be delegated to religious authorities are 
problematic as well. The delegation of all competencies can, as in the 
abdication of rights, pose challenges to the coherence of the legal system.
Legal pluralism is certainly a possibility that could help ensure the 
equality of all conceptions of life and all religious and moral beliefs. In a 
multicultural society it is a possibility which cannot be simply dismissed. 
It requires further research due to its complicated nature and the effects 
that it may have for the understanding of a democracy and the coherence 
of a legal system. As illustrated above, the discussion on religious 
pluralism involves at least questions of three kinds: exclusion from 
universal obligations (mainly criminal law), extra privileges (mainly civil 
law) and resignation from universal rights and principles (constitutional 
law). This theoretical division is based on a traditional European 
understanding of the legal system. In an analysis of the possible effects 
of legal pluralism, it must be remembered that such a division may be 
unnatural for some religions and cultures and thus in practice impossible 
to apply. Religious and moral normative systems may include solutions 
and procedures that affect all or a few of these areas at the same time. 
Thus detailed research of the possibilities of legal pluralism is 
required in order to explore these issues further. This volume’s focus 
was illustrating inconsistencies in approaches to various religions in 
Europe. Deeper analysis of legal pluralism would fall out of the scope of 
this research. The discussion of legal pluralism was introduced in order 
to illustrate that the modern democratic model, based on principles of 
neutrality and values inherent to Western, secular conceptions, is capable 
of incorporating new legal solutions. Such legal solutions can help in 
realising the underlying principle of democracy – the principle of equality. 
Habermas points out that the introduction of rights based on collective 
identity might bring disputes between different groups about the scope 
of their privileges and equal treatment between them as well as disputes 
concerning the disadvantaged position of those not belonging to any of 
the privileged groups.564 Certainly, the issues surrounding legal pluralism 
are complex. But the complexity should not discourage us from analysing 
the possibilities of legal pluralism in detail. Although certain boundaries 
564.  Habermas J., 2008a, p 297.
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of democracy cannot be crossed, it is not impossible to fi nd a margin of 
adjustment to the demands of religious communities and their internal 
activities. Th e reasonable consensus must apply to all those rules that bind 
all citizens equally. Imposing any doctrine on other citizens should be 
considered unreasonable from the perspective of equality. In other words, 
religious communities cannot actively change the scope of the consensus 
in order to adjust it to their own doctrine. But the idea of a reasonable 
consensus is not aff ected by imposing normative religious conceptions on 
the freely participating members of a particular religious group. 
Careful balancing based on democratic principles could allow for greater 
fl exibility in the law. Such fl exibility could allow various religious citizens 
to choose the system consistent with their values in those matters that 
do require the intervention of a secular system necessary for maintaining 
democracy. In other words, the passive aspect of the consensus, expressed in 
conformity to a common standard, could leave a margin for multicultural 
adjustment. It could allow for governance by one’s own system in certain 
areas. Th e idea may be better illustrated by the graph above. 













8. Europe’s commitment to democracy  
and basic values in the context of religion
In the previous chapter I discussed the concept of democracy in general 
and its application to the European conditions. The proposed democratic 
model was based on the common European principles. The analysis in 
previous chapters, however, showed that commitment to those principles is 
not the same in all examined countries. Rights and approach to democratic 
principles applying to religious issues is not coherent and depends in large 
extent on national traditions. Previous analysis and the proposed model did 
not, however, discuss the problems of European integration on axiological 
level. Below, I will discuss the concerns relating to “giving soul to Europe”565 
and the problems of commitment to axiological integration and the common 
principles of justice. Further, I will evaluate whether Rawlsian conception of 
“overlapping consensus” can be a helpful model for multicultural Europe and 
whether it can help in strengthening the common consensus on fundamental 
principles. Finally I will end this volume’s discussion by addressing the 
problem of what kind of Europe we want today. In this chapter I concentrate 
primarily on the European Union as a special kind of legal polity based on 
supra national laws and striving for greater coherence. I do however, similarly 
to the preceding chapters, also refer to initiatives of the Council of Europe.
8.1. European democracy or European democracies?
“A European democracy” is a concept that may refer to common European 
democratic principles or to democracies in various European countries. 
565.  See below.
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Historically, formation of European democracies was a local process 
connected with creation of nation states and their gradual development. 
There was thus British or French democracy, but no general concept of 
“European democracy”. Even today it is disputable whether we can speak 
of a “European democracy” or European democracies. However, the 
processes of European integration aiming at achieving harmonisation of 
laws and policies in certain public areas have identified certain principles 
common for various European democracies. The areas of legal unification 
or harmonisation have been constantly expanding over time. Loughlin 
and Aja argue that democracy is primarily a concept based on the nation 
state tradition. The historical role of the states cannot be underestimated 
and the lack of democratic legitimacy of the European Union system 
caused by the democratic deficit leads to fragmentation and situations 
when democracy is not practiced in the manner consistent with liberal-
democratic principles.566 Also Ward argues that there is still more 
potential for fragmentation that for further integration.567 This tendency 
could be seen in majority of cases concerning religion. Common European 
principles of equality and freedom of religion have been often interpreted 
in such a way that could protect other social and often national values. 
The examples of blasphemy cases showed that traditional feelings of the 
local population are still often more protected than equality of freedom 
of conscience. Head-scarf ban in France on the other hand depicted the 
protection of läicite as the fundamental national value of the Republic. 
Polish, Maltese and Irish reproductive rights struggles revealed how 
protection of national tradition, understood as history of national religion, 
is protected from the influence of the growing arena of women’s rights. 
Originally, as Katzenstein reminds, the process of European integration 
was seen as an initiative of Christian Democracy.568 For that reason 
the issues of position of the religion and its potential influence on non-
religious persons was left for the countries participating in the integration 
processes to decide. The freedom of religion has been often interpreted 
by the ECTHR in the light of the “wide margin of appreciation” of the 
566.  Loughlin J., Aja E., 2001.
567.  Ward I., 2004.
568.  Katzenstein P J., 2006, pp.15-18.
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member states. For that reason, as illustrated by case studies in this volume, 
despite of growing secularization or “unchurching” of Europe569, the role 
of traditional religions in European societies and their influence on other 
rights has for long remained legally unchallenged. And the influence 
of religions on law and politics in Europe has developed differently in 
different countries. Katzenstein refers to the European development as 
development of “multiple modernities”. These multiple modernities, as he 
argues, have left the core of European identity empty:
“Institutional and political hypocrisy capture the tensions between 
legal compliance or harmonization of law on the one hand, and policy 
compliance or policy implementation on the other. (…) Lack of 
capacity, unclarity of priority, and obfuscation of responsibilities are 
characteristic of a European polity marked by the coincidence of both 
binding European rules and discretionary national applications.”570
8.2. European Union’s commitment to basic values
The report of the European Parliament issued in January 2009 
concerning the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union 
concentrates on the above mentioned problems of the commitment 
of European Union members to basic values and rights.571 The report 
underlines that European Union working in its pillars is not an efficient 
organization for monitoring its members’ commitment to fundamental 
rights. Human rights issues cannot be artificially divided into pillars. 
Due to such artificial division, different kinds of rights fall into different 
pillars. It leads to impossibility of efficient monitoring. Monitoring is also 
hindered by the fact that member states of the Union refuse to accept the 
scrutiny of the EU over their own human rights policies and practices 
and endeavour to keep the protection on purely national basis. The report 
reminds that Article 7 of the EU Treaty provides for a procedure to make 
569.  Davie G., 2002 and Davie G., 2006.
570.  Katzenstein P J., 2006, p 24.
571.  Report on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union 2004-2008.
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sure that violations of human rights do not happen but such a procedure 
has never taken place, even if human rights violations have been proven 
by the judgements of ECTHR. Such an approach is a result of the fact 
that the application of the ECHR is monitored by another European 
organization. These divisions of competences undermine the commitment 
to common values on which, according to Article 6 of the EU Treaty the 
Union is based. 
The report suggests strengthening the practical application of 
fundamental rights in the Union and taking human rights as the 
foundation and objective of all European policies. It welcomes 
establishment of a European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights572 
as a body that could be the first step in establishment of an integrated 
framework designed to put to effect the European Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. The report also underlines the importance of the 
perspective of the EU acceding to the ECHR.573 The Convention would 
become an integral part of the EU legal system. Such incorporation would 
allow for closer cooperation between the organizations and institutions.
The focus of the report, similarly to the focus of this dissertation 
concentrates on the credibility of Europe as a preacher of democratic 
values. The report emphasises that for the credibility in the world the EU 
should not practice double standards in external and internal policy. Such 
standards could be observed for instance on the example of reproductive 
rights, where consensus was reached as to the external policies but not 
internal. 
8.3. European identity?
These problems pose a question whether there actually is any “European 
identity”? Are there in fact any “common values” around which the European 
countries are integrated? The statistics show that European citizens identify 
themselves primarily with their own national identity. According to a 
Eurobarometer survey published in May 2008, 91% of the interviewees felt 
572.  Council Regulation No 168/2007.
573.  Such accession will take place if the Lisbon Treaty ratification process succeeds.
285
attachment to their nations and only 49% to the European Union.574
Creation of a “European identity” is a similar project to the creation 
of an “overlapping consensus”. The European states agreed to identify 
the political core of the conception of Europe. The problem is how to 
put this conception to life and create commitment of the member states 
and their citizens to the idea of Europe. European identity is parallel to 
the conception of common principles of political justice. The European 
identity is supposed to be the common core of values that binds 
Europeans in spite of their differences and national identities. At the 
moment, this construction appears empty.
Struggles for strengthening European identity can be observed 
not only through the initiatives of the COE analysed in this volume. 
An initiative of the former president of the European Commission, 
Romano Prodi aimed at discussion how to strengthen European 
identity. The final remarks of the Spiritual and Cultural dimension 
of Europe initiative included observations and recommendations for 
the process of creating European identity. The experts concluded that 
economic integration is incapable of substituting genuine values of a 
public polity. They also observed that European states and citizens must 
adapt themselves and their institutions so that they can be a basis for 
common identity. Otherwise any effort of codifying European values is 
confronted with “diverging national, regional, ethnic, sectarian, and social 
understandings”.575 Without common effort to understand European 
values as common values and not values replacing national, regional and 
other values any such codification effort is bound to meet difficulties. The 
Experts agreed also that in the process of creation of “European values” 
the role of religion is not to be overlooked. Whereas religion may be 
divisive, not conciliatory and religious institutions may possibly invade 
public sphere and be used as justification of ethnic conflicts, religion has 
also got the potential of unifying people. The Experts underlined that 
European identity and European values should not be constructed as an 
574.  Eurobarometer 68, May 2008.
575.  Reflection Group Initiated by the President of the European Commission 
and coordinated by the Institute for Human Sciences, The Spiritual and Cultural 
Dimension of Europe, Concluding Remarks, Vienna/Brussels, October 2004, p 8.
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opposition to any religious values, like Islam. Unfortunately, like seen on 
the example of the veil cases, such constructions are present not only in 
national laws but also in judgments of the ECTHR who influence the 
understanding of European values, identity and democracy.576
Creating “A Soul for Europe” is a challenge. Since the year 2004 the 
Berlin Conference “A Soul for Europe” has been concentrating on the 
social and cultural aspects of the struggle for European identity. The 
initiatives of the Conference have been concentrating among others 
around the roots, ideas and aims of the European development, the 
internal structure of Europe and Europe’s role in the world.577
Attempts of the codification of European values show how difficult 
the process of building the “European identity” is. The failure of the 
European Constitution project or subsequent Irish veto to the Lisbon 
Treaty picture the emptiness of the “European Soul”. Although both 
European Union and the Council of Europe have worked on the 
development of common European values, the existence of such values 
seems to be largely artificial at this moment. The creation of common 
European identity appears to be the greatest challenge of European 
integration. The activity of international courts, ECJ and ECTHR, 
in large degree affect and shape the understanding of European values 
and influence the process of forming the European identity. But as the 
Experts working on the spiritual dimension of Europe underlined, 
European solidarity and values cannot be achieved only by institutional 
imposition from above. The challenge is how to make Europeans as 
individuals feel committed to European values and identity. 
This study concentrated and commented on certain aspects of 
European relativism, double standardisation and lack of actual common 
values in approach to religious issues. In the discussion on the “European 
identity”, it is important to remember that religion is an essential part 
of identity. Approach towards religion impacts the approach toward 
common European values. Whether “European values” are constructed 
576.  See: Dahlab vs. Switzerland, Application no. 42393/98 and Sahin vs. Turkey, 
Application no. 44774/98 cases.
577.  A Soul for Europe, Brief Concept of the Initiative, Berliner Konferenz “A Soul 
for Europe”, 2008
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as values completing one’s identity or values opposed to one’s identity 
will in large degree determine of the future of the “European Soul”. 
Otherisation of some groups of Europeans due to their religion or lack 
of it will certainly not help in the process of building European values. 
As Bankowski observes, building European identity as “Fortress Europe”, 
keeps the other out of the European conception:
“In the name of this ‘fortress Europe’ that we are trying to create 
and the European identity that it entails, we also try and purify from 
within. We see those who are different in culture, religion and values 
as danger. We can see this in the growth of European chauvinisms 
and racism, and the problem of EU citizenship, asylum and migrant 
labour (…)”578
According to Bankowski, the desire to cure the worst excesses of 
nationalism has resulted in creation of European universalism that is 
affected by similar excesses. The Union replicates the ways in which 
smaller states act. It attempts to keep the alien out and secure the 
enjoyment of common Europe only to those who are “really” European579 
Neither forceful exclusion of “the other” nor identification of national 
values with particular religious values can help in the project of creating 
European identity. “European values” must be identified on the basis 
of the common core of values that Europeans agree upon. And since 
absolute agreement is never possible, this chosen set of European values 
must also allow for the maximally broad possible interpretation in 
accordance to one’s own culture or the possibility of legal pluralism. 
8.4. Can Rawlsian conception be the leading model for Europe 
in search of European identity and religious pluralism?
Finally, looking at the complicated European picture it is necessary to ask 
whether the democratic model presented here and based on the Rawlsian 
578.  Bankowski Z., 2004, p 45.
579.  Ibid., pp. 37-48.
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theory could be useful in the case of Europe. Although Rawls claimed 
that the model of an overlapping consensus as the foundation of public 
reason was utopian, I want to argue that it can be more than mere utopia 
in European conditions. Although ideal theoretical conceptions are never 
fully workable in reality, they are necessary to show us the boundaries 
of what is possible580. Just like the “common values” on which the EU is 
supposed to be based, they can be goals which the society as a political 
and legal construction aims to achieve. In order to prove that, I must 
argue that the initial step of the constitutional consensus has already been 
achieved in Europe and currently we are striving at the next step, which is 
the overlapping consensus. 
European countries, meaning here the countries belonging to the 
European Union, who are all at the same time members of the Council 
of Europe, have all agreed upon their internal constitutional agreements 
concerning the rules of regulating public political life, fair rules of 
representation, as well as their constitutional rights. Although, as in 
constitutional consensus, the borderlines of these rights, their content 
and mutual relations have been in dispute, European countries agreed 
for taking the next step forward. In the process of European integration 
European countries agreed to ignore the disputable differences between 
them and work for achieving common standard of basic rights as well 
as principles concerning common market. Moreover, this agreement has 
been not only expressed verbally, but also legally in form of the treaties 
and treaty obligations stating, among many other agreements, the 
following in regard to the European Union:
“The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, 
freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human 
rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These 
values are common to the Member States in a society in which 
pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and 
equality between women and men prevail.” 581
580.  See: Dworkin R., 2006.
581.  The version as repeated in the Treaty of Lisbon, 2007.
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Why this is more than just a constitutional consensus requires further 
explanation. While constitutional consensus is based on the principles 
of political fight and concentrates primarily on procedural aspects, the 
overlapping consensus goes further. The European approach takes into 
consideration the same aspects the overlapping consensus does. It creates 
a vision of a society, its structure and principles of justice. It expressly 
affirms the idea of citizens as free and equal and it creates an ideal of 
a well-ordered society bound by common political values. It is in fact a 
political construction, just as the construction of Rawlsian public reason, 
which is based on the overlapping consensus, not touching upon what is 
disputable but what is common and valued. These values are democracy, 
equality, rule of law and respect for human rights, which would fit into 
the Rawlsian concept of basic rights having the primacy in a well-ordered 
society. 
Concerning religion, the values affirmed by the European overlapping 
consensus are those of equality and freedom of conscience expressed 
in the European Convention for Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms and in Employment Equality Directive. In the documents 
that have recently been adopted to clarify the role of religion in the 
European society, the ideals of pluralism, equality and respect to all 
religions prevail582. These ideals follow the Rawlsian conceptions, too. 
The foundations of these European notions are based on the ideas 
that none of the religious or philosophical doctrines should use power 
to coerce citizens, directly or indirectly to follow rules or principles 
that their own comprehensive doctrine does not include. These ideals 
concerning religious pluralism and equality of doctrines as the primary 
European values in approach to the matters of conscience are nearly 
exact expressions of the Rawlsian reasonable pluralism. This is confirmed 
by condemnation and discouragement of fundamentalism, which also in 
Rawlsian understanding is considered as unreasonable583.
582.  See for example documents issued by the Council of Europe and its advisory 
bodies, such as: Recommendation 1396 (1999).
583.  See articles 13 and 17.7. of Recommendation 1805 (2007), which condemns such 
religious behaviours, which penalise in any way threatening life or integrity of persons, 
those who do not follow the values of this particular religion. 
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Europe has achieved a consensus as to the basic democratic principles, 
primacy of human rights and commitment to international law. In 
various recent documents European institutions have expressed more and 
more exact views concerning the position of religion584, which remind 
strongly Rawls’ conception. However, the practice of particular countries 
remains controversial and inconsistent with this approach. In fact some 
of those legal solutions resemble unreasonable pluralism in which certain 
doctrines force others to follow their conceptions of the good and the 
just while marginalising and “othering” of non-traditional religions. Such 
legal solutions in particular countries undermine the common approach 
and the very idea of equality in regards to freedom of conscience. In order 
to achieve the standard, which is currently envisioned in article 8 of the 
European Convention for Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms or 
in the Employment Equality Directive, Europe requires commitment to 
its own political conception. The foundations of both European Union 
and Council of Europe create the ideal of European political justice. 
In order to achieve this ideal and avoid inequality between particular 
comprehensive doctrines, European countries should avoid legal 
solutions granting either superior position, even if symbolical, to various 
doctrines identified with particular national traditions, or legal constructs 
sanctioning religious offences, like blasphemy, by law. These rights and 
principles that Europe has agreed to adhere to should be enjoyed by all 
persons in Europe equally. Rawls reminds that:
“When political liberalism speaks of reasonable overlapping consensus 
of comprehensive doctrines, it means that of these doctrines, both 
religious and nonreligious, support a political conception of justice 
underwriting a constitutional democratic society whose principles, 
ideals and standards satisfy the criterion of reciprocity. Thus all 
reasonable doctrines affirm such a society with its corresponding 
political institutions: equal basic rights and liberties for all citizens, 
including liberty of conscience and freedom of religion.”
584.  See the previously mentioned recommendations issued by the Council of 
Europe’s advisory bodies.
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If countries representing doctrines, which used to be and are traditionally 
associated with national values or identities, do not re-evaluate their 
policies leading to religious otherisation, they will continue to represent 
the “unreasonable doctrine”. In order to achieve the ideal and indeed 
influence change towards greater religious pluralism, equality and 
tolerance, commitment to these values is necessary. Without commitment 
on national level, the argument of relativism of European approach is 
bound to reappear in religious struggles. Discouraging certain religious 
conceptions, such as Islam, is bound to meet the appeals of that doctrine’s 
adherents for equality of religions. And such arguments are difficult to 
dismiss in a credible manner when Christian religious traditions of some 
countries sustain formal or practical superiority.
8.5. Religious pluralism as a new  
challenging common principle
The appearance of multiculturalism has challenged European approaches 
to religion585. It confronted the European chaos of multiple and parallel 
conflicting standards. The democratic discourse had to face the reality 
of new religions and new cultures arriving to Europe. It also was forced 
to face the internal migration. The dynamics of cultural exchange have 
intensified. 
These changes have influenced the understanding of religious equality. 
The analysed recommendations and changing attitude of ECTHR 
embraced more decidedly the principles of religious pluralism. The 
judgements in the case of Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas vs. 
Austria or Hasan and Eylem Zengin vs. Turkey vs. Turkey have emphasised 
the nature of European society as religiously plural society. 
This relatively new principle poses a considerable challenge in 
European conditions. Without common commitment to European 
values, the principle of pluralism and equality is bound to be applied 
selectively. It is important that the model of European democracy adjusts 
to the conditions of religious pluralism. Like shown in this volume, such 
585 See more, e.g.: Knippenberg H., 2005.
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adjustment is likely possible. However, it is even more important that 
commitment to common principles is reached first. Without coherence 
in application of democratic principles and rights, Europe is bound to be 
plagued by guilty conscience of double standardisation and emptiness of 
the European “soul”. 
8.6. What kind of Europe do we want?
Paraphrasing the title of Ward’s article, Europe is still in search of its 
meaning and purpose. The potential for fragmentation is still large, 
even though new initiatives aiming at strengthening commitment and 
unification of approach to fundamental values have recently emerged. The 
question, however, remains the same: What kind of Europe do we want? 
And in which direction will the European integration go from this point? 
These questions naturally relate primarily to the European Union and its 
future. Success or failure of the ratification process of the Lisbon Treaty will 
have a decisive impact on this future direction of European integration.586 
If the Treaty is ratified and the amendments enter to force, it will mark the 
beginning of the new era in European integration. This era will have as its 
goal, among others an increased commitment to basic values and principles 
of equality. It will also gradually lead to the ideal of “common Europe” as a 
legal and political pan-European entity. If this construction is accepted and 
develops, Europe indeed may gradually move closer to a federal European 
state more than federation of European states.
However, if Europe does not find its common identity and the 
processes designed by the Lisbon Treaties do not take place; European 
Union will remain a forum of disagreeing countries pursuing their own 
national goals rather than common European principles. With the 
enlarged number of 27 members, the decision making processes will 
be increasingly more and more difficult and achievement of European 
consensus in matters of vital importance will be as hindered as they are 
today.
586.  See: e.g. Nuotio K., Lissabonin sopimus parantaisi yksilön oikeuksia unionissa, 
Helsingin Sanomat, 25.09.2009
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The issue of religions may have a decisive impact on the direction that 
Europe will choose. The fear of new religions and new values, which are 
currently present in the European legal and political spheres, may catalyse 
the renewal process. Fear of the religious “other” may unify Europe 
around the core of its common values and prepare it for taking the next 
step in internal integration. And paradoxically, this fear may also catalyse 
changes towards greater coherence and commitment to the common 




The analysis conducted in this volume shows that approach to issues 
of religion in Europe is diverse and incoherent. Starting from defining 
religion and ending at approach to religious education everything seems 
to be problematic in regard to religious issues in Europe. New efforts of 
European organs attempt to intensify commitment to values of religious 
equality and pluralism and call for higher tolerance and broadmindedness. 
Despite these efforts, however, commitment of European countries to 
common principles is not uniform. The multiplicity of norms, on various 
levels, affect the status quo. Some countries, like Sweden or Norway, 
strive to facilitate religious pluralism. Some others, like Greece, Poland 
or Malta, protect their traditional religions as national values. In other 
countries, while the law seems to promote equality between religions 
and religious pluralism on the surface, the effect of the law leads to 
“otherisation” of religious adherents different than those traditionally 
protected. Sometimes, the otherisation is only symbolic, like in the case 
of the majority of the states maintaining church state. “Otherisation”, 
however, occurs also in the case of extreme separation between church 
and state, like shown on the French example. “Otherisation” of the 
Muslim populations appears to be the strongest and happens not only in 
the European countries, but has been also expressed in judgements of the 
ECTHR, such as Dahlab or Sahin. Symbols such as the veil are contrasted 
with the values of European democracy and treated as undemocratic. 
The lack of coherence and difficulties of commitment to common 
European values, leave the discussion on the model of democracy 
extremely difficult. However, if the principles of equality of religions and 
religious pluralism are taken as the foundation for democratic model 
for Europe, the model of reasonable consensus appears to be a plausible 
solution for religious problems of Europe. In the era of multiculturalism 
and growing religious pluralism, traditional model of reasonable 
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consensus can be adjusted to demands of those who identify themselves 
with their religious community rather than with the secular democratic 
standard. Careful study on the possibilities of legal pluralism is essential, 
in order to find the possible margin of adjustment.
Ultimately, however, it will be the commitment of European countries 
and citizens to the common principles of European democracy that 
will determine what kind of religious landscape in Europe will emerge 
in the years to come. Whether it will be Europe torn in violent religious 
conflicts and constantly fearing the “other” or Europe striving for greater 
inclusion and understanding between adherents of various religions and 
non-believers depends in large degree on each of the European countries 
and their citizens. The future of European institutions and the EU will 
also have an impact on religious issues. If the Union is reformed, it 
will increase the possibility of greater coherence. However, if the states 
continue to see the EU as well as the COE as impostor of external values, 
rather than institutions creating common set of values, changes are 
unlikely to occur. Religious issues, just like other social issues in Europe, 
will in large degree depend on the success or failure of “giving soul to 
Europe”. And in this process taking European common legal principles 
as the lens through which the laws and approaches, both on national and 
European level are analysed is not only an exercise for theoretical legal 
researchers. In my conclusions, I agree with Thorson Plesner’s dissertation 
conclusions that legal principles matter for the protection of religious 
freedom of each individual. However, only coherent application of these 
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